To forge a new kind of relationship with India under which their economic, political and strategic interests would remain secure, the British imperialists felt the efficacy of negotiations with Indian leaders. Election had been the first step, negotiations were another. These were intended to sow illusions among the people and lull them into passivity. These would also encourage communalism to gather strength and disrupt the anti-imperialist solidarity of the people.
The Congress leaders also were keen on a quick negotiated settlement to stave off anti-imperialist struggle. Nehru emphasized again and again that any delay on the part of the British to arrive at a compromise with the Congress would be disastrous for both imperialism and India. In his letter of 27 January 1946 to Cripps, he wrote: "Elections have somewhat held people in check but as soon as these are over, events of their own motion, will march swiftly.... What happened in Calcutta two months ago and what is happening in Bombay now are significant signs of the fires below the surface. A single spark lights them." He said that any delay on the part of the British to take the initiative "might well lead to disastrous consequences". He pleaded that if the raj opened "a way out to independence in the near future with recognition of it and an approach to it now...then it may be possible to control the situation in India and proceed peacefully and co-operatively". He assured Cripps that the gulf between India and imperial Britain, which "has never been so wide", could perhaps "be bridged even now with a great effort" and that he worked "to that end".(66)
To check the deluge of revolutionary struggles, a veritable deluge of "interesting negotiations about the future" was released. A British parliamentary delegation toured India in January 1946. Almost close on its heels came the Cabinet Mission, which had as its members Secretary of State Pethick-Lawrence, Cripps and A.V. Alexander. Before it arrived in late March, "India, in the opinion of many", as P.J. Griffiths, the leader of the European group in the Central Assembly, said, "was on the verge of revolution.... The Cabinet Mission has at least postponed, if not eliminated, the danger."(67) When the Mission met the Viceroy's Executive Council, Edward Benthall said on behalf of it that
"the Council was unanimous that a change of Government at the Centre was imperative.... It [the Council's lack of confidence] is due to the uncertainty of Indian troops and police to whom they must look for defence and support in the future."(68)
The British imperialists regarded India as "the essential linchpin in the structure of the Commonwealth". When the Indian troops and police became unreliable, their aim was to transfer power to "friendly hands" -- political representatives of the classes which had a symbiotic relationship with British capital and which could be trusted to preserve and further their interests -- and to enmesh the new state or states in a net of Commonwealth ties.(69) The British Chiefs of Staff and the G.H.Q. (General Headquarters), India, held that "from the military point of view, it was as nearly vital as anything can be to ensure that India remains within the Commonwealth". The (India) Chiefs of Staff Committee repeatedly emphasized that
"From the military point of view, and on the grounds of our future strategy and the security of the British Commonwealth, our aim must be to retain India constitutionally within the British Commonwealth of Nations, and to direct all our endeavour towards persuading her to this end."(70)
A paper, prepared under Wavell's instructions "on the effect which the transfer of power in India would have on the Strategy, Economics, and Prestige of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth", pointed out that the transfer of power "to a stable and friendly Government" would "bring advantage and not loss" to Britain from all those considerations, if a defensive alliance was formed. The Chiefs of Staff Committee held that no formal defensive alliance was necessary, if India remained within the Commonwealth.(71)
Though the British had encouraged the idea of Pakistan previously as a counterpoise to Congress claims, they were in favour of a united India and no partition of its defence forces from about 1943 or 1944. As Ayesha Jalal observes, "Congress imperatives were coming neatly to dovetail with London's priorities since a strong unitary government was the best way of assuring British economic and strategic interests in South Asia."(72)
Wavell told the Central Assembly in February 1944 that the "geographical unity" of India was central to its post-war constitution and argued with Jinnah that the unity of India ought to be maintained at least for security and economic reasons. Auchinleck stated:
"If we desire to maintain our powers freely by sea and air in the Indian Ocean area, which I consider essential to the continued existence of the British Commonwealth, we can do so only by keeping in being a United India which will be a willing member of that Commonwealth, ready to share in its defence to the limit of her resources."(73)
The paper on the results to the British Commonwealth of the transfer of power in India, to which we have already referred, also said that "Great Britain should not lose, but, on the contrary, may gain in prestige and even in power, by handing over to Indians, provided that...Power can be transferred in an orderly manner to a friendly and united India..."
Even on 18 March 1947, when the Cabinet Mission plan envisaging a united India had foundered on the question of the grouping of provinces, Prime Minister Attlee emphasized in his directive to Viceroy-designate Lord Mountbatten that it was "the definite objective of His Majesty's Government to obtain a unitary Government for British India and the Indian States, if possible within the British Commonwealth.... In the first place you will impress upon the Indian leaders the great importance of avoiding any breach in the continuity of the Indian Army and of maintaining the organization of defence on an all India basis. Secondly you will point out the need for continued collaboration in the security of the Indian Ocean area..."(74)
The Cabinet Mission spent more than three months in India negotiating with Indian leaders for an agreed solution of the constitutional problem, but no solution could be arrived at. If there were only two parties -- British imperialism and the Congress -- there would have been little difficulty or delay in reaching a compromise. But there was a third party -- the Muslim League; and the real conflict was between the Congress and the League and not between either of these parties and British imperialism.
Gandhi told the cabinet delegation on 3 April that he stood by the Rajagopalachari formula on the basis of which India could be partitioned and Jinnah could have Pakistan. Earlier, in March, he told Abell, the Viceroy's private secretary, that he was prepared to accept partition.(75)
In a statement issued on 15 April, Congress president Azad pointed out that the Congress wanted future India to be a federation composed of fully autonomous units with residuary powers vested in them. According to the Congress scheme, there would be two lists of federal subjects, one compulsory and the other optional. Jinnah told the delegation and Wavell that the principle of Pakistan should be accepted. He was prepared to settle for a Pakistan comprising five provinces -- Punjab, Sind, the NWFP, Baluchistan and Bengal. Common arrangements could be made for defence, foreign policy and communications through treaties and agreements between the two states after their formation.(76)
The vicious `war of succession' that raged was fought not over the issue of Pakistan but over the `content' of Pakistan. As Wavell put it,
"The real issue between Congress and the League is not repeat not that of self-determination for Muslim-majority provinces, but whether, and if so how, Bengal and Punjab should in the last resort be partitioned."(77)
Early in May the cabinet delegation convened a conference at Simla to thrash out an agreement. They suggested a three-tier constitutional structure -- a common Union centre to administer the minimum subjects of defence, foreign affairs and communications; two sub-federations or groups, one predominantly Hindu, comprising provinces which would be willing to concede optional subjects to the centre, and the other comprising Muslim provinces and areas which would concede only compulsory subjects; and autonomous provinces enjoying residuary powers vested in them.
The Congress leaders insisted on a "strong and organic Federal Union" and on a constituent assembly having "perfect freedom to draw up its constitutions with certain reservations to protect the rights of minorities". They claimed that "the Federal Union must have power to raise revenues in its own right"; that currency and customs as well as other subjects like planning must be included in the Union subjects; and that the Union must have powers to "take remedial action in cases of breakdown of the constitution and in grave public emergencies". They were after a strong centre though Nehru had been telling the public that "the common subjects...would be very minimum in number such as defence and foreign affairs".(78)
Jinnah agreed to a United India provided the Congress accepted the sub-federation or groups. The League also proposed that "Each Province will have the power to opt out of the Group after the constitution for the group has been framed".(79)
The Congress leaders refused to accept sub-federations. To Gandhi, the proposed three-tier solution was "worse than Pakistan". He affirmed that the British "must adopt entirely the Congress point of view if we thought it just, or Jinnah's point of view if we thought it juster; but there was no half-way house. Gandhi seemed quite unmoved at the prospect of civil war..."(80)
When Wavell saw Patel on 8 May, Patel was "uncompromisingly hostile to any settlement except on the basis of complete Hindu supremacy; and said that they were bound to have it out with the Muslims sooner or later, and that it was better to have a conflict now and get it over".
As the Secretary of State said, the "vital points...actually boiled down to the basic question whether there should be a strong centre or a weak centre with two sub-federations..."(81)
After the failure of the Simla Conference, the delegation and Wavell produced their own plan, known as the Cabinet Mission Plan, on 16 May. It argued against the Muslim League demand for a separate sovereign Pakistan and pointed out that "a radical partition of the Punjab and Bengal, as this would do, would be contrary to the wishes and interests of a very large proportion of the inhabitants of these Provinces". It said: "Bengal and the Punjab each has its own common language and a long history and tradition." Besides, the partition of Punjab would be harmful to the interests of the Sikhs who were spread over the whole of the province. The scheme the delegation recommended for India comprising both `British India' and the native states was a three-tier one -- a Union centre dealing with foreign affairs, defence and communications and with powers to raise the necessary finances and equipped with an Executive and a Legislature; three groups of provinces (or sub-federations) with their own executives and legislatures -- one including all Hindu-majority provinces, another comprising Punjab, Sind, the NWFP and Baluchistan and the third one consisting of Bengal and Assam; and the provinces vested with all other subjects and with residuary powers. British paramountcy over the native states would lapse and there should be negotiations between them and the rest of India for their inclusion in the Indian Union.
The three groups of provinces would frame constitutions for the provinces included in them and decide whether to have group constitutions. A province would be free to opt out of a particular group after the first general election under the new constitution.
The constituent assembly to draw up the constitution for India would be formed not through election on the basis of adult suffrage but by single, transferable votes of the members of the existing provincial legislatures (formed under the Government of India Act 1935), Muslim members and non-Muslim members voting separately. Each province would be allotted seats in the constituent assembly "proportional to their population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million". On the demand of the legislature of a province, the constitutions of the Union and of the Groups would be reconsidered "after an initial period of 10 years and at 10-yearly intervals thereafter".
The delegation's statement said that the Viceroy was taking the initiative to form an interim government all members of which, except the Viceroy, would be Indians enjoying the support of the major political parties.
The statement concluded with the hope that "the new Independent India may choose to be a member of the British Commonwealth".(82)
In the meantime the Congress leaders mounted pressure for the immediate formation of an Interim Government responsible to the elected members of the Central Assembly, that is, ultimately to the Congress high command. As early as 1 March 1946, Gandhi's emissary, Sudhir Ghosh, conveyed to Major Woodrow Wyatt the opinion of Gandhi and Rajendra Prasad that
"the only possible solution was for the British Government to hand over power to the majority in India and to rely on it to find a way of coming to terms with the Muslims and other minorities. This would have to be done by the use of force, or in other words, the combined might of the British and Indian majority, as represented by Congress, would be able to keep the joint forces of the Muslim League and the Communists in order."(83)
Gandhi spoke repeatedly in a similar vein. He expressed the view that "there may well have to be a blood bath in India before her problems are solved".(84)
The Congress leaders opposed the grouping of provinces on the plea that this feature deprived the provinces of their autonomy and was detrimental to the interests of the Sikhs. They insisted that the proposed constituent assembly should be "a sovereign body" which would have powers to change the recommendations and procedure suggested by the Cabinet Mission and "decide as it chooses in regard to any matter before it and can give effect to its decision". They urged withdrawal of the British troops the moment the interim government was formed and insisted on disallowing European members of provincial assemblies to vote in the elections to the constituent assembly or offer themselves as candidates.(85) This was the first time after the Communal Award had been announced in 1932 that they came out in sharp denunciation of the fantastic over-representation of the Europeans in the Bengal and Assam assemblies.
The delegation clarified that the grouping of provinces was "an essential feature of the scheme, which can only be modified by agreement between the two parties"; that the scheme could be changed by the constituent assembly only if a majority of members of each of the two parties agreed to do so; and that "independence [and the withdrawal of British troops] must follow and not precede the coming into operation of the new Constitution".(86)
The Congress Working Committee's resolution of 24 May asserted that "India must necessarily have a strong central authority", interpreted the Cabinet Mission statement to mean that it was not compulsory but optional for provinces to form groups, and insisted that the "Provisional National Government" must function in the interim period with full independence and as a cabinet responsible to the Central Legislature". "In the absence of a full picture", the Congress Working Committee reserved its final opinion on the Mission's scheme.
The Council of the All India Muslim League, while resenting the Mission's arguments for rejection of a sovereign Pakistan, considered the compulsory grouping of six provinces in Section B and C "as the basis and foundation of Pakistan", accepted the Cabinet Mission scheme and authorized its president to negotiate on the interim government issue and take appropriate decisions.(87)
At a meeting of the Cabinet Mission and Wavell with Nehru and Azad, Nehru was categorical that the Congress was resolved "to work for a strong Centre and to break the Group system" and that "they would succeed". He affirmed that "They did not think that Mr Jinnah had any real place in the country".(88) The attitude reflected in the statement was an invitation to civil war and partition of India on religious lines, for Jinnah was then, thanks mainly to Congress policies, the unquestioned leader of the overwhelming majority of the Muslims.
Meeting on 25 June the Congress Working Committee adopted a resolution claiming to accept the Cabinet Mission plan but putting its own interpretation on it. While rejecting the grouping system, which, according to the Mission and Wavell, was "an essential feature of the scheme", "the whole crux of the plan",(89) the Committee played the provincial autonomy and Sikh cards with a vengeance. Ironically, it was their refusal to agree to provincial autonomy within an India with a weak centre, that had raised the spectre of Pakistan, and it was their long-term policy to concentrate all powers at the centre denying provincial autonomy and suppressing the aspirations of the different nationalities. To woo the Sikhs when the `war of succession' was bitter and when they needed them most, (90) Nehru said:
"I want not only provincial autonomy, but if necessary, within the provinces, smaller semi-autonomous areas. Take the Sikhs for instance. If they desire to function as a separate unit, I should like them to have a semi-autonomous area within the province, so that they may have a sense of freedom."(91)
In reply to a query from Mountbatten about the importance of the Sikhs and Assam to the Congress V.P. Menon wrote to the Viceroy's private secretary Abell:
"The support of the Sikhs is a matter of paramount importance to the Congress.... Apart from other considerations, if the Congress loses the support of the Sikh community, Hindus in the Punjab will by themselves not be able to stand up to the Muslims, much less to a possible combination of Sikhs and Muslims."(91a)
It is worth noting that while Nehru played the communal card at this stage by making a separate appeal on the basis of religion to the Sikhs, the same Nehru later bitterly opposed even the formation of a Punjabi-speaking state within the Indian Union.
While professing to accept the Mission's scheme with reservations, the Congress leaders torpedoed it. Succeeding Azad as Congress president, Nehru declared at the AICC meeting on 7 July that "it is not a question of our accepting any plan... We are not bound by a single thing except that we have decided for the moment to go to the constituent assembly." He affirmed that the centre's powers would not be confined to foreign affairs, defence and communications but would extend to all subjects linked with these. He told the press on 10 July that after elections to the constituent assembly, the Congress would be "entirely and absolutely free to determine" what they did there. While repeating that the centre would have very wide powers in the economic sphere, he asserted that the centre would have "over-all power to intervene" in the affairs of provinces or states "in grave crisis, such as a breakdown of the administration, or an economic breakdown or a famine".(92)
Thus the last chance for India not being dismembered by communal considerations vanished. Nehru was not so naive as to be unable to anticipate what would follow these declarations.
The Congress leaders talked of a sovereign constituent assembly but the proposed constituent assembly would emerge not after seizure of power by the Congress but through a compromise agreement between three parties and would be convened by the raj. The plan would fall through if its very basis was rejected. These declarations were actually an invitation to civil war. The fact is, the Congress leaders preferred a divided India with a strong centre to an undivided India with a weak centre. More of it later. Nehru's declarations proposed to do away with much of the provincial automomy by which the Congress had begun to swear in order to oppose the grouping system. As Ayesha Jalal writes, the Muslim politicians were afraid that their "freedom of action in their provincial domains" was intended to be restricted and "For the League's business supporters this meant the supremacy of the Tatas, the Birlas and the Dalmias in the competitive wilds of an independent India".(93) Meeting on 29 July, the Council of the AIML withdrew its acceptance of the Mission's 16 May statement. To achieve its goal of Pakistan, it resolved to launch direct action.
Before the League decided on direct action, Jinnah had made a last minute attempt to avoid it and reach a peaceful settlement. In a "strictly private, personal and confidential" letter of 6 July to Attlee, Jinnah complained that the Congress was out to wreck the Cabinet Mission plan, though claiming to have accepted it. He warned that, if the British government surrendered to the Congress, "Its consequence, I need not say, will be most disastrous and a peaceful settlement will then become impossible". Attlee's reply of 23 July to Jinnah's letter was evasive. In a leading editorial on 17 July, the League's mouthpiece Dawn wrote that if the British government "restate that there shall be no departure from the fundamental basis of that [the Mission's] Statement, Moslems would still be willing to play their part honourably and peacefully, provided that such a restatement by the British Government is logically followed up by action in respect of setting up an Interim Government also".(94)
The seemingly endless negotiations and the brave declarations of the leaders were having an insidious effect on the people, much to the satisfaction of the raj and the Indian reactionaries. "Amidst these `summit talks'", wrote Michael Brecher, "the poison of communalism penetrated deeper into the body politic of India."(95)
Calcutta, the port-city, which was a bone of contention between the big Marwari compradors and their up-country Muslim counterparts, became not surprisingly the first scene of a communal flare-up. The Calcutta City Muslim League was controlled by the Ispahanis and the Siddiqis. They had been preaching jehad against the Hindus for some days.(96) 16 August had been declared the `Direct Action Day' by the League. The communal riots which began on 16 August raged for some days in the city and resulted in the most barbarous killing of 5,000 persons and injuries to many more and rendered homeless about one hundred thousand. Bengal's Premier Suhrawardy helped initially to stoke the communal fire, and British military officers did precious little to stop the carnage at the first stage for fear that people might turn anti-British.(97)
Later, on 24 January 1947, when communal holocausts had spread, the director of the Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, noted for the benefit of the policy-makers:
"The game so far has been well played, in that (a) both Congress and the League have been brought into the Central Government; (b) the Indian problem has been thereby thrust into its appropriate plane of communalism;...Grave Communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reproduce anti-British agitation."(98)
The `Great Calcutta Killing' and the prospect of more to follow had no sobering effect on the leaders. As Wavell wrote, "It is appalling with what irresponsibility and lightness many of them seem to regard prospects of renewed disturbances or civil war." On 27 August Nazimuddin, a member of the League Working Committee, told Wavell "that an unequivocal statement by Congress that Provinces could not opt out of the Group except as laid down in [the] Statement of May 16th might cause League to reconsider [the] Bombay resolution [of 29 July]" or if Wavell or HMG "stated plainly" their "intention not to permit Congress to put any other interpretations on grouping except that meant by Mission".(99)
When Wavell proposed to Gandhi and Nehru that the Congress should make a categorical statement "that the Provinces must remain in the sections, as intended by the Mission, until after the first elections under the new Constitution", "Gandhi said that if a blood-bath was necessary, it would come about in spite of non-violence". He spoke in the same vein many times during this period. With all his faith in non-violence Gandhi seemed prepared for and repeatedly spoke of "a blood bath", a savage communal war, the killing of "a few lakhs", "grievous loss of life...on an unprecedented scale".(100)