It has been noted that the partition of India was the voluntary choice of the Congress leaders, that they preferred a divided India with a strong centre to an undivided India with a weak centre.
The Marwari, Gujarati and Parsi big bourgeois wanted a strong centre, for only a strong centre could enable them to realize their ambitions. They wished to prevent by using the state machinery the emergence of competitors from different national regions and aspired to become a zonal power in the Indian Ocean region.
The end of the war saw in Asia the defeat of Japan, the decline in the power and prestige of the old imperialist powers like France and the Netherlands and the prospect of a bitter civil war in China. This whetted the appetite of the Indian big bourgeoisie. While Patel was their most trusted man, Nehru gave voice to their aspirations. While detained in the Ahmednagar Fort, Nehru was emphatic that the small nation state "can have no independent existence", that "The days of small nations are over". In August 1945 he affirmed:
"I stand for a south Asia federation of India, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Burma.... In the world of today there are two big powers, Russia and America. In the world of tomorrow there will be two more, India and China -- there will be no fifth."
In January 1946 he asserted that "India is likely to dominate politically and economically the Indian Ocean region". Addressing army officers in October 1946, he said:
"India is today [when India was still a British colony] among the four great powers of the world, other three being America, Russia and China. But in point of resources India has a greater potential than China."
It became the theme of his many speeches and statements in 1945 and after that India was "bound to emerge as one of the greatest powers of the world". According to him, "Some form of a common organization [for countries from the Middle East to South-East Asia] dealing with defence, trade and possibly other subjects seems to be an inevitable development." He held that
"in the modern world it is inevitable for India to be the centre of things in Asia. (In that term, I would include Australia and New Zealand too, being in the Indian Ocean region. East Africa comes into it also).... India is going to be the centre of a very big federation."(174)
As regards Pakistan, the Congress leaders were sure that Pakistan would not prove viable and come back to them.(175) Nehru considered Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) to be "really part of India" and wanted her to be included within the Indian federation. Nepal too, according to Nehru, was "certainly a part of India", though an independent country and, as Chester Bowles, Nehru's friend and US ambassador to India for two terms, said: "So India has done on a small scale in Nepal what we have done on a far broader scale on two continents."(176)
Patel shared Nehru's hopes and aspirations and said: "Let India be strong and be able to assume the leadership of Asia, which is its right." And it was Gandhi's fond wish that Hindustani might "become the language of the whole of Asia".(177)
George Laithwaite, then Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Burma, referred in a note to "the somewhat `imperialistic' attitude which it will not be surprising to see India take in the field of foreign policy, at any rate so long as Nehru is head of the Government. Her whole inclination will be to endeavour to establish her hegemony in the Indian Ocean area..."(178)
What India under Nehru hoped to play was not an imperialist role but the role of a sub-exploiter -- an intermediate role between the imperialist metropolises and countries in Asia weaker and less developed than India. The Indian big bourgeoisie had been accustomed to playing the role of a sub-exploiter in the British colonies of Burma, Malaya, Sri Lanka and in East Africa. The end of World War II made them see visions of greener pastures in the whole of Asia except China and Japan.
How could India "dominate politically and economically the Indian Ocean region" when she was one of the most impoverished countries, woefully lacking in economic and military strength? The Indian big bourgeoisie sought to play worthily the role of a zonal power under the umbrella of the Anglo-American powers. Earlier, in January 1942, Nehru declared:
"Either under America or Europe a world order would be established which would include Britain, Russia, China and a free India. This would be a proper order."
Again, he wrote echoing American imperialists:
"The next hundred years, it has been said, are going to be the century of America. America is undoubtedly going to play a very important role in the years and generations to come."
Early in April 1942, as noted before, Nehru told Colonel Louis Johnson, then President Roosevelt's Personal Representative in India, that India wanted to hitch her wagon to America's star, not Britain's.
Later, Nehru modified his view and asserted:
"We shall seek to build anew our relations with England on a friendly and co-operative basis, forgetting the past".(179)
The Indian big bourgeoisie and their political frontmen expected Britain and the U.S.A. to equip them economically and arm them militarily so that they could become a zonal power under the aegis of the Anglo-American powers. K.M. Munshi wrote:
"Russia is within a striking distance of India. South-East Asia is in a ferment. Turkey, Iraq and Iran are menaced by Russia.... A vital bond...links us to England.... Before the next trouble starts a National Government in India, fully equipped and assisted by Britain, must emerge as a self-controlled unit of international strength."
In a lengthy note dated 13 March 1947 addressed to Viceroy-designate Mountbatten, Krishna Menon, Nehru's confidant, who was then serving as an unofficial intermediary between Nehru and the British rulers, proposed as "the basis of Indo-British relations":
"(a) Reciprocity of citizenship.(b) Agreements with regard to mutually suitable arrangements...
(c) Long-term treaty of alliance..."
During the first interview on 24 March 1947 between Viceroy Mountbatten and Nehru, the latter "said, they did not want to break any threads, and he suggested `some form of common nationality'".(180)
Interestingly, a book entitled The Basis of an Indo-British Treaty, written by K.M. Panikkar, who was then Prime Minister of the native state of Bikaner and later India's ambassador to China and other countries, was published in June 1946 jointly by the Indian Council of World Affairs (the same body which invited an Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in March 1946) and the Oxford University Press. It pleaded for the conclusion of an Indo-British treaty and the formation of a "maritime State System" extending from Britain to Indonesia. It held that as India would be "one of the pivotal areas", it was Britain's interest to see that India was "strong, well-organized, industrially advanced". One of "the finest fruits of the alliance" would be "an Indo-British Monroe Doctrine for the Indian Ocean Region". "The future organization of relationship between England and India", wrote Panikkar, "will be the first and important step towards the creation of a new Commonwealth, the fourth British Empire..."
Nehru also wanted to invoke an Asian Monroe doctrine.
Later, on 6 May 1949, G.D. Birla wrote to Sardar Patel, then India's Deputy Prime Minister:
"I talked to him [Anthony Eden] about the need of building up a strong India militarily as well as industrially and to that end the U.K. should co-operate with us. He said he would talk to (Lord) Alexander about military equipment, and about industries to City men. Now that India was in the Commonwealth, he said that they would all co-operate."(181)
The following from the written evidence of the Engineering Association of India before the Fiscal Commission 1949-50 is also illuminating:
"...industrially-advanced countries like U.S.A. and U.K. should undertake the obligation of making India industrially great. The exigencies of the situation in South-East Asia require it" and demand "that India should be made strong in order that she may act as a bulwark against the rising tide of Communism in this part of the globe."
On his return to India after attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in May 1949, where India's membership of the British Commonwealth was formally accepted, Nehru declared:
"We join the Commonwealth obviously because we think it is beneficial to us and to certain causes in the world that we wish to advance."(182)
What socialist causes did Nehru seek to advance together with Britain, Canada, Australia and South Africa?
So the Indian big bourgeoisie and the Nehrus became enamoured of the virtues of the British Commonwealth and at the same time longed to hitch their wagon to the star of U.S. monopoly capital.
One may note that the `socialist' Nehru was greatly upset when, immediately on his release from prison in September 1945 Sarat Chandra Bose at interviews to press correspondents including a correspondent of Blitz (Bombay) and at public meetings lashed out at Chiang Kai-shek as "Arch-Fascist tyrant of China", who "exterminated millions of his countrymen" with the financial and other help of foreign powers and who, but for Mao Tsetung, "would never have fought the Japs". He also acclaimed Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Communists for coercing Chiang to fight Japan and regretted that "our internationalists" lionized Chiang and never mentioned one word about Mao "the great man and his band of workers".(182a) Nehru, while extolling Chiang and his wife and paying his homage to them, issued statements to the press condemning Bose for his "extraordinarily unfair and unwise and totally uncalled for" statements. He continued to pay his tribute to Chiang, "the illustrious leader of China", and did not think "that even in the midst of civil war there is any person who challenges the right of the Generalissimo to be the leader of China" -- "the only possible leader in the present circumstances who can lead China out of chaos".(182b)
Not without reason New York Times wrote in October 1949 after the flight of Chiang to Taiwan and after the U.S. loss of China:
"Washington's hopes for a democratic rallying point in Asia have been pinned on India, the second biggest Asiatic nation, and on the man who determines India's policy -- Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru" -- the hoped for "counterweight to Mao Tsetung".(182c)
While the Indian big bourgeoisie sought internally to suppress the different nations and nationalities of India, externally they aspired to extend their sway as a junior partner of Anglo-American imperialist powers over neighbouring countries, especially in South and South-East Asia. And a strong centre was deemed indispensable for fulfilling their aspirations.
The partition of India on communal lines was due to several causes. But it was the `great power' syndrome, which demanded a strong, unitary government and which was bent on curbing the forces of genuine nationalism, that was the main cause of this unnatural division of India.
India became a British dominion under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, which was passed by British Parliament in July at record speed and without division. Churchill, whom Roosevelt had called "an unreconstructed Tory", "the last of the Victorians", kept the promise he had given Mountbatten in May that if Mountbatten "could achieve Dominion status for both Hindustan and Pakistan, the whole country would be behind them" and "the Conservative Party would help to rush the legislation through".(183) While it was hailed by Congress and League leaders, Attlee declared during the passage of the bill that it was "not the abdication but the fulfilment of Britain's mission in India, a sign of strength, and the vitality of the British Commonwealth". Field Marshal Smuts, then Prime Minister of South Africa, said: "This does not look like quitting." The American reaction to the acceptance of the Mountbatten Plan had been "especially enthusiastic". Expressing the feelings of the Congress leaders, Gandhi described the British withdrawal as "the noblest act of the British nation".(184)
Campbell-Johnson correctly pointed out that dominion status "made possible the maximum administrative and constitutional continuity, on the basis of the great India Act of 1935". And as he said, some two hundred and fifty of the clauses of this `great' Act became part of the constitution of post-colonial India.(185)
As the social order remained almost the same as before, so did the administrative structure. The bureaucracy, the police and the army, the judiciary, etc., of the colonial era continued with minor changes. The same laws too prevailed; only the repressive laws were given more teeth and the coercive apparatus has been strengthened with the passing of years as para-military forces have proliferated. British capital received ample assurances that it would be encouraged to thrive in India.
At the invitation of the Congress leaders, Mountbatten, the last British Viceroy, became the head of the new Indian state. Nehru and Patel "wanted him to stay on as long as he would". Hodson writes:
"By a strange paradox Lord Mountbatten as constitutional governor-general of independent India exercised more direct executive authority in certain spheres than he had enjoyed as autocratic viceroy."
Nehru and his colleagues sought Mountbatten's advice about the composition of the cabinet for post-colonial India, "tore up the list of the Cabinet" they had prepared and changed four members of the old list.(186)
Invited by the Congress, two British governors for the largest two provinces -- Bombay and Madras -- and two other governors of the period of direct British rule remained. In Pakistan the governors of all the provinces except Sind were British after the transfer of power. As in Pakistan so in India, British military officers became heads of three defence services. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army, Claude Auchinleck, became for some time the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the two new states. All the British officers and other British personnel in India's armed forces were appealed to continue with a 50 per cent increase in India Allowance for other ranks. Forty-nine per cent of the British army officers and ninety-four per cent of the other ranks were retained in the army of `free' India.(187) But the INA soldiers and the naval ratings who had been victimized for their role in the R.I.N. revolt of 1946 were denied jobs.
Both Nehru and Jinnah "wholeheartedly welcomed" the British Government's proposal to negotiate "overall Commonwealth defence arrangements". The Joint Defence Council which was composed of Mountbatten (as chairman), Auchinleck, Liaquat Ali and Baldev Singh was empowered to conduct negotiations on behalf of India and Pakistan. Mountbatten informed London:
"As I shall continue to be Chairman of the Joint Defence Council after 15th August, I shall hope to be able to regulate these discussions [with the British delegation] and trust that the desired objects will be achieved."
Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, descended on Delhi and had talks with Nehru on 23 and 24 June 1947 "concerning the grant of facilities for the employment of Gurkha troops in the British Army". Besides Nehru, there was no Indian present during the talks. The note of these interviews prepared by Nehru himself stated that Montgomery
"pointed out the grave man-power difficulty of the United Kingdom leading to the necessity of their retaining Gurkha troops in South-East Asia for emergencies, notably war".
On behalf of India Nehru agreed in principle to grant the facilities the British Government was seeking. Montgomery hoped that the subsequent discussions for working out details would be "carried out quietly without much fuss.... Therefore, it is better to do it as soon as possible in a quiet way without any fuss."
Several Gurkha regiments and battalions which were part of the Indian army, were allotted for service under the British government and recruitment of Gurkha soldiers on Indian soil by the British continued, obviously to suppress the peoples in South-East Asia who were fighting arms in hand to overthrow the imperialist yoke. Earlier, in April, the Indian government had decided that the Indian soldiers who had joined the Indonesians in their struggle against the Dutch "would be struck off the rolls of the Army from the date of their desertion" from the British Indian army. Nehru decided not to appoint "his previous nominee" as Trade Agent in Malaya, "since Lord Wavell had objected to him on the ground that he took part in an anti-British movement during the war".(188)
Mountbatten took great interest in designing flags for the new states and wanted the Congress and League leaders "to have the Union Jack in the upper canton of their flags". Gandhi told a prayer meeting that there was nothing "wrong with having the Union Jack in a corner of our flag". Nehru apologetically told Mountbatten that Gandhi, Patel and others were willing to accept the design but they became afraid of "the general feeling among Congress extremists...that Indian leaders were pandering far too much to the British" and thought it "inadvisable to press the design on them". Both Nehru and Jinnah agreed to fly the Union Jack on twelve days in the year but wanted that this should not be publicized. "In fact", Mountbatten wrote, "they are worried about their extremists agitating against over-stressing the British connection, although they are quite willing to retain it themselves." The list of days supplied by Mountbatten included "Empire Day" (24 May), which was considered "an unfortunate expression so far as India is concerned", and it was changed to "Commonwealth Day".(189) Other flags, too, like the Indian Navy and Air Force flags, were suitably designed by Mountbatten and accepted.
India's freedom was ushered in on 15 August with the playing of "God Save the King" followed by "Jana Gana Mana", with Nehru toasting the health of the British King and Mountbatten toasting the Dominion Government, and with the Union Jack flying proudly while the Indian national flag was unfurled. The "programme had originally included a ceremonial lowering of the Union Jack", but it was changed and the Union Jack was not hauled down, as it might offend "British susceptibilities".
To crown it all, on 15 August, Rajendra Prasad as President of the Constituent Assembly requested Mountbatten, the head of the new State, to convey "a message of loyal greetings from this House" to the British King. It said:
"That message [the King's message to the new dominion] will serve as an inspiration in the great work on which we launch today.... I hope and trust that the interest and sympathy and the kindness which have always inspired His Majesty will continue in favour of India and we shall be worthy of them."
"Thus came to an end", wrote Attlee later, "the direct rule of the British in India..." "The transfer of power", Alan Campbell-Johnson has rightly observed, "was an unique response essentially to a revolutionary situation".(190)
As Harry Magdoff has rightly observed:
"Even though it [the British Labour Party] eventually presided over the dissolution of the formal British Empire -- not by choice, but by necessity -- it realistically managed the dissolution so that there would be as smooth a transition as possible to an informal empire that would serve the same imperialist policies."(191)
The transition became smooth in India -- from imperialism's point of view, not from that of the people -- because the working class here was politically and organizationally weak and the long colonial rule had fostered and moulded the native big bourgeoisie into a class the interests of which were closely linked with those of the imperialists and which depended on the latter for survival and expansion.
But an important change occurred. Britain's formal empire was transformed into an informal empire shared by several imperialist powers, of which the U.S.A. emerged as the leader.
Bipan Chandra has theorized that pressure (or struggle) by the Congress led to compromise with the British raj, which again was followed by more pressure. This process culminated in a compromise settlement which marked the end of British rule and assured India's national independence and formation of a bourgeois nation state in India. Chandra holds that the Indian bourgeoisie adopted what he calls the P-C-P (pressure-compromise-pressure) strategy and advanced step by step towards its goal of a bourgeois nation-state and independent economic development. "The political aim", he writes, "was to be achieved not through the sudden expulsion of imperialism or the seizure of power but through a negotiated settlement." He calls this "a non-revolutionary pattern of anti-imperialist struggle".(192)
This raises several questions.
First, compromise between two or more parties implies surrender by each of some of its claims. Real independence or complete freedom from external control can hardly be the outcome of a compromise between a colony and its masters.
Second, as we have seen, the Indian big bourgeoisie as well as the top leadership of the Congress aspired not to real national independence but to self-government within the framework of basic dependence on imperialism. Gandhi, who is supposed to be the architect of India's `freedom', wrote a few weeks before his assassination:
"Let me tell you, I derived no little strength from my implicit loyalty to the British Empire in thought, word and deed."(193)
Third, the `P-C-P' strategy appears to have ideally fitted into the British strategy. It was the imperial strategy to contain anti-imperialist struggles of the people by associating more and more friendly and reliable Indian elements with the administration of the country at different levels, by making devolution of power by stages to those who could be depended upon to safeguard the vital interests of British imperialism -- strategic, political and economic. This policy was announced as early as 20 August 1917 by the Secretary of State for India,(194) anticipating post-war unrest. Gandhi's `P-C-P' strategy, instead of being a challenge to the British strategy of devolution of power by stages, disrupted anti-imperialist struggles of the people and was complementary to it. The stages and degrees of devolution of power were decided upon by the imperialist rulers as their main contradiction with the people developed and as the need to derail and thwart the people's struggles arose. The Gandhian strategy fulfilled the needs of the imperial strategy: it helped in diverting the people from the revolutionary path by propagating the theory of non-violence and change of heart philosophy and by placing before the people the so-called constructive programme to counter anti-imperialist programmes. It is this strategy of devolution of power by stages that embittered communal relations and led to the unnatural partition of India.
Fourth, no Congress movement forced the British government to arrive at a compromise and make fresh devolution of power. The Rowlatt Satyagraha, the Non-co-operation movement and the Civil Disobedience movements ended in withdrawal, without the raj making the least concession. The individual Civil Disobedience movement fizzled out: the raj did not yield to Gandhi's threat of a `Quit India' movement. Throughout the entire period from 1919 to 1947, the initiative lay with the British imperialists, not with the Congress.
In 1956, Attlee came and stayed in the Raj Bhavan in Calcutta, when P.B. Chakravarti, then Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, was acting as governor of West Bengal. During a conversation between them, Attlee cited several reasons why the British withdrew from India in 1947, of which the most important, according to him, was the weakening of "the very foundation of the attachment of the Indian land and naval forces to the British Government" under the impact of Subhas Bose's activities. When asked by Justice Chakravarti "about the extent to which the British decision to quit India was influenced by Gandhi's activities...Attlee's lips widened in a smile of disdain and he uttered slowly, putting emphasis on each single letter, -- `mi-ni-mal'".(195)
Dominion status was often equated with independence. Under the Statute of Westminster, 1931, dominion status came to embody complete constitutional freedom: a dominion could even decide for itself whether it was to be at war or peace and enjoyed the right to secede from the Commonwealth. A member of the British Commonwealth or the Commonwealth of Nations has the right to walk out of it, if it so chooses. So it is argued that there is little difference between dominion status, membership of the Commonwealth and independence.
But what is apparent is not real. A state that emerges as a dominion or member of the Commonwealth invariably becomes a weak client state. As Harry Magdoff points out,
"What really makes the difference in the Third World is that these countries, under the sway of a long history of colonialism and semi-colonialism, have evolved a mode of production, a class structure, and a social, psychological and cultural milieu that are subservient to the metropolitan centres.... their economic structure, the nature of their international trade, and their wage-and-price relations are also geared to reproduce, through the ordinary processes of the market place, the subordinate condition of these societies."
Continued integration into the capitalist-imperialist system perpetuates dependence. Dominion status or membership of the Commonwealth is the outward symbol of this continued integration and consequent dependence. If the economy of a post-colonial state is integrated into the capitalist-imperialist system, it cannot escape dependence, even though it may not flaunt the outward label -- dominion status or membership of the Commonwealth. Even if a post-colonial state secedes from the Commonwealth, it cannot move out of the orbit of imperialism, unless the age-old links of dependence with the metropolitan country are snapped. During colonial rule, the economy of a colony becomes a dependent, lop-sided economy. There is a forced complementarity between the economy of the colony and that of the metropolitan country. Barratt Brown was right when he said:
"Most of the mechanisms of neo-colonialism, like earlier forms of imperialism, work automatically. They do not require to be positively set in motion by the colonial power for the day after the grant of independence, but they would have to be positively stopped by the successor government if the ties of economic as well as political dependence were to be loosened. Hence the importance attached by the colonial powers to the succession."(196)
During the colonial rule, British imperialism fostered certain classes -- the Indian big bourgeoisie and the feudals -- which became the dominant classes in Indian society. When, in the changed international and Indian context, British imperialism found it impossible to continue its direct rule, it handed over power to these indigenous elites that had thriven by serving it, that had been long tested and found that they could be trusted to preserve imperialism's vital interests. The attainment of dominion status or membership of the Commonwealth through negotiation and compromise precluded any social revolution which could smash this nexus between imperialism and these classes and the complementarity between the economy of the metropolitan countries and the economy of post-colonial India. The old order continued with some cosmetic changes.
Presiding over the Lucknow Congress in April 1936, Nehru said:
"Between Indian nationalism, Indian freedom, and British imperialism there can be no common ground, and if we remain within the imperialist fold, whatever our name or status, whatever outward semblance of political power we might have, we remain cribbed and confined and allied to and dominated by the reactionary forces and the great financial interests of the capitalist world. The exploitation of our masses will still continue and all the vital social problems that face us will remain unsolved. Even real political freedom will be out of our reach, much more so radical social changes."
Such words that cast a spell over the youth of India can hardly be reconciled with Nehru's life-long practice.
Addressing the Associated Chambers of Commerce of India, dominated by British expatriate capitalists, in December 1946, Nehru declared:
"during 150 years of British rule, all manner of visible and invisible contacts have grown up with her [England]. These contacts cannot be cut off suddenly."Well, so far as our relationship with England is concerned, unless the break comes in such a way as to poison the future this relationship will continue in hundreds of ways that flourish culturally and linguistically."
He assured the British capitalists that they would continue to have their "place in industry and commerce in India".(197)
Campbell-Johnson described the relationship which was forged between post-colonial India and imperialist Britain as "one of the greatest reconciliations of history". He said:
"Perhaps Lord Mountbatten's greatest achievement lay in producing a solution which had about it sufficient substance and support to survive storm of immediate revolutionary crisis and to maintain in spite of Partition the vital links between the past and the future."(198)
As the vital links between imperial Britain and India were preserved, real political freedom, as Nehru had said, remained out of our reach. To quote John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson,
"...mercantile techniques of formal empire were being employed to develop India in the mid-Victorian age at the same time as informal techniques of free trade were being used in Latin America for the same purpose.... formal and informal empire are essentially interconnected and to some extent interchangeable.... Within the last two hundred years, for example, India has passed from informal to formal association with the United Kingdom and since World War II, back to an informal connection."
National independence can never be won without a social revolution: without the overthrow of the classes which serve as the props of colonial rule, imperialism is hardly overthrown. India could not liberate herself from the imperialist yoke until a political and social revolution swept clean the legacy of the colonial past. Only by breaking the fetters that enchain her to the capitalist-imperialist system and by overthrowing the classes which are national only in the geographical sense, could India be really free.
Writing in the early sixties, Dr Thomas Balogh, the Oxford economist who served as economic adviser to the British cabinet, observed:
"...neo-imperialism does not depend on open political domination. The economic relations of the US to South America are not essentially different from those of Britain to her African colonies. The International Monetary Fund fulfils the role of the colonial administration of enforcing the rules of the game."(199)
The transfer of power marked the end of imperialism's direct rule and the beginning of its indirect rule. And India's dependence on Britain alone yielded to dependence on several imperialist powers including Britain. Her formal empire changed into an informal empire shared by them.