Aspects readers know, and generally appreciate, that we avoid long tables, welters of statistics, and detailed calculations, since this makes it difficult to follow the thread of the argument. (Even readers of academic magazines tend not to examine the tables in an article too closely.) However, there might also be readers who are interested to know exactly how we arrived at a particular figure, in order that they be able to question the procedure, or use the same procedure with different data. In the following piece, we have attempted a compromise by reproducing the lengthy tables, but keeping them at the end of the article.
Below we have attempted to construct an estimate, or four alternative estimates, for the extent of dependence of cultivators on moneylenders/traders/landlords for their costs of cultivation; and on that basis we have calculated four alternative estimates of drain on agriculture via interest payments on short-term debt for cultivation.
Peasant indebtedness, and in particular indebtedness to moneylenders/traders/landlords, is not merely a cause of suffering for the peasant, a ‘human problem’, as it is made out by the media, the parliamentary parties, and the Government. It is a major drain on the agricultural economy, one of the major hurdles to rapid agricultural growth. To see how this is so, let us carry out a small exercise. (This is a serious revision of the exercise we carried out in Aspects no. 19.)
The returns in backward agriculture like India’s are meagre. Hence capital for investment is scarce. The interest payments made by the peasant to the moneylender, trader or landlord leave him that much less with which to reinvest in improving his land, in irrigating it, and in purchasing implements or machines to improve his output. On the other hand, it is unlikely that those who earn this interest would re-invest it in agricultural activity: some of these sections (moneylenders, traders) are not connected with productive activity, and even for landlords the returns they are able to earn instead in such usury are higher and less risky than the returns from investing in productive assets. So usury operates as a drain from agriculture to parasitic activities and classes. It has been generally accepted that the persistence of usury not only makes the peasant poorer, but harms agricultural investment and output.
How much does the peasant borrow, from which sources does he/she borrow, and how much does he/she pay as interest? For this there is little reliable information. The All India Debt and Investment Survey (AIDIS) 1981-82, claimed to show that indebtedness had fallen sharply over the previous decade, and that the share of the ‘informal’ sector (moneylenders, traders and landlords) in the peasant’s debt had fallen even more sharply. But the data in the AIDIS was soon shown by various studies to be highly suspect (see Aspects nos. 19 and 21). Other surveys which show much higher indebtedness to the informal sector were limited to one or the other region, and so no comprehensive figure was available.
In 1997 and 1998, the spate of peasant suicides in A.P., Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab, and now Haryana has highlighted once again the fact that indebtedness to the informal sector is far more serious than indicated by the AIDIS 1981-82. However, since the Reserve Bank has yet not come out with the next survey in the series, ie AIDIS 1991-92, an all-India picture is still missing.
Still, we can get a very rough idea of peasant indebtedness in an indirect way. We know that peasants generally take short-term loans to cover most of the costs they actually incur in the course of production (ie, their working capital needs, as distinct from their need for long-term capital assets, such as a plough or a borewell) [1]. So one way to approach the problem would be to to take all the crops in the country, and calculate the costs actually incurred in growing them: this would give us an idea of agriculture’s requirements of working capital.
Unfortunately, the data we need is not complete. For the purpose of fixing minimum support prices and procurement prices for various crops, the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) carries out periodic surveys of costs of cultivation. The CACP reports for the years 1993-94 to 1996-97 covered 19 crops: cereals (paddy, wheat, jowar, bajra, maize, barley), pulses (tur [arhar], moong, urad, gram), oilseeds (groundnut, soyabean, sunflower, sesamum [til], rapeseed/mustard, safflower), sugarcane, jute and cotton. These crops accounted for about 148.5 million hectares of the 185.5 million hectares of gross cropped area cultivated in 1994-95. But we do not have figures for the crops cultivated over the remaining 37 million hectares — that is, 20 per cent of the gross cropped area. Nevertheless, we have no other source of information, and we have to base our calculations on the crops that the CACP covers.
The cost of cultivation varies from state to state, and the CACP reports give us figures relating to only between one and eight states for various crops [2]. We have calculated figures for the average costs incurred in the course of production for 19 crops in the year 1994-95. By multiplying these figures by the number of hectares under various crops, we can get a nationwide figure for the costs actually incurred in production for all 19 crops.
Table 1 at the end of this article gives the details of the 19 crops, their average (median) costs of production per hectare, the number of hectares under each crop, and the estimated total costs of production of each crop nationwide. For example, we have costs of production of paddy for eight states: A.P., Bihar, Haryana, Karnataka, M.P., Punjab, U.P., and West Bengal. In 1994-95, the median cost of production per hectare for these eight states was Rs 7,677 per hectare. The total area under paddy in the country is 42.2 million hectares. We multiply 42.2 million hectares by Rs 7,677 to get a total of over Rs 32,432 crore (1 crore = 10,000,000). This is a rough estimate of what peasants actually spent on cultivation of paddy throughout the country in 1994-95.
In this fashion, we can calculate that the total costs actually incurred in production — that is, the working capital needs — for all these 19 crops in 1994-95 was Rs 78,720 crore [3]. Let us assume for the moment that this would be roughly the same as the short-term credit needs of Indian agriculture in 1994-95.
How much short-term credit did agriculture actually get from the ‘formal’, or institutional, sector that year? The Reserve Bank’s Report on Currency and Finance, 1996-97 gives us details of the short-term direct credit extended to agriculture in 1994-95: Rs 6,996 crore by cooperative banks, Rs 407 crore by state governments, Rs 3,842 crore by scheduled commercial banks, and Rs 688 crore by regional rural banks, all institutional short-term credit totalling Rs 11,932 crore.
The contrast between the working capital requirements and actual delivery of short-term credit is very stark. Indeed, the short-term credit from the institutional sector amounts to just 15 per cent of the working capital requirements of just the above-mentioned 19 crops. Interestingly, the proportion of commercial banks in this figure for working capital requirements was trivial — just 4.9 per cent. (These conclusions can be compared with the reported statement of the executive director of NABARD that the institutional sector only accounts for 20 per cent of the cost of agricultural production — Times of India, 4/7/98. It also fits in with the reports from various parts of the country cited in the article on peasant suicides in this issue.)
The picture gets worse if we recall that, for lack of information, we have not been able to include in this calculation the costs of production of crops grown over 37 million hectares of gross cropped area. These crops include ragi and small millets; linseed, castorseed, nigerseed, and coconuts; all vegetables, roots, and tubers; all fruits and nuts; chillies, ginger, turmeric, pepper, arecanuts, coriander, cardamom, and garlic; natural rubber and tobacco. If we take the costs of cultivation of these crops to be the average of the figure for the remaining 19 crops, ie about Rs 5,300/hectare, we have to add Rs 19,680 crore to our figure for costs of cultivation, giving a total of Rs 98,400 crore for all crops [4]. In which case direct institutional short-term credit for agriculture goes down to 12.1 per cent of working capital requirements.
We have also not been able to include the working capital needs of livestock operations. This is a major gap. The activities of this sector include production of milk, meat, eggs and poultry meat, wool and hair, dung, silkworms, cocoon and honey. The National Income data tell us that "feed of livestock" accounted for as much as Rs 28,277 crore, which is 44.9 per cent of physical inputs in agriculture in 1994-95. It appears from the description given in the CSO’s Sources and Methods, 1989, that a large proportion, perhaps the bulk, of livestock feed is purchased. There is no break-up available there of what proportion of the feed is used for dairying, poultry, etc, and what proportion for farm animals. But even if we arbitrarily take one-fourth of the figure for livestock feed, we get a figure of Rs 7,069 crore for 1994-95.
If we were to include a figure of Rs 19,680 crore for the crops not covered by the CACP figures, and Rs 7,069 crore for the feed of livestock, the total figure for working capital needs would go up to Rs 1,05,469 crore, and the percentage share of institutional finance in working capital needs would sink to 11.3 per cent. Clearly, the institutional sector has barely scratched the surface of the credit needs of agricultural operations.
Let us work, for the moment, with the first estimate we arrived at for working capital requirements, namely, Rs 78,720 crore. If we assume that the entire working capital requirements are met by borrowing, and subtract from the working capital requirements the short-term credit from institutional sources, we get the figure that peasants would have to borrow from moneylenders, traders, and landlords. This is about Rs 78,720 crore minus Rs 11,932 crore = Rs 66,788 crore.
For these remaining credit needs, peasants have to turn to the ‘informal’ sector — moneylenders, traders, and landlords. Here the interest rates are widely put at between 36 and 60 per cent, or even higher (in Maharashtra, for example, the range is widely put at five to ten per cent a month -- see the article on peasant suicides elsewhere in this issue.)
If the sum of Rs 66,788 crore were borrowed for six months (taken to be the average crop span) at interest rates averaging 36 per cent, the interest payments would come to Rs 12,022 crore; at 60 per cent, they would come to Rs 20,036 crore. The calculations are given in Table 3, col. 3.
The implications of these facts are profound. As we will see, the producers are being bled in a fashion that not only impoverishes them but cripples agricultural growth.
Let us place these figures in context. How much of gross value added (GVA) in agriculture is drained away by interest payments?
Value added in agriculture in 1994-95 came to Rs 231,426 crore. This is not the value that accrues to the cultivators. "Value added" is the market value of the output (calculated at prices prevailing just after harvest in markets where the farmer sells to traders, or at procurement prices to Government agencies) minus the cost of the physical inputs (eg. seeds, fertilisers, irrigation, etc.). Value added includes the amount paid by the cultivators in the form of land rent, rent of bullocks/machines, and wages to labourers. It also includes the sum that, at the time of harvesting, they pay to the lenders, both banks and private parties. It further includes the amount with which they feed, clothe and house themselves and their families. It even includes the extent to which traders frequently manage to buy from the farmers at below even the market prices. And it is only with what remains out of the "value added" that the farmers can think about saving something to invest — in irrigating/improving their land or purchasing equipment [5]. Yet it is only this last share that holds out any promise of a better future, since without investment they remain condemned to stagnation and declining production per head.
If we take average annual interest rates in the informal sector at 36 per cent, and those in the institutional sector at 15 per cent, total interest payments would come to Rs 12,917 crore. If informal sector interest rates are taken at 60 per cent, the total interest payments (formal and institutional) on short-term borrowings would come to Rs 20,931 crore (Table 3, col. 5). That is, depending on the assumptions we make, interest payments on short-term borrowings would drain away between 5.58 per cent and 9.04 per cent of gross value added in agriculture (Table 3, col. 6).
However, comparisons with value added are not so revealing, for the reasons we mentioned earlier: value added includes the earnings by various sections other than the cultivators. A more interesting comparison is between interest payments and gross capital formation (GCF) in agriculture. GCF is the total investment made in agriculture by both the public sector and the private sector in a particular year. As we said above, it is the figure for investment that tells us something about the future of agriculture, and the real condition of the farmers.
In 1994-95, GCF in agriculture came to just Rs 20,737 crore at the prices then prevailing — less than nine per cent of the value added. Total interest payments on short-term borrowing, by the above calculations, would be between 62.3 per cent and 101 per cent the size of gross capital formation (Table 3, col. 7). That is, if it were not for interest payments on short-term debt, investment could have gone up by 62 to 101 per cent.
It is worth remembering that less than half of GCF in agriculture is from the cultivators’ own resources. Of the GCF of Rs 20,737 crore, Rs 4,355 crore was by the public sector, and Rs 6,841 crore was funded by loans from public sector banks and cooperative banks. Only Rs 9,541 crore was from cultivators’ own resources. Thus interest payments were between 135.4 per cent and 219.4 per cent the size of "GCF from cultivators’ own resources". In other words, if it were not for interest payments, the cultivator could have increased the investments made from his/her own resources by 135-219 per cent.
On the basis of the earlier mentioned assumptions, let us calculate what would have happened had the institutional sector extended adequate short-term credit at 15 per cent rate of interest to agriculture to cover all its working capital needs. In that case, the total interest payments would have been just Rs 5,904 crore. Total interest payments would have been lower by between Rs 7,013 crore and Rs 15,027 crore (according to different assumptions about interest rates). Compare these figures to the GCF in agriculture (Rs 20,737 crore).
We have also carried out the same exercise with different assumptions.
Above, we had assumed that all of working capital requirements are met by borrowing. A study by the Institute for Development and Communication, Chandigarh, reviewed elsewhere in this issue, calculates that 90 per cent of working capital requirements in Punjab agriculture are indeed met by borrowing. But this may be because agriculture in Punjab is particularly capital-intensive, and requires more credit. Let us take a more conservative assumption, namely, that only 70 per cent of working capital needs are met by borrowing, and the remainder by the cultivators’ own resources.
In Table 3A, we have taken short-term credit needs at 70 per cent of working capital requirements (which we had estimated above at Rs 78,720 crore). In that case, total short-term credit needs would be just Rs 55,104 crore, and the interest payments would accordingly be lower. Note, however, that even with this assumption, interest payments as compared to capital formation (cols. 7 and 8) are very large.
Our second exercise is to compensate for the gaps in the data regarding crops and activities. In Table 3B, we have adjusted the working capital requirements to take into account the 20 per cent of gross cropped area for which we did not possess cultivation cost data, and also added, somewhat arbitrarily, a figure for livestock operations costs (as one-fourth of the value of total livestock feed). As we mentioned earlier, this gives us a figure of Rs 105,469 crore for working capital requirements. Naturally, if we take that as the figure for short-term credit needs, we get larger figures for interest payments, and all the percentages derived thereof.
In Table 3C, we have taken the figure of working capital requirements from Table 3B (Rs 105,469 crore), but assumed (as in Table 3A) that only 70 per cent of working capital requirements are met by borrowing. This gives us a figure of Rs 73,828 crore for short-term borrowings. This is probably the best figure of the lot, since it makes allowance for the major gaps in our information.
However, for several reasons even these figures amount to a serious underestimation of indebtedness, the amount appropriated by total interest payments, and more particularly the amount appropriated by usury.
First, we have taken short-term credit for only agricultural operations. This leaves out consumption loans taken by cultivators [6], which are taken only from the informal sector. Short-term consumption loans are taken, for example, at the time of illnesses, crop failures, or other emergencies. There are also long-term loans for non-productive purposes such as marriages and other social ceremonies, as well as housebuilding. Both these are common and major items of indebtedness. (In Punjab, long-term loans for non-productive purposes reportedly accounted for 12.8 per cent of total indebtedness of cultivators, short- and long-term.)
Our data also leave out long-term loans for productive purposes, which are almost wholly from commercial banks and cooperative banks. (In Punjab, this accounts for 25.4 per cent of total debt of cultivators; however, this proportion would be likely to be lower in other states, where agriculture is less mechanised and rural banking is less widespread.)
Secondly, any loan that the peasant is unable to repay on time and in full would get added to his indebtedness, and interest would continue to accrue on it. Our calculations, which are based only on the cultivation costs of a single year, have not been able to take this into account. (Moreover, after a certain point, if the peasant continues to be unable to repay the loan, he/she may have to mortgage part of his/her land to wealthier farmers, who provide a loan in return for use of the land.)
All the above data could only be calculated from a properly conducted survey, which the AIDIS 1981-82 is obviously not. What we can certainly say at the moment is that our calculations are conservative. A thorough survey ought to reveal that indebtedness and interest payments are much larger than what we have calculated.
Thirdly, and most importantly, in talking of credit till now, we have deliberately ignored certain glaring features of semi-feudal India. Whereas we have talked of various rates of interest, and calculated interest payments on that basis, in fact it is difficult for even an unbiased study to make such calculations when all the three markets — for labour power, credit and agricultural inputs/output — are intertwined, and when the exercise of feudal social authority is ever present in the picture.
For example, the person lending money to a peasant may be a trader who sells the peasant his inputs at inflated rates, which the peasant must agree to because he/she needs a loan from the trader; by the same token, the peasant may also be bound to sell that trader, and only that trader, the crop — and this at a depressed price. In order to accurately calculate the rate of interest on such loans, we would have to add the excess payments made for inputs as well as the loss suffered by the peasant from having to sell the output at a depressed price. That would give us a true picture of the total interest payments, and of the actual rate of interest.
Similarly, a peasant who borrows from a landlord may be forced to work off the loan amount by working for the landlord at a depressed wage. The amount lost by the borrower as a result of having to work at such wages would have to be included in the effective rate of interest. In all these cases, the effective rate of interest would be far higher than the stated rate, and indeed it would be difficult for the peasant to even calculate the effective rate of interest, since it does not appear explicitly as such, but in some disguised form.
In rural India, the moneylender/trader/landlord generally has a stranglehold on not only the economic but also the social and political life of the peasant. Physical coercion, State or private, ensures that the peasant does not step out of line, repudiate the debts, violate some aspect of the agreement, or in any other way attempt to escape the net of indebtedness. Moreover, control over State agencies allows the moneylender/trader/landlord to corner much of the formal sector credit and even lend it on at higher rates. In this light, we can see how difficult it is to get a real picture of interest rates and the amount drained off by usury.
For example, take the case of a peasant forced to mortgage a portion of his land for a consumption loan from a powerful local moneylender who is also, say, the local leader of a parliamentary political party. Once possession of the land has been given to the moneylender, it is extremely difficult for the peasant to reclaim it even after the mortgage period is over. The moneylender is well-connected; he has bribed officials and paid musclemen to defend his false title, whereas the peasant may even be illiterate and unable to come up with documentary proof that he did not sell the land, but merely mortgaged it. In such a case, the effective rate of interest is the value of the land itself divided by the paltry consumption loan given to the peasant — that is, hundreds of per cent.
Therefore, though our earlier exercise calculated that investment in agriculture could have grown sharply if not for the drain caused by usury, the real picture of the drain is far more dramatic than can be brought out through the above statistics.
In concluding, we need to keep in mind one point. First, when talking of short-term ‘credit needs’, we are not implying that credit of this order will permanently be needed. Peasants need to borrow for cultivation purposes largely because of the meagre surplus — or lack of surplus — remaining with them at the beginning of each production cycle. This in turn is due to the existing production relations. If peasants had adequate land (including, in the case of tribals, secure possession of it), assets (bullocks/tools/machinery) and democratic control over water and other common resources; if their inputs were provided cheaply and their entire surplus output purchased at assured, remunerative prices; if their past debts were liquidated; and if they were not at the mercy of sundry exploiters, criminals and officialdom; then they would, over time, retain a substantial surplus. With this, they would probably be able to dispense with the need for short-term production credit, and even further they would be able to fund much of their long-term investment from their own surpluses. So the reliance on short-term debt arises from the existing production relations and the exploitation implicit in those relations. And in turn it increases the rate of exploitation under those relations [7].
[Note: In the tables below, 1 cr. = 1 crore = 10,000,000.]
|
Table 2: Expenditures Incurred in Cultivation of 19 Major Crops, 1994-95
(Methods II & III -- Mode and Mean) |
||||||
|
Sr. |
Crops |
Avge exp of |
Total cost |
Avge exp of |
Total cost |
Notes to Table 2 Col. 2: Statistical mode of costs of cultivation of different states (no. of states covered is given in col. 2, Table 1). In the case of tur, moong, sunflower, sesamum, rapeseed/mustard, and cotton, for which we did not have the mode, we used the median. Col. 3: Total cost of cultivation = mode of costs of cultivation (col. 2) multiplied by area (col. 4 of Table 1). Col. 4: Arithmetic mean of costs of cultivation of different states (no. of states covered is given in col. 2, Table 1). Col. 5: Total cost of cultivation = mean of costs of cultivation (col. 4) multiplied by area (col. 4 of Table 1).
Source: Same as Table 1. |
|
1 |
Paddy |
7,724 |
32,630 |
6,858 |
28,973 |
|
|
2 |
Wheat |
6,714 |
17,215 |
6,081 |
15,590 |
|
|
3 |
Jowar |
3,079 |
3,617 |
2,314 |
2,718 |
|
|
4 |
Bajra |
926 |
937 |
2,308 |
2,335 |
|
|
5 |
Maize |
3,025 |
1,847 |
2,848 |
1,739 |
|
|
6 |
Barley |
4,644 |
391 |
4,935 |
415 |
|
|
7 |
Tur |
3,180 |
1,068 |
3,130 |
1,051 |
|
|
8 |
Gram |
3,742 |
2,717 |
3,101 |
2,251 |
|
|
9 |
Moong |
2,151 |
654 |
2,166 |
659 |
|
|
10 |
Urad |
2,154 |
678 |
2,066 |
650 |
|
|
11 |
Gr. nut |
5,790 |
4,587 |
5,951 |
4,714 |
|
|
12 |
Soyabean |
3,962 |
1,582 |
3,962 |
1,582 |
|
|
13 |
Sunflower |
3,225 |
635 |
3,225 |
635 |
|
|
14 |
Sesamum |
1,913 |
389 |
1,913 |
389 |
|
|
15 |
Rapeseed/ |
2,877 |
1,793 |
3,288 |
2,048 |
|
|
16 |
Safflower |
1,467 |
113 |
1,467 |
113 |
|
|
17 |
Sugarcane |
5,890 |
1,994 |
9,596 |
3,249 |
|
|
18 |
Jute |
3,746 |
281 |
4,305 |
323 |
|
|
19 |
Cotton |
6,182 |
4,539 |
6,184 |
4,900 |
|
|
Total for 19 crops |
78,026 |
74,337 |
||||
|
Notes to Table 3 * Rs .78,720 crore is the cultivation cost of 19 major crops for which the CACP provides data (see Table 1). Col. 1: Different crops have different maturing periods, but six months has been taken as the average. Col. 2: Separate figures assuming the informal sector (moneylender, trader, landlord) lending at an average rate either of 36 % or of 60 %. Col. 3: Informal sector interest payments. On the basis of the assumptions in cols. 1 and 2, the total interest payments on informal sector short-term debt for cultivation. (The latter figure is taken as total short-term credit need for cultivation minus short-term institutional credit.) Col. 4: Institutional sector interest payments. Interest payments on total direct institutional short-term credit to agriculture during 1994-95, at Rs 11,932 crore, assuming an interest rate of 15 % and loan period of 6 mths. Col. 5: Total interest payments on short-term agricultural debt, both informal sector (col. 3) and institutional (col. 4). Col. 6: Total interest payments (col. 5) as a percentage of Gross Value Added (GVA) in agriculture for 1994-95, GVA being put at Rs 231,426 cr. Col. 7: Total interest payments (col. 5) as percentage of Gross Capital Formation in agriculture (Rs 20,737 crore). Col. 8: Total interest payments (col. 5) as percentage of Gross Capital Formation in agriculture from cultivators’ own resources (that is, GCF minus capital formation by the public sector and medium/long-term loans to agriculture from public sector banks and co-op societies). Col. 9: Reduction in total interest payments if total short-term credit needs of agriculture were supplied at 15 % rate of interest. Sources: Table 1 above; for direct institutional credit, RBI, Report on Currency and Finance, 1996-97. |
|
Table 3A: Estimates of Interest Payments on Short-Term Credit for Cultivation,1994-95
(Taking total short-term credit needs for cultivation at Rs 55,104 cr.)* |
|||||||||
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
Notes toTable 3A
For an explanation of the column headings, see Table 3.
Sources: Same as Table 3. |
Taking loan period as (mths) |
Taking |
Inf. |
Inst. |
Total |
Int. |
Int. |
Int. |
Savings |
|
6 |
36 |
7,771 |
895 |
8,666 |
3.74 |
41.8 |
90.8 |
5,428 |
|
6 |
60 |
12,952 |
895 |
13,846 |
5.98 |
66.8 |
145.1 |
10,609 |
|
|
Table 3B: Estimates of Interest Payments on Short-Term Credit for Agricultural Operations,1994-95
(Taking total short-term credit needs for agr. operations at Rs 105,469 cr.)* |
|||||||||
|
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
Notes to Table 3B * The figure of Rs. 105,469 cr. is arrived at by taking the cost of cultivation of 19 major crops (80 per cent of gross cropped area) plus (i) an estimate for the 20 per cent of gross cropped area for which cost data are not available, and (ii) a rough figure for the costs of livestock activities. We have calculated (i) as average cost of cultivation/hectare on 80 per cent of gross cropped area multiplied by remaining 20 per cent of gross cropped area. For (ii), we have taken one-fourth of the value of "feed of livestock" in National Income data regarding value of inputs in agriculture. The remaining methodology is the same as in Table 3, except that in place of Gross Capital Formation in agriculture for cols. 7 and 8, we have taken Gross Capital Formation in agriculture and allied activities, since we have included an estimate for working capital needs of livestock activities.
Sources: Same as Table 3. Also see text of article. |
|
Taking loan period as (mths) |
Taking |
Inf. |
Inst. |
Total |
Int. |
Int. |
Int. |
Savings |
|
|
6 |
36 |
16,836 |
895 |
17,732 |
7.66 |
77.9 |
185.8 |
9,821 |
|
|
6 |
60 |
28,061 |
895 |
28,956 |
12.51 |
127.2 |
303.5 |
21,046 |
|
|
Table 3C: Estimates of Interest Payments on Short-Term Credit for Agricultural Operations,1994-95
(Taking total short-term credit needs for agr. operations at Rs 73,828 cr.)* |
|||||||||
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
Notes to Table 3C * The figure of Rs 73,826 crore is arrived at by taking working capital requirements at Rs 105,469 crore, and assuming short-term credit needs to be 70 per cent of working capital requirements. For the figure of working capital requirements, see the note to Table 3B. As in Table 3B, we have taken Gross Capital Formation in agriculture and allied activities for cols. 7 and 8.
Sources: Same as Table 3B.
|
Taking |
Taking |
Inf. |
Inst. |
Total |
Int. |
Int. |
Int. |
Savings |
|
6 |
36 |
13,289 |
895 |
14,184 |
6.13 |
62.3 |
148.7 |
8,647 |
|
6 |
60 |
22,148 |
895 |
22,043 |
9.96 |
101.2 |
241.5 |
17,506 |
|