NEHRU had said in 1933: "Army, police, laws, prison, taxes, are all methods of coercion. The zamindar who realises rent and often many illegal ceases relies on coercion, not on conversion, of the tenants". The real problem, therefore, was how to end exploitation and vested interests. History showed no "instance of a privileged class or group or nation giving up its special privileges or interests willingly... coercion or pressure is necessary to bring about social change.... The achievement of freedom thus becomes a question... of divesting vested interests... if an indigenous government took the place of the foreign government and kept all the vested interests intact, this would not even be the shadow of freedom".
This "Marxist revolutionary anti-imperialist" did not wait for the transfer of power to begin his vicious attacks on Communists. He was crucial in expelling Communists from the Congress in December 1945, and even incited physical assaults on them (such as when a speech by Nehru inflamed a Congress mob to attack the CPI headquarters in Bombay). This had little to do with the CPI's role in 1942: after all, C.Rajagopalachari and the Hindu Mahasabha had both gone to the extent of assuming office in 1942, but the Congress spared them attack and indeed made Rajagopalachari a top Congress leader once again.
Nehru's new repressive streak had more to do with the lollipops the British were now dangling before him. By September 1946, Nehru was de facto Prime Minister in an Interim Government; and proper Prime Ministership was less than a year away: could he allow his chances to be wrecked by disrupters and labour agitators?
Other Congress leaders, of course, shared his opinions on this score: Viceroy Wavell recorded in his diary on January 9, 1947, that Patel spoke to him "about the danger of Communists. I got the impression that he would like to declare the Party illegal".
V.P.Menon, (the crucial I.C.S. officer and adviser to the Congress leaders in the entire transfer of power) reported to Wavell in the context of the early 1947 strike wave "that Congress leaders were losing popularity.... There were serious internal troubles in Congress and great fear of the Left Wing; and that the danger of labour difficulties was acute."
In fact, the British saw the Congress as the best tool to suppress the Communists, and for that reason had allowed them to form a wholly Congress Interim Government on September 2, 1946. On July 31, 1946, the Viceroy had written to an aide:
"I dislike intensely the idea of having an Interim Government dominated by one party, but 1 feel that I must try to get the Congress in as soon as possible.... If Congress will take responsibility they will realise that firm control of unruly elements (sic) is necessary and they may put down the Communists and try to curb their own Left wing."
The Director of the Intelligence Bureau wrote a little over a week later:
" ... the labour situation is becoming increasingly dangerous.... Until a responsible Indian government is, introduced at the Centre, there is little that can be done. The Communists are only part of a larger nettle which must be grasped."
Congress mirrored the rulers' views: On August 5, Wavell was informed that Patel was "convinced that the Congress must enter the government to prevent chaos spreading in the country and was even prepared to threaten resignation from the Working Committee if his views were not accepted." And the Congress swiftly set about its task.
Hardly two and a half weeks after they assumed office, Wavell was "cynically amused" to note that the new Congress Minister Sarat Bose's "first reaction to a threatened strike of the Delhi electricity workers had been to make a plan for troops to be flown to Delhi to take over essential services and to summon certain British technicians."
Nehru, with his Leftist image, was able to play an important role in controlling the Left wing; it was perhaps for this reason that Gandhi - in a near-exact replay of 1929 - had installed him in the Congress presidency despite the fact that most P.C.C.s supported Patel.
On July 4 1947, after having given the Congress nine months' training in the Interim Government, the "Indian Independence Bill" was introduced in the Commons. In a fortnight, it secured the approval of both Houses of Parliament. India was thus awarded its "independence" not by any legislation of its own assertion, but by a bill proposed, discussed, and passed in London!
The Act provided for the creation of two new Dominions, India,and Pakistan, on August 15, 1947. (The Chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary defines dominion as "lordship: sovereignty: a domain or territory with one ruler, owner, or government: a completely self-governing colony, not subordinate to but freely associated with the mother country".) Each Dominion was to be headed by a Governor-General, and governed by a Parliament.
The existing Constituent Assemblies were given the dual function of a legislature and a constitution-making body. Nehru's earlier demand for a Constituent Assembly based on universal adult suffrage to draft, the constitution of a free India was conveniently forgotten; the existing assembly was based on an extremely limited franchise weighted overwhelmingly in favour of the propertied and the princes.
The earlier 1935 Government of India Act, and its accompanying Orders-in-Council, would remain in force pending alteration or introduction of a new constitution. All laws in force in British India on August 15, 1947, would remain in force until amended by new Dominion legislatures. There was also a provision for continuity in the terms of employment of members of the Services (in fact the entire cadre of all the Services continued to serve in post-1947 India).
"Indeed", says the British historian Brecher approvingly, "the Indian Independence Act was remarkable for the degree to which it assured continuity in political institutions, the legal and judicial system and the Constitutional fabric of British India."
The new Constitution was drafted between December 1946 and November 26, 1949. It took as its basis the famous Objectives resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly on December 9, 1946. The Resolution was drafted largely by Nehru, and emphasised what had by now become the Congress "mantras": fundamental rights, federalism, and an independent sovereign republic.
But more significant was the omission of certain mantras. Many were surprised by the omission of any reference to socialism. Nehru, embarrassed, replied that "we wanted this Resolution not to be controversial in regard to such matters".
In Nehru's closing speech before the passage of the Resolution, he suddenly emphasised: "At no time have we ever thought in terms of isolating ourselves... or of being hostile to countries which, have dominated over us... We want to be friendly with the British people and the British Commonwealth of Nations."
The eventual Constitution of India that emerged from three years of committees and drafts was a gargantuan document, the longest written constitution in the world. Its legal ideas are a hodge-podge of borrowings from variety of European and American constitutions. To Great Britain it owes its parliamentary form of government, to the United States its detailed list of fundamental rights, and to Australia the supposedly federal structure. The most ingenious borrowing is from Ireland: a set of "Directive Principles of State Policy" which have no legal force at all but are merely intended to convey the "intent" of the "fathers" of the Indian constitution.
Of course, and most significantly, the central and overwhelming borrowing was from the Government of India Act, 1935. Approximately 250 articles were taken either verbatim or with minor changes in phraseology from the 1935 Act, and the basic principles remain unchanged.
Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar, one of the new constitution's architects (strange architects, who preferred old foundations to new ones!) stated baldly in the Constituent Assembly that "we are not starting a Constitution anew after a revolution. The existing administrative structure which has been worked so long cannot be altogether ignored in the new framework."
The economist H.Venkatasubbiah wrote that certain Directive Principles were added "on the plea that they give expression to the Leftist conviction of the people", and it was thought "desirable to add these revolutionary desiderata to something which otherwise so much resembled the instrument of the defunct British Raj."
However, in the Constituent Assembly debate itself, one participant succinctly noted that, by depriving them of any legal force, the Directive Principles had been consigned to "the rubbish heap of history".
By contrast, it was Nehru who defended the clause ensuring compensation for expropriated property. The princes were in the process of being integrated into the Union without loss of privilege or purse. (They did not wield independent political power under the British either: what they sought now was merely the maintenance of their former status.)
Patel assured the princes on July 5, 1947 "The Congress are no enemies of the Princely Order, but, on the other hand, wish them and the people under their aegis all prosperity, contentment, and happiness".
When the Nawab of Bhopal heard of the appointments of Patel and Menon to head the new States Department, he declared happily, "this alters the whole outlook for the states".
In fact, step by step, the Congress arrived at peaceful and amicable settlements with the princes under which they were given very generous privy purses and often appointments as Governors or Rajpramukhs. The palatial residences of the princes were left in their hands. When zamindari was abolished, they were allowed to keep millions of acres under supposed "personal cultivation"; for the remainder they were handsomely compensated, thanks to Nehru's constitutional clause.
The Congress was in fact doing the princes a great favour by integrating them into the Union. For in most of the princely states radical movements were threatening to unseat the princes entirely, and it was the Centre's intervention that prevented this eventuality. As Nehru stated in the Constituent Assembly,
"One has to be careful of the steps one takes so as not to injure the existing structure too much - I, am not brave and gallant enough to go about destroying more."
The fact that the new Indian State had not the slightest intention of ending the concentration of land in the hands of landlords stares us in the face today. Even according to official statistics (which are fiddled in innumerable ways and which do not group all the land owned by members of a single family as one holding), one-third of the land is held by just four per cent of the rural households. A vast reservoir of landless and near-landless peasantry, unable to find work elsewhere, labour in near-bondage for these feudal lords. How did this come about? For an example let us look at Nehru's home state of U.P., where he is purported to have led a radical anti-zamindari movement in the 1920s and 1930s.
The abolition of zamindari failed to put land actually in the hands of the tiller: what generally happened was that, in anticipation of or in response to the legislation, his limited rights were de facto taken away, he was evicted, and he was re-hired in conditions of virtual bondage by the same landowner.
The Government started talking about a land ceiling Act in 1958, but the big landowners were given prior knowledge of its provisions. In 1960 the Act was passed, with August 1959 as the cut-off date for land transfer. But between 1958 and August 1959 land "transfer" occurred on a fantastic scale - on paper. Land was placed in the name of children, dogs, dead men, fictitious men, and of course every member of the family.
At any rate the ceilings were generous to the zamindar: 40 acres for good quality land, 60 acres for medium quality land, 80 acres for lower quality land. Large exemptions were provided for "orchards", "poultry farms"; educational, religious or charitable institutions"; and so on. Overnight, "co-operatives" of thousands of acres of landlords' land came into existence on paper.
The legislation had the excessively modest stated aim of redistributing four lakh acres among the poor peasantry. In the early years of its operation the rush for implementation should have been the highest. However, after 13 years of its operation, according to the Land System Enquiry Committee, only 1.1 lakh acres had been redistributed; of this, 20,000 acres had been distributed to various institutions and 76,000 acres had been distributed on "temporary" settlements to the relatives and friends of big landowners. Even according to this official committee, then, only 14,000 acres were actually distributed to the poor peasants of U.P. in this 13-year period; a closer examination by a non-biased organisation might reveal the figure to be considerably lower. In other words, landlordism continued intact in India's most populous state. The situation is not basically different elsewhere, though it takes many forms.
An even more open and significant surrender was made to foreign capital, particularly American capital, by the new rulers of India.
The National Planning Committee was set up in 1938 by the Congress. This was the brainchild of Nehru and Bose, and it had made some seemingly radical statements calling for the takeover of foreign capital invested in key industries. However, it left ample room for mollifying foreign interests: for one, it said that such acquisitions should be made "on payment of reasonable compensation". It also allowed for the investment of foreign capital in Plan enterprises "if proved to be absolutely inevitable".
In 1944, India's biggest tycoons, headed by Tata and Birla, formulated the Bombay Plan, which they claimed was to rapidly industrialise India and raise its per capita income radically. Already they proposed that seven per cent of the capital for their plan be raised abroad. The publication of the Bombay Plan was followed by several visits to Britain and America by its authors, and the formation of several joint companies with foreign capital. The Eastern Economist, a Birla mouthpiece, claimed (May 18, 1945) that industrialisation "would cost much less if we could enlist foreign technicians and financial co-operation". As Manu Subedar, the sole nationalist member of the Indian Merchants Chamber, pointed out, an "illegitimate marriage" of Indian and foreign big business was being prepared.
Both British and American capital in India was anxious: the British were concerned that their existing very large investments be protected; the Americans were concerned that the field for their future very large investments be kept open. It was to these anxieties that the Congress immediately attended.
The Interim Government headed by Nehru thus created more ambiguities in its first statement on economic policy (December 1946):
"In the case of highly specialised industries, it may be necessary, where such a course is unavoidable in the national interest, to acquiesce in an Agreement of Management, which would leave the control of management in foreign hands for a limited period. In such a case, if participation in capital is made a, necessary condition, of association, there would be no objection to it provided that effective control is retained in Indian hands."
Nevertheless, nationalist businessmen members of the Advisory Planning Board managed to press through a paragraph vigorously opposing any entry of foreign capital beyond this limited sphere, even stating that it would be better to import finished objects than to allow investment of foreign capital. However, pressures from abroad were soon to suppress voices like Subedar's.
The American ambassador to India, Henry F.Grady, himself took the lead in exerting such pressures. In April 1947, he called for the removal of obstacles faced by foreign companies in India, such as the "complicated tax structure". In August, he warned that American capital would not come to India on Indian terms. Three months later, he threatened that unless nationalisation plans were dropped, no American loan was forthcoming.
The Government of India was quick to respond. On December 15, 1947, exactly two months after the announcing of India's "independence," Nehru was explaining to the Associated Chambers of Commerce that his Government "would welcome foreign capital and technical assistance". The United States Department of Commerce could reassure American businessmen by the end of 1947:
"Although agitation continued during 1947 in favour of nationalisation of industry and in favour of restrictions on foreign private investment, there developed in the last quarter of the year a conciliatory attitude on the part of the Government towards private enterprise and to some extent toward foreign capital...."The need for foreign capital and technical assistance was recently acknowledged by the Minister of Works, Mines, and Power. He was aware of the prejudice in certain quarters about the utilisation of foreign capital and skill, but stated, `these prejudices were valid before August 15 but now that we are free, whether it is foreign talent or capital, both are going to be completely under our control and will be available and acceptable on our conditions.' Prime Minister Nehru has also indicated in a recent public statement the necessity and willingness of India to seek foreign capital assistance."
The Americans wanted an even more explicit welcome, however. Grady declared that American businessmen "were anxious to have a clear picture of the Government of India's policy towards labour and private capital". The Congress was eager to respond appropriately. B.C.Roy (Chief Minister of West Bengal) told the Eastern Chamber of Commerce in Calcutta on December 10:
"So far as I could feel from my tour, they (the Americans) are eager to help us with men and materials provided they, can feel secure by investing, in India. The question of security does not lie with the internal strife between India and Pakistan, but with the industrial policy of the Indian Government. By the industrial policy I mean the policy of nationalisation and their policy to deal with labour disputes."
By February 17, 1948, Nehru announced in Parliament:
"There will not be any sudden change in the economic structure. As far as possible, there will be no nationalisation of existing industries."
On April 6, 1948, Parliament adopted a Resolution on Industrial Policy. This important document must have set American investors' hearts at rest. First, significant nationalisation was ruled out. The State sector was to be setting up new units "rather than... acquiring the existing units. Meanwhile private enterprise, properly directly and regulated, has a valuable role to play". The Government monopoly would exist only in munitions, atomic energy and the railways. Even in the key industries "The Government have decided to let existing undertakings in these fields develop for a period of 10 years.... At the end of this period the whole matter will be reviewed..." Should the State acquire any unit, "the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution will be observed and compensation will be awarded on a fair and equitable basis".
These fundamental rights were also to apply to foreign capital. While deceptively emphasising "regulation" and "safeguards", the Government now made clear that foreign capital was "of value":
"While it should be recognised that participation of foreign capital and enterprise, particularly as regards industrial technique and knowledge, will be of value to the rapid industrialisation of the country, it is necessary that the conditions under which they participate in Indian industry should be carefully regulated in the national interest".
It also provided a neat loophole:
"It will provide that, as a rule, the major interest in ownership, and effective direction, be in Indian hands; but power will be taken to deal with exceptional cases in a manner calculated to serve the national interest".
The Resolution did not explain how the leaving of the major interest in the ownership in foreign hands could be calculated as serving the national interest.
At any rate, as Capital (the magazine which was the voice of British capital in India) reassured foreign investors:
"... there is no reason to suppose that it involves any serious danger that control of the companies concerned will pass out of the hands of the foreign promoter. If the latter retain 49 per cent of the shares, their voting strength would be strong enough to resist any attempt to take control out of their hands."
In any case, an official memorandum accompanying the Resolution made it explicit.
"The Resolution contemplates full freedom for foreign capital while at the same time assuring that it should be regulated in the national interest. This part of the Resolution reveals the Indian Government's recognition of the need for foreign aid both in management and technical training and investment, and of the wisdom of welcoming foreign capital and skill to supplement Indian enterprise."
Some might claim that this open invitation to foreign investors was justifiable because now the Indian big bourgeoisie were in a strong enough position to make independent use of such investments. But this was hardly the case.
Total foreign investments in 1953 were, according to a Government estimate (using a very restricted sense of the word "investments"), Rs 441 crore; the capital in India directly controlled by foreign investors amounted to Rs 841 crore; and taking a less restricted sense of the word "investments", total assets controlled by foreign capital amounted to about Rs 1000 to 1,200 crore. Thus, of the capital invested in big industry, mining, plantations, banking, and big business, foreign capital directly controlled roughly half. (Charles Bettelheim, India Independent, London, 1968.)
Of course, its indirect control was far greater. For instance, these figures do not bring out the various collaboration agreements signed by Indian firms with foreign ones whereby the foreign firm was given greater control than its share of the capital might suggest. The following table for the same period also does not list such joint ventures, but nevertheless gives some idea of how great was the degree of direct control by foreign capital:
Degree of Control by Foreign Capital, 1953 |
|
1. Industries in Which More Than 50 Per Cent of the Capital Is Under Foreign Control: |
Percentage of Control by Foreign Firms |
| Petroleum | 97 |
| Rubber Factories | 93 |
| Light Railways | 90 |
| Matches | 90 |
| Jute | 89 |
| Tea | 86 |
| Coal | 62 |
| Other Mines | 73 |
| Plantations and Distribution of Rubber | 54 |
| 2. Industries in Which 25 to 50 Per Cent of the Capital Is Under Foreign Control: | Percentage of Control by Foreign Firms |
| Banks and Financial Institutions | 46 |
| Electrical Industries | 43 |
| Engineering Industries | 33 |
| Coffee Plantations | 37 |
| Food Industry | 32 |
| Paper and Cardboard | 28 |
| 3. Industries in Which Less Than 25 Per Cent of the Capital Is Under Foreign Control: | Percentage of Control by Foreign Firms |
| Sugar | 24 |
| Cotton | 21 |
| Cement | 5 |
| Source: Bettelheim, op.cit. | |
We have described elsewhere how the Indian big bourgeoisie were themselves merely compradors of foreign capital; but aside from that, it is clear that direct foreign investments too were in command of large sectors of the Indian economy. It was in this context that the new Congress rulers were giving their assurances of no nationalisation.
The British sterling debts to India totalled Rs 1,700 to Rs 1,800 crore in 1946. These represented goods and services acquired by the British forcibly from India at depressed rates during the war, and during the immediately post-war period - times of acute shortage and famine. Manu Subedar wrote that had the goods and services been acquired at market prices, "the debts would have (been) three times as much". "The price paid by India", he said, "runs into millions of lives."
Subedar, a nationalist businessman and one of the Congress delegates to the negotiations, was shocked that the Congress leaders were tacitly agreeing to scale down the debts further, as early as in 1946.
"The lever used (by the British Indian government) is the impatient industrialists who want machinery and want some dollars now for their machinery, regardless of what happens to the country's economy. It is these big industrialists who are therefore being used by the Government."
And later:
"In February (1946), at the time of the Bretton Woods discussions, I found the hand of the Government reaching right inside the Congress Party to secure the results they wanted." (S.K. Ghosh, The Indian Big Bourgeoisie)
Subedar was soon dropped by the Congress from the list of nominees to the Constituent Assembly. This paved the way for, among other things, the scaling-down of the sterling debts in favour of Britain. By 1949, at any rate, representatives of the nationalist bourgeoisie like Subedar had been eased out of the Congress.
By 1949, the Congress government felt it could drop all pretenses at a nationalist path of development. Nehru told the FICCI on March 4, 1949 that the 10-year waiting period for nationalisation did not mean, "even in regard to certain basic and key industries, ...that we would necessarily touch them immediately after the 10 year period". By August 27, he was referring to the "remote event of nationalisation of certain industries".
Indian magnates were happy. In August, G.D.Birla addressed the India-America Conference, inviting American capital precisely in the key industries:
"I visualise collaboration only in big tasks, that is, things like steel, heavy chemicals, heavy engineering and things of that nature where large-scale investment amounting to a few crores of rupees is needed and also where necessary technical skill is wanted in India...."
On October 4, 1948, the Government had also provided a number of liberalisations for Indian firms wanting to import machinery - liberalised rules regulating allowance for depreciation on plant and machinery, tax exemption of new undertakings for a specific period, and customs duty relief for imports of raw materials and machinery.
Nehru's statement in Parliament on April 6, 1949, however, outdid all earlier concessions. As the Office Secretary of the Congress Parliamentary Party stated,
"All the statements made in this behalf (ie, on foreign investments) by the National Planning Committee have completely become out of date, especially after the statement made by the Prime Minister on Foreign Capital in 1949."
The statement is worth quoting at length:
"The object of our regulation should, therefore, be the utilisation of foreign capital in a manner most advantageous to the country. Indian capital needs to be supplemented by foreign capital, not only because our national savings will not be enough for the rapid development of the country on the scale that we wish, but also because in many cases scientific, technical and industrial knowledge and capital equipment can best be secured along with foreign capital."
Nehru addressed himself not to the Indian electorate, but to foreign investors:
"In this context, foreign investors would no doubt wish to have some clear indication of our policy on certain matters.."... As regards existing foreign interests, Government do not intend to place any restrictions or impose any conditions which are not applicable to similar Indian enterprises. Government would also frame their policy so as to enable further foreign capital to be invested in India in terms and conditions that are mutually advantageous.
"Secondly, foreign interests would be permitted to earn profits, subject only to regulations common to all. We do not foresee any difficulty in continuing the existing facilities for remittance of profits, and Government have no intention to place any restriction on withdrawal of foreign capital investments, but remittance facilities would naturally depend on foreign exchange considerations; if, however, any foreign concerns come to be compulsorily acquired, Government would provide reasonable facilities for the remittance of proceeds.
"Thirdly, if and when foreign enterprises are compulsorily acquired, compensation will be paid on a fair and equitable basis as already announced in Government's statement of policy.
"... Government will not object to foreign capital having control of a concern for a limited period, if it is found to be in the national interest.... Government would not object to the employment of non-Indians in posts requiring technical skill, and experience, when Indians of requisite qualifications are not available.... There is, and will still continue to be, considerable scope for the investment of British capital in India. These considerations will apply equally to other existing non-Indian interests. The Government of India have no desire to injure in any way British or other non-Indian interests in India and would gladly welcome their contribution in a constructive and co-operative role in the development of India's economy."
Thus foreign capital could directly be invested in almost any industry, could control a majority of shares, could employ foreign management, could remit its profits out of the country, and would be protected from nationalisation - all that was required was the mantra of "national interest". In July 1949, even tariff protection was made available to foreign-owned units as much as to Indian-owned ones.
Capital reassured foreign investors once again on August 18, 1949:
"India's position has already been clarified on this issue. With the exception of about half a dozen key industries, India will not object to majority control by Indians, Britons or Americans. There is almost a free zone outside the `key industries preserve'...."The participation of foreigners even in the `reserve' field may be considered. Although the Government would prefer cent per cent or majority control in such undertakings, the need for their rapid development and financial considerations may compel modifications in the original plan."
An official statement of the Government of India in September 1949 outdoes all earlier declarations:
"The policy of the Government of India was to allow foreign capital to come in freely in the industrial field.... Every attempt must be made to secure the maximum possible influx of foreign capital in the shortest possible time. The Government of India categorically declared that permission to retain a majority of non-Indian interest in the ownership and effective control in some cases could not ipso facto be considered as detrimental to the interest of the country." (emphasis added)
In just two years from the official declaration of "independence" the Government of India was declaring its intention to "secure the maximum possible influx of foreign capital in the shortest possible time"! Surely this demonstrates best of all how a transfer of power was in fact the most ingenious device for not just maintaining but intensifying foreign exploitation.
For Nehru, the step by step accession to India's Prime Ministership had been the fulfillment of his dearest dream - the dream he had conceived riding on the white charger at the Lahore Congress in 1929. To him it was not demeaning but, on the contrary, particularly splendid that he was being crowned by the British. Mountbatten's aide, Campbell-Johnson, records Mountbatten's first meeting with Nehru. "`Mr. Nehru', said Mountbatten, `I want you to regard me not as the last Viceroy winding up the British Raj, but as the first to lead the way to the new India'. Nehru turned, looked intensely moved, smiled, and then said, `Now I know what they mean when they speak of your charm being dangerous'."
The official swearing-in of Cabinet Ministers took place at the Viceroy's House in the lavish and evocative Darbar Hall. Nehru followed up this ceremony with another, where he sought and received the traditional coronation by Brahmin priests. Nehru the self-proclaimed anti-imperialist and agnostic, sought and received the double blessings of imperialism and feudal reaction.
It was in fact Nehru's insistence that kept India in the British Commonwealth - a startling move for a man who supposedly represented the Congress Left. But similarly, while in 1936 he had stated that "the whole conception of Dominion Status seems to me to be an acceptance of the basic fabric of British imperialism", he managed 11 years later to treat Dominion Status as if it were complete independence.
Thus in December 1948, he pressed vigorously for, and got, the Congress to accept India's remaining within the British Commonwealth, of which the King of England was the Head. He also managed to press the acceptance through the Constituent Assembly despite considerable opposition.
After 1942, the Indian Communists - by then, the target of Nehru's vigorous repression were the only party that called for genuine independence.
By contrast, the Socialists, that other element of the "Left", were now openly aligning themselves with America. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia said in 1951, "Her (America's) best friends in Asia are the Socialists". The Socialists' international outlook was unabashedly pro-American: for instance, the party's Madras Conference (July 9, 1950) supported American intervention in Korea - something no other Indian party had dared to do. At the end of 1950, the Socialists campaigned for India's active intervention in Tibet. In March 1951, Socialist leaders Jayaprakash Narayan and Asoka Mehta sponsored the Indian Congress for Cultural Freedom, organised with American aid, to lobby for a closer alignment with the so-called democracies of Western Europe and the USA. On May 4, 1951, Dr. Lohia informed a meeting at Bombay that donors of foreign aid might legitimately ask India to check population growth, revise land laws, refrain from assisting militarily the enemy of the country aiding India.
When the American bourgeoisie and people revolted against British rule, they formed an independent republic with no ties to Britain. During and after their armed War of Independence, the American people singled out for attack all those who had collaborated with the British (the "Tories"). Many of these collaborators were humiliated in public, dispossessed of their property, and even dispossessed of their civil liberties for a certain number of years. All of this was done by American patriots in order to protect themselves from the possibility of the reinstallation of foreign rule. Development of American industry really followed this nationalist revolution.
By contrast, in India after 1947, the compradors, zamindars, and princes, all of whom had collaborated with foreign rule, sat on the new State's highest offices. Nehru in his famous address of August 14 attempted to obliterate any anger at the imperial rulers or at their collaborators: "We end today a period of ill fortune and India discovers herself again.... This is no time for petty and destructive criticism, no time for ill-will or blaming others".
The Indian civil servants, police and army officers and even intelligence agents were requested to maintain their positions: in his August 15 address, Nehru clarified: "production is the first priority.... In the difficult days ahead our services and experts have a vital role to play and we invite them to do so as comrades in the service of India."
In post-1947 India, the ones who were targeted who were dispossessed of not merely their property but their lives, and were officially stripped of civil liberties - were not the collaborators. They were members and sympathisers of the only party that was agitating for complete independence: the Communists.
In 1936 itself, when Nehru set up a Civil Liberties Union, he made clear there were limits to the extent to which he was advocating this cause.
"It is clear that, in spite of every desire to avoid it, coercive action may become necessary in particular cases.... violence or dangerous incitement to violence... cannot... be tolerated by any State."
In 1948, as he employed full armed force to smash the Communist-led railwaymen's strike, he elaborated this point of view:
"The Government is anxious that the civil liberties of the people should be fully maintained. But it is not the Government's conception of civil liberty to permit methods of coercion and terrorism to be practiced against the general community. It is the paramount duty of the Government to give security to the people and to prevent the normal life of the community from being interfered with by such methods of violence. No Government and no social life would be possible if these methods were tolerated.... If any strike takes place on the railways by a fraction of the railwaymen or elsewhere, they are determined to deal with it firmly." (S.L. Poplai, ed. India 1947-50, documents, London, 1959.)
Nehru reacted sharply to the criticisms of civil liberties organisations:
"We are accused by various people, by various groups in the country of crushing civil liberties.... There is often a conflict between the State's duty to maintain security and the State's duty to maintain liberty."
He was particularly disturbed by the advance of anti-imperialist struggles in not only China but the Philippines, Malaya, Vietnam:
"The Communist Party, as everyone who has followed events knows, about a year and a half ago suddenly took a new turn, ie about March 1946. Not only here, but in various parts of South East Asia, they definitely adopted the policy of violence and producing chaos, whether in industrial circles or peasants - everywhere...."
But he asserted proudly:
"In some places, they created a big situation outside India. In India they were checked."
"If there is one thing that history shows it is this: that economic interests shape the political views of groups and classes.... It is an illusion to imagine that a dominant imperialist power will give up its domination over a country or that a class will give up its superior position and privileges unless effective pressure, amounting to coercion, is exercised.... Having for so long accustomed itself to the notion that its superior position and privileges were necessary for the good of society, any contrary opinion savours of heresy. Law and order and the maintenance of the status quo become the chief virtues, and attempts to challenge them the chief sins."- Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, 1936.
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