As Michael Kalecki, the Polish economist, observed, "the central problem here is at whose expense the country is to be developed [or under-developed]."[1] It is the class character of the State that decides whether there will be development or maldevelopment and which classes will finance the plans.
Though the main beneficiaries of India's plans are the Indian and foreign big bourgeoisie and Indian landlords, their contribution to the total plan outlay, as we shall see, has been negligible. It is the toiling people of India — the workers, the peasantry (except its upper stratum) and the petty bourgeoisie — at whose expense 'development' takes place in India. It is on them that the burden of financing the plans has been imposed by the ruling classes.
The sources of finance are internal resources and external borrowing (external borrowings are a built-in feature of India's plans). Internal resources are raised by the Government through taxation, deficit financing and loans. Over the years the incidence of indirect taxes, which hit the common people, has gone up steeply while the direct taxes like the income tax, the corporate tax, the wealth and gift taxes have steadily declined.
The Seventh Five Year Plan 1985-90 conceded:
"Contrary to the expectation that with economic development the ratio of direct to indirect taxes would increase, as a result of poor performance of direct taxes the Government has been forced to rely increasingly on indirect taxes, which rose from 11.7 per cent of GDP at market price in 1975-76 to 14.0 per cent in 1984-85, while direct taxes fell from 3.4 per cent to 2.3 per cent during the same period."
The Seventh Plan also states that corporation tax as a percentage of non-agricultural gross domestic product at current factor cost in 1983-4 was 2.32; income tax 1.51; wealth tax 0.08; land revenue and agricultural income tax 0.27; and other direct taxes 0.27.[2] These percentages would be much lower if agricultural domestic product also was taken into account.
The share of indirect taxes in overall tax collections of the Centre went up from 56.5 per cent in 1950-1 to 81.1 per cent in the budget estimates of 1986-7, while the share of direct taxes went down during the period from 43.5 per cent to 18.9 per cent.[3] In 1990-1 the share of direct taxes in the total tax revenues of the Union, states, union territories and local bodies combined was only 15.9 per cent and that of indirect taxes 84.1 per cent.[4] Since then, the rates of both income tax and corporate tax have been further reduced.[5]
The Eighth Plan states: "At present, the number of personal income tax payers is only about four million, accounting for about 0.5 per cent of the total population.... The ratio of direct taxes relating to the agricultural sector (which includes land revenue and agricultural income tax) to agricultural GDP has fallen over the years from about 1.2 per cent in 1950-51 to less than 0.7 per cent in 1989-90."[6]
While mass consumption goods are invariably taxed at different stages, as regards taxes on income, profits and property, the Indian tax laws are full of concessions, exemptions and loop-holes. We would refer here briefly to the corporate tax. Most new enterprises (especially those which are set up in districts notified as backward and an overwhelming number of districts are so notified) are permitted to operate free of any corporate tax for the first five years. The budget for 1995-6 declares five-year tax holiday also for all infrastructure projects. In June 1995, the Government decided to allow with effect from April 1995 a tax holiday for any five years of the first twelve years of operation of an infrastructure project, which includes transport and communications, mining and power.
If a new enterprise undertakes expansion before the end of the five-year period, the corporate tax is waived for several more years. Very generous depreciation allowance, even 100 per cent accelerated depreciation, is allowed and export earnings are totally exempt from taxes. Some years ago, an American specialist in international investment and tax problems, Matthew J. Kust, said that the Indian tax laws permit "extremely liberal and accelerated depreciation which allows a new enterprise to write off 85 per cent of its investment during the first three years."[7] Various other concessions and rebates, like development rebate and rebate on expenditure for research and development (in almost all cases, a euphemism for adaptation of foreign technology to Indian conditions or for quality control) are liberally offered. At a convention "Advantage Maharashtra Global Investors", organized by the Maharashtra government and others early in 1997, S.N.L. Aggarwal, commissioner of income tax, Mumbai, said that India has an assessee-friendly tax system and that the incidence of taxation on foreign corporates is very low compared with other countries. "There are also", he added, "tax exemptions in many ways. For example, 100 per cent tax exemption is available in some cases — for projects at SEEPZ and other export-oriented projects".[8]
An article in Economic Times stated that because of these concessions, exemptions and loopholes, Reliance Industries, now the largest private sector company in India, which made a net profit of Rs 576 crore (Rs 5760 million) in 1993-4, did not pay any corporate tax at all. So, in this year TISCO, ACC, Bombay Dyeing, Arvind Mills did not have to pay any corporate tax at all though they made huge profits. The Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) found that, out of a sample of 1,208 companies, as many as 514 companies paid no corporate tax at all in 1993-4. To quote from the above article in Economic Times, "The tax paid by the corporate sector in proportion to their gross profits has fallen from 23.55 per cent in the first half 1993-4 to 17.07 per cent in the same period in 1994-5." [9]
Speaking at a workshop organized by the Confederation of Indian Industry at Delhi on 16 May 1995, the revenue secretary of the Indian government, M.R. Sivaraman, said: "What needs to be considered is incidence of tax and not the tax rate and compared to other countries, tax incidence in case of corporate tax is much lower in India." He observed that since a large number of exemptions are provided in India, the corporate tax incidence works out to just 19.5 per cent to 20 per cent whereas it is as high as 30 to 40 per cent in other countries where tax rates are lower.[10] Again, on 6 December 1995, he said that the rate of corporate tax was 46 per cent but the final rate was only 19.5 per cent due to a large number of exemptions and concessions. He added that there were 148 exemptions and a plethora of litigations pending in the courts.[11]
It appears that what Sivaraman said may be an overestimate of the incidence of corporate tax in the case of big houses. In 1991-2 and 1992-3, the operating profits of the top 300 companies in India amounted in the aggregate to Rs 14,602 crore and Rs 16,268 crore respectively. "Depreciation provision went up from 22.3 per cent to 24.3 per cent... But there was a big fall in the tax burden, which came down by more than four percentage points, from 13.1 per cent to 9.0 per cent."[12]
Interestingly, Reliance Industries has not paid any corporate tax since its inception some 25 years ago.[13] The following is a list of major zero-tax paying companies with the net profits they made in 1994-95.[14]
| Name of the Company | Net Profit (Rs Crore)* |
| Steel Authority of India | 1108.57 |
| Reliance Industries | 1064.85 |
| State Bank of India | 715.49 |
| Essar Gujarat | 397.51 |
| National Aluminium Co. | 300.20 |
| Tata Chemicals | 286.65 |
| TISCO | 264.19 |
| Nagarjuna Fertilizers & Chemicals | 192.89 |
| Great Eastern Shipping | 173.35 |
| Century Textiles & Inds. | 159.17 |
| Chambal Fertilizers & Chemicals | 132.86 |
| BSES | 126.64 |
| Gujarat State Fertilizers | 114.43 |
| Gujarat Ambuja Cements | 99.10 |
| Jayaprakash Industries | 95.54 |
| Madras Refineries | 92.19 |
| Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers | 91.92 |
| Essar Shipping | 90.69 |
| Arvind Mills | 90.64 |
| Texmaco | 78.51 |
| Hindustan Zinc | 76.44 |
| Ashok Leyland | 70.59 |
| Lloyds Steel Industries | 70.51 |
| CESC | 68.50 |
| Southern Petrochemical Industries | 67.53 |
*Rs Crore = 1 crore rupees = 10 million rupees = 10,000,000 rupees
Zero tax companies abound in the list of top 300 companies every year. There are other giant companies which pay only negligible taxes. For instance, Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. (INDAL), a subsidiary of a transnational based in Canada, made net profits of Rs 51.08 crore and Rs 91.79 crore in 1993-4 and 1994-5 respectively. Its provision for corporate tax in the respective years was Rs 1.2 crore and Rs 1.5 crore.
The Union Budget for 1997-98 has levied a minimum alternative tax (MAT) of 12.9 per cent of their book profit on companies which take advantage of various exemptions to pay no corporate tax. This has already been modified to exempt profits from exports and a system of tax credit can be carried forward for five years. Besides, the budget has reduced corporate tax by 25 per cent and abolished the surcharge. There has also been an effective reduction of personal income tax by 33 per cent. Earlier, investments in primary issues were exempted from capital gains tax.
So far we have been concerned with exemptions legally permitted. But it may be borne in mind that Indian businessmen enjoy the dubious reputation for possessing skill in cooking accounts. Years ago, it was estimated by the ministry of finance that in many branches of industry only one-third of profits was declared for taxation.[15]
To attract investment by large Indian and foreign companies, the different state governments vie with one another with offers of capital subsidy, sales tax exemptions, etc. besides land, water, electricity and other infrastructural facilities at nominal prices.
To promote exports, all kinds of incentives are offered to export houses, Indian and foreign, by the Central Government. Till 1992 the incentives were primarily (1) duty drawback, (2) cash compensatory support, and (3) import replenishment. Amaresh Bagchi writes that in the Tenth Report presented to Parliament in November 1977, the Public Accounts Committee (Sixth Lok Sabha) observed that "while the votaries of the cash assistance scheme may argue that this is not too high a price for maintaining a steady growth in exports, which is vital for the economy, if the value of the other concessions and facilities, like import replenishment, concessional railway freight, concessional bank finance, supply of raw materials at subsidized prices, grants-in-aid, etc., extended to exporters is also quantified and taken into account, the total cost of the export promotion effort may well turn out to be not quite proportionate to the net gain actually accruing to the country as foreign exchange."[16]
Amaresh Bagchi points out that "in several cases the PAC found that the amount of cash assistance was disproportionate, the percentage of cash assistance admissible to the net foreign exchange to be earned in three such cases being 93 per cent, 151 per cent and 131 per cent." In once case "the proportion of cash assistance to net foreign exchange earned was as high as 2875 per cent."[17] Deepak Nayyar, who became chief economic adviser to the Government of India, was of the view that "if one added up indirect advantages with the direct 20 per cent subsidy extended to engineering exports, the total subsidy to them might be as high as 100 per cent."[18]
Since April 1992 a new scheme called the duty exemption entitlement certificate (DEEC) scheme has replaced the direct subsidy like the cash compensatory support. The new scheme is doubly welcome to export houses. It helps many exporters to enrich themselves in several ways. A consignment may be exported and "sold" to an overseas buyer at a price many times its real worth. The black money that was sent out in a clandestine manner returns laundered as white money. The "export earnings" are free of income tax. Besides, exporters import duty-free raw materials against their export obligations and make a killing in the local market. According to the Government's own calculations, the amount of customs revenue sacrificed on account of imports under the DEEC scheme alone in 1994-95 was worth Rs 17,000 crore. Misuse of export-import incentives accounted for a substantial part of it. One of the participants at the all-India conference of chief commissioners and commissioners of customs and central excise, which met in New Delhi in mid-November 1995 to discuss the issue, told Business Standard that the actual revenue sacrifice and misuse of import provisions are much bigger. He said that the commence ministry makes no mention of imports made through non-computerised ports and against which no exports were made. Usually, all records of these imports are destroyed on completion of transactions. According to his estimate, the actual revenue sacrificed as a result of the DEEC scheme is over Rs 25,000 crore. A report by a study group of senior revenue officials has underlined that the most frequent misuse of DEEC has been by way of diversion of duty-free imports into local markets while meeting export obligations by fraudulent means. The study group has pointed out that in many cases no exports were made at all. The export figures announced by the commerce ministry are inflated. The study group has noted that there were cases where exported goods were deliberately made of inferior quality imports of prime material. If the central excise, foreign exchange and income tax sides of the scheme were also taken into account, the loss would be many more thousand crores of rupees.[19] Newspapers report that since the introduction of the scheme there has been a spate of such fake exports and rackets in hawala operations. These "bogus exports", which are rather encouraged by the authorities who have asked all enforcement agencies like the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, the Enforcement Directorate, Income Tax (Investigation) and the CBI to stop all probes and "harassment" of the exporters, [20] are likely to have contributed a sizable portion of India's foreign exchange reserve, which has swelled since 1992.
Big and middle bourgeois are offered all kinds of incentives and tax-relief, apart from other concession and subsidies, on the ostensible plea that these would promote savings and stimulate investment. How valid is the plea?
It is actually public funds that mostly finance private enterprises. Public sector financial institutions like the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI), Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) and state financial corporations, besides the joint venture financial institutions like the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) were set up to promote investment in the private sector. A study of the companies assisted by the IDBI revealed that 27.3 per cent of the equity, 60 per cent of the preference shares and 63.7 per cent of the debentures of the large and medium-size companies were held by the public sector financial institutions.[21] According to an earlier study undertaken by the Corporate Study Group of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, public financial institutions held more than 50 per cent of the equity in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co., Escorts, Kirloskar Pneumatic and so on. Usually the debt-equity ratio when a project is set up is 3:1 or 4:1 and it is the public financial institutions and public sector banks, besides foreign creditors, that provide all the loans. The above study pointed out that the asset holding of the following seven families, which are the leading ones in the private corporate sector, are less than one per cent of the total assets of the companies they control — Tatas: 0.4 per cent; Mafatlal: 0.9 per cent; Birlas: 0.2 per cent; Shri Ram: 0.1 per cent; Singhanias: 0.7 per cent; Thapars: 0.2 per cent; and K.P. Goenka: 0.3 per cent.[21a] The working capital for a project is usually provided by public sector commercial banks.
A big business house makes only a marginal contribution to the costs of setting up a large industrial project. And usually it takes back its share of the costs during the construction of the project itself. To quote S. K. Goyal,
"a large part of the project costs consists of machinery and civil works. The execution of the industrial projects is undertaken, invariably, by sister concerns. It is well known that in all project executions the contracting firms make profits which may be 10 per cent or more of the total cost. Thus, the business reality in India happens to be that the promoters have by and large earned back their own contribution in the project even before the projects go into operation!"[22]
Indian businessmen are keen on making quick profits and much interested in running a parallel economy that is tax-evaded. According to an estimate of the Planning Commission, the amount of black money is about Rs 3 lakh crore at 1989-90 prices. The addition to the parallel economy is put at Rs 50,000 crore per year by conservative estimates.[23] Surinder K. Singh, a member of Parliament's standing committee on finance, also told Economic Times that the information available with the committee shows the unaccountable economy amounting to Rs 3 lakh crore at constant prices.[24] The black money is invested in real estate, share markets, etc, for quick speculative profits.
Our businessmen are in the habit of transferring illegally a substantial portion of their unaccounted money to be stashed in their secret accounts in foreign banks or in tax havens. It is through over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports and through what is called the hawala route that these illegal transfers take place. According to a Reuters report, dated 3 December 1992, the director of India's Central Bureau of Investigation told Reuters that most of the money leaving India through illegal channels was either deposited in "foreign banks which thrive on secrecy or in several tax havens across the world." The report states: "some official estimates place India's losses through illegal transfers at between $5.5 billion and $7.5 billion annually."[25] According to a study by three American economists (J.S. Zdanowicz, W.W. Welch, and S.J. Pak, "Capital Flight from India to the United States through Abnormal Pricing in International Trade", Finance India, September 1995), illegal flight of capital via over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports was perhaps even larger than the CBI estimate. In trade with the United States alone, during the year 1993, between $1.6 and $4.4 billion were funneled out of India using such practices; and since trade with the United States accounted for only about a-sixth of India's external trade, the total figure leaving the country through this route could be some multiples of that.
Madhu Dandavate, deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, made a very modest estimate of the black money circulating in the Indian economy when he said in December last year that it was to the tune of Rs 80,000 crore. As regards the money stashed away by Indian businessmen and politicians in Swiss banks alone, the chef de mission of the Swiss embassy in New Delhi, Dr Pierre Helg, quoted unofficial estimates suggesting that it amounted to more than $80 billion (Rs 280,000 crore) (Outlook, 26 March 1997, p. 52). Bhure Lal, central vigilance secretary, revealed that Swiss bank officials had told Indian investigators on the probe mission some time ago that the amount of Indian money lying in vaults cannot be estimated. He commented: "It is really a situation of rich India contributing to poor Europe." (The Statesman, 2 Dec. 1996)
Instead of contributing to savings and stimulating investment for productive purposes, various tax reliefs to the tycoons have only helped corruption to assume gigantic proportions to the detriment of the interests of the country and the people.
The landlords too are a favoured class who hardly pay any direct taxes. As already noted, according to the Eighth Plan, the ratio of direct taxes relating to the agricultural sector, including land revenue and agricultural income tax, to agricultural GDP fell from about 1.2 per cent in 1950-51 to less than 0.7 per cent in 1989-90.[26]
On the other hand, all kinds of state bounties are showered on the landlords and rich farmers and they are the main beneficiaries of hundreds of thousands of crores of rupees invested for the development of agriculture, for it is they who own most or the land. They thus get the bulk of the benefits of low irrigation rates, subsidized electricity, cheap credit to buy farm machinery, subsidized fertilizers, etc. It is the landlords and rich peasants who can derive the maximum benefit from the increases in procurement prices: for procurement prices set the 'floor' price above which prices in private trade are fixed. An overwhelmingly large share of the benefits from irrigation, subsidized electricity, cheap credit and subsidized fertilizers is appropriated by the landlords and rich peasants. The Eighth Plan states that, according to estimates for 1987-88, "the gap between the annual working expenses and the gross receipts from water rates stood at over Rs 400 crores.... Similar problems exist in the case of ground-water irrigation where water rates reflect only about 1/6th of economic water rates. Electric charges for agriculture purposes including pumping of water are highly subsidized.[27] (Two qualifications need to be mentioned here. First, the figures for subsidies are not reliable, as they also include massive plunder by various other interests. For example, the contractor-bureaucrat-politician alliance drains massive funds out of each irrigation project, which are then added to the 'costs' of the project. Fertilizer plants have been built with grossly overpriced imported technology; and there is a further incentive to inflate costs because the prices they receive are on the basis of a cost-plus calculation. Secondly, even in a planned socialist economy, subsidies may be maintained for various agricultural inputs, with the perspective of ensuring agricultural development. The point is that in our society, given the sharp inequalities of land distribution and the tight grip wielded by the larger landholders over rural administration, such subsidies actually benefit only a narrow section.)
According to S.S. Acharya, Chairman of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, the subsidy for irrigation was Rs 3,011 crore, for electricity Rs 5,963 crore and the total input subsidy for the agricultural sector was Rs 14,082 crore in 1992-3.[28] The middle and poor peasants had only a small share of benefit from these subsidies.
The landlords are among the ruling classes of India: they share State power with the comprador big bourgeoisie. And like the latter, they contribute little to the financing of the Plans.
Deficit financing is another important tool of India's ruling classes for raising resources to finance the Plans. The Indian ruling classes have resorted to greater and greater monetary expansions — much greater than what the meagre increase in national income has justified — to raise resources during the second and all subsequent plans. During the Third Plan (1961-66), for instance, the annual rate of growth of national income was 2.2 per cent but the money supply increased by about 40 per cent. The growth of the national income especially of the per capita income (which has been about 1.4 per cent per annum), has always lagged far behind the monetary expansion.
Like more and more of indirect taxation, the reckless monetary expansion has invariably caused severe inflationary pressures since the mid-fifties. While the rate of growth of production, especially of mass consumption goods, is slow, the growth of money supply and consequent rise in the prices of goods, especially essential goods, is very rapid. We shall soon return to this aspect.
Internal debt is another important source of finance for the plans. It, too, is mounting every year. The outstanding internal debt of the Centre during 1993-94 stood at Rs 2,42,729 crore, which was higher by Rs 43,627 crore than in the previous year. The other liabilities comprising small savings, provident funds, etc., rose to Rs 1,83,298 crore in 1993-4 from Rs 1,60,554 crore in 1992-3.[29] The budget for 1995-6 has estimated interest payments for the interest loans at Rs 52,000 crore, which will take away 51.5 per cent of total revenue receipts.[30]
As noted before, Indian Plans are invariably dependent on external loans. The costs that the Indian people have to pay for such finance are quite a heavy burden on them. Only for servicing the external debt — apart from other payments under different guises — India had to pay the foreign creditors during the last four years alone $35.52 billion ($8.2 billion in 1991-2 and again in 1992-3, $8.32 billion in 1993-4 and $10.8 billion in 1994-5) — approximately Rs. 1,11,888 crore. These are official estimates. The actual outflows must have been much greater.
A contributor to The Statesman wrote: "...the outstanding dues of the Government, domestic and international, were Rs 723,850 crore in 1994-95 that went up to Rs 783,462 crore in 1995-96.... It must be realised that whenever the Government talks of external debts, it gives figures at historical prices, which means the actual implication is far more ominous." (Aditi Roy Ghatak, "Pig's Breakfast: Making a Mess of Reforms", The Statesman, 27 Feb. 1997).
According to the Budget for 1997-98, the revised estimates of repayment of debt (internal and external) was Rs 66,545 crore and of interest payments Rs 58,500 crore — a total of Rs 125,045 crore, which was 95.6 per cent of the total revenue receipts of the Government of India in 1996-97. The budgeted figures for repayment of debt and interest payments in 1997-98 are respectively Rs 74,632 crore and Rs 68,000 crore, totalling Rs 142,632 crore, expected to be 93.1 per cent of the total revenue receipts. The percentage is likely to be exceeded as there are likely to be shortfalls in revenue receipts on account of the tax concessions showered on the corporate sector and the rich. The debts and the payments to service debts are mounting fast — higher and higher every year.
All these ways of financing the Plans — heavy indirect taxation (and all kinds of tax relief to big and middle bourgeoisie and landlords), the enormous increase in money supply without corresponding growth in the purchasing power of the people, the staggering increase in internal and external debt and the servicing of them — are means of transferring money from the toiling people to the bourgeoisie and the landlords and from the Indian people to the foreign bourgeoisie.
All these have invariably contributed to the rise in inflationary pressures on the economy since the mid-fifties. Inflation, the scourge of the toiling people, has been particularly severe since 1991-92. The average annual rate of inflation in 1990-1 was 13.6 per cent, in 1991-92 13.7 and in the following years — 1992-3, 1993-4 and 1994-5 — it was 10.1, 8.4 and 10.8 percent respectively.[31] In the same years the growth of the GDP was 1.1, 4.0, 3.8 and 5.3 per cent respectively. This growth in the GDP in 1991-5 was propped by a boom in the financial sector, which outstripped the growth rates in the primary and secondary sectors.
The official Economic Survey 1994-5 states, "Primary articles continue to contribute disproportionately to the total inflation, with an increase in their contribution from 35 per cent in 1993-94 (till February) to 46 per cent in 1994-95 (till February)." The regular and steep increase by the Government, especially in the eighties and in the nineties, of prices of foodgrains, sugar, etc., supplied through the public distribution system and of administered prices of petroleum products, coal, and of freight rates and fares have intensified the inflationary pressures. In most years the prices of foodstuff have tended to rise faster than those of other goods. While the GDP growth is slow and the per capita GDP is much slower, the food prices have risen steadily and steeply. In the three years alone — 1991-2 to 1993-4 the Central Government increased the issue prices of wheat and rice under the public distribution system (which is supposed to benefit the poor) by 72 per cent and 86 per cent respectively.[32] This also led to a spurt in their prices in the open market.
Inflation, particularly the soaring food prices, hurt the toiling people most, for a large majority of them spend most of their income on the purchase of food — the barest necessity for survival. To quote B. S. Minhas,"the poor and the weak, who have no means available to them to neutralize inflation, are hit in their stomachs. Every one per cent increase in the rate of inflation, over and above the rate at which the real incomes of the poor might grow, manages to swell their ranks by more than one per cent. The direct benefits of the anti-poverty programmes and food subsidy are obliterated many times over even by a modest acceleration in the rate of inflation."[33]
While the benefits of 'development' planning are reaped by the imperialist bourgeoisie, its compradors and the landlords, the cost is borne by other sections of the people.
Next Page Previous Page Table of Contents
1. Kalecki, "Theories of Growth in Different Social Systems", Monthly Review, Oct. 1971, p.77.
2. GOI, Planning Commission, Seventh Five Year Plan, 1985-90, New Delhi, 1985, Vol. I, 57,5X (Table 4.15).
4. See AlE, No.12, Jan.-Mar.1994, Table 4, p.15. The source is Statistical Outline of India, Tata Services.
5. GOI, Planning Commission, Eighth Five Year Plan, 1992-97, Vol. I, p.95.
7. Harrison (ed.), India and the United States, p. 151, also p.152; see also Mathew J. Kust, Foreign Enterprise in India: Laws and Policies, Bombay, 1965, pp. 386 ff.
9. Neeraj Kaushal, "Corporate Lies and Statistics", ET, 30 Mar. 1995.
10. The Statesman, 17 May 1995.
12. ET 300: India's Corporate Giants (an Economic Times publication giving the rank and financial performance of each of the top 300 companies for the financial years 1991-92 and 1992-93), Bombay, n.d., p.16.
14. "Money Manager" supplement, BS, 28 Dec. 1995.
16. Amaresh Bagchi, "Export Incentives in India: A Review", in Amiya Kumar Bagchi and Nirmala Banerjee (eds.), Change and Choice in Indian Industry, Calcutta, 1981, pp.315-6.
20. See BS, 1 Jun. and 5 Jul.1994; The Statesman, 21 Dec.1994; ET, 27 Feb. 1995.
21a. The Telegraph, 23 Jun. 1983.
22. S.K. Goyal, op cit, p.110.
23. ET, 11 Mar. 1991; see also V.M. Dandekar, "Budget 1994-95: Fiscal Aspects and the Real Economy", EPW, 16-23 Apr. 1994, p.989.
25. See AIE, No. 9, Jul-Sep. 1992, p.62.
26. Eighth Five Year Plan 1992-97, Vol. I. p.95.
27. Eighth Five Year Plan 1992-97, Vol. II, pp.67-8.
28. S. S. Acharya, "Getting the Subsidies Right", ET, 27 Mar. 1995.
29. Extracts from Reserve Bank of India's report on Currency and Finance, 1993-94, reproduced in ET, 16 Mar. 1995.
31. The Statesman, 29 Apr. 1995.
32. Jaya Mehta "Prices and Distribution", in Public Interest Research Group, Alternative Economic Survey 1993-94, Delhi 1994, p.77.
33. Minhas, "Planning Process and Budgets" (Excerpts), ET, 10 Jul. 1987.