Soon after entering prison, Gandhi appealed to the Viceroy "to reconsider his position" and repeated his request for the fourth time within about a fortnight to allow him to see him. This communication was not even acknowledged. In a letter of 15 January 1932 he wrote to the Secretary of State that he had tried his "best to keep up co-operation but failed in my opinion through no fault of my own". He went on assuring the raj that he would be more delighted than anybody else "to endorse any worthy suggestion for co-operation by the Congress with the Government and the Round Table Conference" and that "by instinct I am a co-operator". In his long cable of 13 November to Lord Sankey, he expressed his deep regret at the Viceroy not permitting him even a chance to suspend civil disobedience. Again, he assured Sankey that he was "actually dying for co-operation" and that the Lord "would find `Gandhi in his pocket' if a genuine gesture of co-operation is forthcoming from the Government side".(1)
Gandhi's British emissaries were also trying their best to promote this spirit of co-operation between the Congress leaders and an intransigent British government. Among them were C.F. Andrews and members of the India Conciliation Group -- Agatha Harrison, Professor Horace Alexander and others.(2) With Gandhi's blessings they were making behind-the-scene approaches to British ministers like Irwin, Sir Samuel Hoare and Ramsay MacDonald. Gandhi was "quite sure that all of you over there are doing your best and what is proper".(3)
But neither the appeals and assurances of the mahatma nor these approaches by his British friends yielded any fruit. The raj wanted from the Gandhis unqualified surrender and refused to provide them with any fig-leaf of negotiations. They sought to coerce the Gandhis to give up even their seemingly oppositional role and to cast them in a new role -- junior partners in the imperial enterprise of exploitation and oppression. In the critical years that were ahead, they wanted the Congress leaders to assume charge of Indian affairs under their aegis.
Contrary to what the Indian academicians and the Pavlovs say, the Indian big bourgeoisie was no less interested in preventing all conflicts with the raj. As noted before, when, at the invitation of Gandhi and Patel, the Bombay millowners saw Gandhi before his arrest, Sir Homi Mody, Chairman of the Bombay Millowners Association, warned that the civil disobedience movement, if launched, would not have their support.(4) Rather, they rallied to the support of the raj and British capital. Boycott of foreign cloth was one of the key planks of the programme of the civil disobedience movement, but Mody was the architect of the Mody-Lees Pact, which agreed to a lower tariff for Lancashire textiles than that recommended by the Indian Tariff Board. The pact was concluded in 1933 and approved by the Bombay Millowners Association. Purshotamdas Thakurdas attended the third RTC in London, which opened in November 1932, when repression was in full swing, and held that India's salvation "lies in coming to some understanding with British commerce".(5) Thakurdas was doing his best to assure the British raj of Gandhi's devotion to the cause of peace between imperial Britain and colonial India and to restore "friendly relations between the Congress and the government". He pointed out to the Secretary of State in his letter of 4 September 1933 that it looks as if in substance the difference between the Government and Gandhiji is not fundamental" and that Gandhi also seeks "the withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience movement".(6) While trying to get the civil disobedience movement withdrawn, Thakurdas was anxious to see that the boycott of British firms in cotton trade was removed and to arrange a meeting between leading Indian merchants and big British merchants to end the unsatisfactory state of affairs.(7)
After the second phase of civil disobedience movement had opened, G.D. Birla, who has been acclaimed by Bipan Chandra and many others as India's foremost `nationalist' bourgeois, was pledging loyal co-operation of his own and of the Indian business community to the Secretary of State. On 14 February 1932 Birla wrote to Samuel Hoare: "The best service I can render to my own country as well as to the cause of co-operation [between Britain and India] is to persuade the Federation [FICCI] to officially offer its co-operation.... I shall discuss there [in Calcutta] with Mr Benthall and others the question of closer co-operation between the two communities interested in trade and commerce." Forwarding a copy of a resolution which the Committee of the FICCI adopted at the instance of Birla and Thakurdas, Birla wrote to Hoare on 14 March that the resolution "definitely commits us to a policy of co-operation". He went on to say:
"I always make a distinction between Gandhiji and the Congress, and I again submit that it is possible for you to give us a constitution which, though not acceptable to the Congress, may not be rejected by Gandhiji...what I want is a permanent peace between the two countries....I wish I could convert the authorities to the view that Gandhiji and men of his type are not only friends of India but also friends of Great Britain, and that Gandhiji is the greatest force on the side of peace and order. He alone is responsible for keeping the left wing in India under check. To strengthen his hands is, in my opinion, therefore to strengthen the bond of friendship between the two countries.... Probably the best way to success in this mission [of explaining Gandhi] is to give you our co-operation as far as possible."
He assured Hoare that he could rely on Birla's "humble services" in bringing about happy relations between the imperialist metropolis and the colony. Referring to the Ottawa Conference, Birla said, as we noted in Chapter One, that Thakurdas would be delighted to accept an invitation to represent
Indian trade and commerce at this conference. "We", wrote Birla, "realize the importance of this Conference and you may rely on our support in the right direction." Before concluding the letter, the `radical' Indian `nationalist' gave Hoare the assurance that "you will find us always ready to work for the economic interest leaving aside sentiments and politics".(8)
Similar appeals and assurances Birla conveyed to Lord Lothian, Under-Secretary of State for India in 1931-2, Chairman of the Indian Franchise Committee in 1932 and, later, British ambassador to the USA.(9)
As early as July 1923, M.R. Jayakar, then a prominent Congress and Swarajist leader of Maharashtra, observed with some regret:
"The internal control of politics in Gandhi's time is often exercised through the influence of wealth and patronage and a community like the Deccanis, which can boast of no commercial magnates like the Tatas, Birlas and Kasturbhais, cannot possibly control politics from the inside. The influence that such men, by their patronage and capacity to finance, wield over political movements may not be obvious. It is none the less real."(10)
What Jayakar wrote from his rich experience was no doubt true. But sometimes the comprador big bourgeois not only employed their funds and exerted behind-the-scene pressures to control Congress politics but played an active role in the making and implementation of major Congress policies -- a role little known to the people and ignored by historians. It appears that Gandhi and Birla, who together formed "a unique association" (as Birla claimed), were the two major architects of the new policies which brought about a transformation in the very character of the Congress -- from a party treading from time to time the path of non-co-operation and civil disobedience to a `parliamentary' party, a Swarajist party of old but with a very important difference. When the Swaraj Party vowed to carry the fight against the raj to the legislative councils, to put up "uniform, continuous and consistent opposition to the Government" and refuse office to make the Government of India Act of 1919 unworkable, the Congress decided in 1937 to form ministries in as many provinces as it could and work the new British-imposed constitution. Encouraged and applauded by Gandhi, Birla played an active role in bringing about this transition from the politics of non-violent satyagraha to constitutional politics, the politics of collaboration with the raj as an adjunct to the colonial state machinery.
As Birla wrote later, he hated civil disobedience or any kind of mass action. He was afraid that "if this psychology continues any Government, even our own, would become an impossibility.... Hence my dread at anything that will lead us towards a mass movement.... Hence my horror at any talk of civil disobedience."(11) His political goal was, as he wrote to Professor J.M. Keynes on 28 May 1932, "a decent place in the household of King George the Fifth"(12) -- in other words, self-government within the British empire. He believed that India would attain this goal through negotiations, persuasion and personal contacts and by following the constitutional path, for he held that the British since Macaulay's days were eager that "Indians should progressively learn to govern themselves and do so as soon as they could". As Birla said, he "sought to prevent the growing distrust, which the British in India entertained of Gandhiji's high motives and the passionate distrust which Indians felt in regard not merely to the English in India but towards British statesmen and the British Parliament".(13) What he wanted was that the Congress should abjure mass action for all time, strictly stick to the constitutional path and rely on negotiations and the `personal touch' to arrive at the goal. Birla held that the two countries, India and Britain, "by destiny are bound together".(14)
In 1932 Gandhi and the Congress leaders entered a blind alley. They were anxious to shirk all conflicts with the raj, yet they were trapped in a conflict. The British imperialists would not allow them to beat an honourable retreat. The raj would not be content with anything less than an unabashed capitulation, that is, withdrawal of the civil disobedience movement without going through the ritual of interviews, talks and negotiations as a face-saving device. In such a situation G.D. Birla took upon himself the task of conciliating the rulers, disabusing their minds about the true intentions of the Congress leaders, making commitments on behalf of Gandhi, and bringing them closer. In his "Foreword" to G.D. Birla's In the Shadow of the Mahatma, first published in 1953, Rajendra Prasad, then our Rashtrapati, commended the book, saying:
"Little, however, is known of what was passing behind the scenes both in Mahatma Gandhi's camp and the Government's. This volume to an extent fills this gap.... One can see from this book how he [Birla] undertook visit after visit to England on his own and utilized the opportunity for keeping those in places of authority there well informed about the way Gandhiji's mind was working. He never claimed to act as an appointed agent on behalf of Gandhiji and yet having studied and understood his philosophy and his programme, he took upon himself the responsibility to convey its implications to those that counted. And it may be said that he succeeded in no small measure in this self-appointed role."(15)
The gap to which Prasad referred is also partly filled by the letters and other writings compiled by Birla in the four volumes of Bapu: A Unique Association as well as Gandhi's writings published in his Collected Works.
In 1932 and subsequent years Birla worked hard to remove the misunderstanding and mistrust between Gandhi and his associates on the one hand and the British colonial rulers on the other. His objects were to put an end to direct action for all time, get the Congress to work the new constitution as "partners in this repression and in the exploitation of our people" (to borrow Nehru's phrase), build an alliance between the raj and the Congress leadership, and to curb the growth of "the left wing", that is, to deal effectively with the oppressed people.
As a true comprador that he was, Birla wrote to Sir Walter Layton on 20 May 1932 that "if I would be dealing entirely with businessmen I should not find any difficulty in convincing them that the interest of India as well as of Great Britain lay in a friendly and permanent settlement". As "an Indian who has got a large stake in the country", he yearned for "permanent peace between the two countries" and assured Sir Walter that Gandhi was "as much a friend of Great Britain as of India".(16)
In order to conciliate the raj Birla was not only conveying the "implications" of Gandhi's "philosophy" and "programme" to "those that counted" in London but was also wooing leading representatives of expatriate British capital in India like Sir Edward Benthall(17) and the King's deputies in India. In his pursuit after "permanent peace" Birla saw Sir John Anderson within a few days of his arrival and had several interviews with him. Eloquent in praise of the man who came to Bengal trailing clouds of notoriety for his role in the `Black and Tan' operations in Ireland, he sought his help to persuade the raj to relent. Anderson agreed with Birla that Gandhi "was a most reasonable man and very modest in outlook", of whom Findlater Stewart, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India, "had spoken to him very highly".(18)
On 17 August 1932 the `Communal Award' by the British Prime Minister, who had been invited by the Indian delegates, including Gandhi, to give his award, was announced. As noted before, Gandhi had assured MacDonald that the Congress would abide by his award and would be content with separate electorates for the Muslims and the Sikhs, but would resist if separate electorates or statutory reservation of seats in the legislatures were provided for other minorities. But when MacDonald granted separate electorates not only to the Muslims and the Sikhs but to all other religious minorities including a handful of European expatriates, Gandhi and the other Congress leaders did not utter a single word of protest except in the case of "depressed classes".
The Communal Award gave the Europeans in Bengal and Assam incredibly high representation. In Bengal 14,175 Europeans, forming less than .01 per cent of the population, were awarded 25 seats in a house of 250 -- 10 per cent of the total, while the Muslims constituting 54.8 per cent of the population were allotted 119 seats -- 47.6 per cent of the total seats -- and the Hindus, forming 44.8 per cent of the population, 80 seats, no more than 32 per cent.
As regards communal representation, the Communal Award was manifestly unjust especially to the Hindus but also to the Muslims. In Punjab, too, the Muslims, though the majority community, were given less than half the number of seats.
Gandhi went on a fast on the issue of separate electorate for the depressed classes but he and the other Congress leaders swallowed the rest of the Communal Award on the specious plea that they were out to reject the entire Government of India Act of 1935. Though they claimed to represent all classes and all communities, they did not oppose British imperialism's deliberate policy to split the Indian people on the communal basis in order to perpetuate their rule. The resistance to only one provision of the Communal Award clearly shows that, while claiming to fight for independence, they submitted to the imperial policy of `divide and rule' and were eager to participate in constitutional politics on the basis laid down by British imperialism.
It was obvious that a handful of Europeans, non-nationals dominating India's trade, commerce, industry, plantations, banking, etc., were given fantastic representation so that they might directly exercise sinister influence on Bengal's politics, which was conducive to the interest of the big compradors like Birla. It was in the interest of the big Marwari compradors based in Calcutta, with whose compatriot agents the urban and rural markets of Bengal and Assam were honeycombed, that the Congress leaders did not make even a whimper of protest against this representation of the Europeans in Bengal and Assam.
Long before, at the Delhi Congress session in 1918, C.R.Das had spoken in support of a resolution which stated:
"That the non-official Europeans should not be allowed to form separate electorates...and if they are allowed such representation it should be limited to their proportion compared to the population of the provinces concerned."
But all this was ignored by other eminent Congress leaders -- then as well as later.(19)
Lying on his death-bed early in January 1931, Maulana Mohammed Ali, too, strongly opposed the principle of giving any weightage to the Europeans in Bengal.(20)
At the Congress session in 1934, both Hindu and Muslim delegates from Bengal raised objections to the over-representation of the Europeans in Bengal, but in vain.(21)
The Congress leaders broke their silence over this issue about fourteen years after the announcement of the Communal Award. In about mid-1946, when the British Cabinet Mission announced its plan about the future constitutional set-up in India, the Congress came out in sharp denunciation of the European representation. They were afraid that the Europeans in Bengal and Assam Assemblies voting in the elections to the proposed Constituent Assembly might affect its composition to the detriment of their interests. Nehru rhetorically asked what did the "tremendous over-representation [of the Europeans] in Bengal and Assam signify except the patent fact that a colonial economy has been translated into the political sphere". Gandhi said:
"Till now they had used their vote to uphold the British power and acted as a wedge between the Hindus and the Mussalmans."
He belatedly questioned their right "to be in the Assemblies at all".(22) Gandhi and Nehru were quite right when they accused the Europeans of acting "as a wedge between the Hindus and Mussalmans" of Bengal and of helping to strangle "the dumb millions". In fact, the Europeans could play this role since the inauguration of the Government of India Act 1935 because the Congress policy was complementary to theirs. We shall return to this point later. It may be noted here that the Congress leaders had no objection to the Europeans continuing to play the same role in Bengal and Assam. In his letter of 14 June 1946 to Viceroy Wavell, Congress president Abul Kalam Azad made it explicit that they objected only to the British "participating in and influencing the elections to the constituent assembly".(23)
On 18 August 1932, the day after the announcement of MacDonald's Communal Award, Gandhi wrote to him that unless his government revised its decision in respect of separate electorates for the depressed classes, he would go on fast from 20 September. As he confided to his associates, Patel and Mahadev Desai, he felt worried that "the separate electorate will create division among Hindus so much that it will lead to bloodshed. Untouchable hooligans will make common cause with Muslim hooligans and kill caste Hindus."(24) The Muslims were already alienated from the Congress; Gandhi could hardly permit the `untouchables' to break away from the Hindu or Congress fold. To avert the disaster the mahatma decided to undertake a fast.
It was Gandhi's public stance that separate electorate for the depressed classes would erect a wall between them and the caste Hindus and be destructive of the Hindu religion. Replying to Gandhi, MacDonald contended that under the government's scheme no wall of separation would arise and the unity of the Hindu community would in no way be impaired. Under the scheme the depressed classes would remain a part of the Hindu community and vote in the general Hindu constituencies. The scheme proposed to create only a small number of special constituencies in seven provinces, from which the depressed classes, despised by the upper castes, might return members of their own choosing to the legislatures "to voice their grievances and ideals", besides voting in the general Hindu constituencies.
Gandhi replied: "Without arguing I affirm that for me this matter is one of pure religion." So the supreme leader of India's `freedom' struggle resolved to go on a fast to put pressure on the British raj to withdraw a provision in a constitution then under preparation by the raj for enforcement in colonial India -- not on the issue of national freedom, which would see the end of colonial slavery and all British-made constitutions, and for which the civil disobedience movement is supposed to have been launched.
It had been announced by MacDonald that any alternative scheme mutually agreed upon by the caste Hindus and the depressed classes would be accepted.
Before embarking on his fast at God's call, Gandhi did not spare his efforts to organize public opinion so that he might not have "to carry the fast to its logical end".(25) On 18 September, two days before the fast began, G.D. Birla, Thakurdas, Sir Chunilal Mehta (Bombay's bullion king and Thakurdas's cousin), Mathuradas Vasanji -- all business magnates -- had seen Gandhi in prison "to sound Gandhi on some sort of compromise on a system of joint electorates with the reservation of seats".(26) The mahatma's fast put the required pressure on B.R. Ambedkar and other leaders of the depressed classes to arrive at a settlement, which was immediately endorsed by the British raj. Though the mahatma had been opposed in London to both separate electorates and reservation of seats for the minorities except the Muslims and the Sikhs, the compromise that was achieved, known as the `Poona Pact', provided for reservation of seats for the depressed classes as well as a modified form of separate electorate for them. Under it there would be a primary round of elections in which the members of the depressed classes alone would participate to send up a panel of depressed class candidates for the reserved seats, who would have to face a mixed electorate of caste Hindus and depressed classes for final election; and there was a considerable increase in the number of reserved seats for them from what had been granted by MacDonald -- from 81 seats in the whole of India to 148. G.D. Birla played a leading part in arranging the settlement and bringing the fast to a happy end. The `Poona Pact' was signed, among others, by the two Birla brothers (Ghanshyamdas and Rameswardas), Thakurdas, Sir Lallubhai Samaldas, Sir C.V. Mehta, Walchand Hirachand (all tycoons), besides Malaviya, Ambedkar, Rajendra Prasad, Rajagopalachari, Sapru, Jayakar and Devdas Gandhi.(27) Perhaps Bengal, where the scheduled castes were allotted 30 seats, was represented by G.D. Birla.
When the fast had commenced, Nehru, sitting in prison, noted in his diary: "...was not his [Gandhi's] action a recognition and in part an acceptance of the Communal Award and the general scheme of things as sponsored by the Government?.... was there not danger of our movement trailing off into something insignificant after so much sacrifice and brave endurance?" He criticized Gandhi's religious approach to a political question and frequent references to God. "What a terrible example to set!" he commented.
But, as usual, the "emotional crisis" was soon over and when the news came of the settlement he was ecstatic in praise of Gandhi and his action. "By his fast", wrote Nehru, "he has changed the face of India and killed untouchability at a blow."(28)
Whether untouchability was killed or not, the civil disobedience movement was killed with this blow. Immediately on ending his fast Gandhi declared in a press statement: "None would be more delighted than I would be to endorse any worthy suggestion for co-operation by the Congress with the Government and the Round Table Conference." He promised that "when the proper time comes, I should throw the whole of my weight in favour of co-operation".(29)
The Harijan Sevak Sangh was formed with G.D. Birla as its all-India president. Birla was authorized to nominate the presidents of the provincial boards. "Centralization [of powers in the Sangh] was insisted upon by Sheth Ghanshyamdas Birla and Shri Amritlal Thakkar [the nominated general secretary] for the decisive reason that money was found by the Centre... and the policy was also evolved by the Central Board." Gandhi coined a new name, `Harijan' -- God's own man -- for a member of the depressed classes -- `the untouchable'. The Harijan Sevak Sangh became an exclusively caste Hindu organization after the resignation of Ambedkar and another `Harijan' from the Central Board for, the Sangh, as Gandhi argued, was intended to expiate the sin of the caste Hindus and there was hardly any room for `Harijans' in it.(30)
A campaign was started for opening the doors of Hindu temples to the `untouchables': Gandhi himself was leading it from within the prison, all facilities for which were generously provided by New Delhi's Mussolini and his men. In February 1933 Harijan, an English weekly, was started as Gandhi's mouthpiece and was followed in quick succession by several language editions -- Hindi (with Birla Mills, Delhi, as its address), Bengali, Gujarati and Tamil.
When Ambedkar was asked for a message for Harijan, he refused to give any, saying: "The outcaste is a by-product of the caste system. There will be outcastes as long as there are castes. And nothing can emancipate the outcaste except the destruction of the caste system."(31) But the mahatma was among the most eloquent defenders of the hereditary caste system -- the varnashrama -- minus the later proliferations of castes and sub-castes. "If abolition of castes", wrote Gandhi, "means the abolition of varna I do not approve of it."(32)
The untouchables were and are mostly scavengers, leather-workers, poor or landless peasants, often bond slaves of caste Hindu or other landowners. This section of the most wretched on earth had and still has in many rural areas to perform various social obligations to caste Hindus, crippling and most degrading. In some areas landlords and their sons abuse their women sexually, with impunity. The leaders of the untouchables were not much interested in temple entry. What they were interested in was improvement in their social, economic and political status. Ambedkar told Gandhi in October 1932 "that I have no interest in the temples being thrown open, common dinners and the like, because we suffer thereby.... I only want that social and economic hardships should end".(33) Ambedkar was right when he said that "it is a mistake to suppose that it [untouchability] is only a religious system.... It is also an economic system which is worse than slavery.... History shows that where ethics and economics come in conflict, victory is always with economics."(34)
But the mahatma was opposed to any change in the social and economic status quo. He extolled the occupation of scavengers as "a holy profession" and their services as indispensable, and advised them "to be conscious of the dignity of your profession, to learn to practise it [disposal of night-soil] in a clean manner". His "ideal Bhangi" [scavenger] was one who would approach his profession "only as a sacred duty... would not dream of amassing wealth out of it"(!) and "would consider himself responsible for the proper removal and disposal of all the dirt and night-soil within the area which he serves and regard the maintenance of healthy and sanitary condition within the same as the summum bonum of his existence". The mahatma wanted the `untouchables' to continue as helots but better helots with improved knowledge of their work and greater devotion to their "sacred duty" -- more contented, cleaner, and free from weaknesses like drinking and meat-eating, for which he often upbraided them. He said: "I would, therefore, suggest to reformers that they should not persuade Bhangis and Chamars to leave their occupation but they should, on the contrary, give them proper knowledge about their work."(35) "Under Gandhism", said Ambedkar, "the Untouchables are to be eternal scavengers."(36) In June 1936 the Adi-Karnataka Sangh deputation told Gandhi that it was no use concentrating on temple-entry when Harijans' economic and social conditions badly needed improvement. The leader of the deputation said to him that "instead of devising means to help them you are devising new means to keep them down".(37)
It was Gandhi's injunction during the temple-entry movement that the untouchables should not "seek to force entry into the orthodox temples even through the method of satyagraha". The privilege of entering them should be a gift of the caste Hindus.(38)
It appears that the mahatma's temple-entry agitation was intended to kill several birds with one stone.
First, it was expected to divert attention from the basic social and economic issues. The social and economic problems which, if raised, might do harm to the semi-feudal social structure, were swept under a religious carpet. One of the main problems was the problem of landlessness or near-landlessness of the `untouchables'. If any attempt was made to tackle this problem, the very roots of feudalism or semi-feudalism would be shaken. So the concrete realities of life were meant to be obscured by the religious outpourings about `sin' and `penance' and `sacred duty' and so on. The entire movement sought to maintain the social and economic status quo by appealing to the good sense of the dominant castes and classes to curb the grosser manifestations of the caste system. Even these the movement failed to eradicate. Despite the brave declarations of Gandhi and Nehru, made quite frequently before and after the campaign, that "Untouchability is on its last legs"(39), or untouchability has been "killed at one blow", the actual results were far from encouraging. In March 1946, after a long campaign of many years, Gandhi was informed by the Gujarat Harijan Sevak Sangh that in his home-province "apart from Karadi nowhere are temples open to Harijans, and nowhere may they use public wells". A few weeks before his death he said that the Harijans' conditions had become worse than during British rule.(40)
Second, the political situation in the early thirties demanded that Gandhi should step up the campaign against untouchability and for temple-entry. The Muslims were already alienated from the Congress; the representatives of the depressed classes had been asking for separate representation from as early as 1917;(41) during the Round Table Conference in 1931 a Minorities Pact had emerged and the depressed classes were also granted some separate constituencies under the MacDonald award. Years before, Gandhi had drawn the lesson from the Moplah revolt in 1921 that "If we do not wake up betimes, we shall find a similar tragedy(42) enacted by all the submerged classes.The `untouchables' and all the so-called semi-savage tribes will presently bear witness to our wrongs against them if we do not do penance and render tardy justice to them".(43) Besides, conversion of his `Harijans' to Christianity or Islam posed a problem. To quote Ram Gopal, "In the competition for the `untouchables' between Muslim leaders and the Hindu Mahasabha (which may be considered as including all other movements like the Arya Samaj, the Shuddhi Sabha, etc.), the Muslims were winning all along the line;... whatever the motive, they indeed were the pioneers to focus attention on the plight of the depressed classes."(44) Gandhi was afraid of the danger of the "poor Harijans [who] have no mind, no intelligence, no sense of difference between God and no-God", some of whom were according to him, "worse than cows in understanding", might be enticed by the "Christian Missions" and "Mussalmans and others" to leave the Hindu fold and swell their numbers. While he admonished the Christian missionaries and Muslims for converting the untouchables to their faiths, he warned the caste Hindus: "So long as the poison of untouchability remains in the Hindu body, it will be liable to attacks from outside."(45)
Though Gandhi denied it, many people held that the purpose of the anti-untouchability movement was "to secure domination of a consolidated Hindu majority, overwhelming all minorities by its numbers".(46)
The stepping-up of the movement was particularly necessary when constitutional changes were in the offing. These impending changes, as Gyanendra Pandey wrote, "inspired some of the institutional arrangements within the Congress in the early 1930s, particularly those connected with the establishment of a Harijan Sevak Sangh and the launching of a concerted Harijan programme". The campaign against untouchability, to quote Gyanendra Pandey again, "brought rich dividends to the Congress, especially in elections".(47)
The third bird that Gandhi's fast and the anti-untouchability movement killed was the civil disobedience movement. As noted before, the government allowed him all facilities of interview, correspondence, etc., to lead his campaign from within the prison. Interestingly, when the struggle for freedom from British rule was on, its supreme leader was busy soliciting the support of the Viceroy and other high officials for temple-entry bills which would remove legal obstacles for the trustees of Hindu temples to open them to the depressed classes. Subhas was right when he said: "As the year [1932] came to a close... resolutions were being passed from many a platform, at the instance of the Congress leaders, asking the Viceroy to accord sanction to the Temple Entry Bills in the Madras Legislative Council and the Indian Legislative Assembly. Civil Disobedience indeed!"(48)
The Viceroy informed the Secretary of State on 1 November 1932: "We think... there may be definite advantages in getting Gandhi involved in untouchability. It will rouse strong feelings on both sides and will divert attention from strictly political issues and Civil Disobedience." "The interest of many Congress workers", declared Secretary of State Hoare with considerable satisfaction, "has now been diverted to Mr Gandhi's campaign against untouchability."(49)
An article in the Communist International correctly put it: "The Congress, hiding behind the `struggle' for the abolition of the pariah system, is preparing the ground for adopting the constitution worked out by British imperialism. Thus the National Congress is literally repeating the manoeuvre which it carried out in 1922."(50)
G.D. Birla had a long interview with Gandhi in prison after the fast was over. Birla informed Hoare that Gandhi gave him "a clear indication that he was himself very eager to see peace restored and also promised that if I came back with permission to talk these matters he would give me something in writing".(51)
A little earlier, in July 1932, Birla was trying to arrange an interview between Anderson and Gandhi. Though Anderson was quite willing, it did not come off. The raj wanted Gandhi's capitulation -- total and unqualified -- without the figleaf of an interview and negotiation. The raj knew that the Congress leaders were panting to accept the dose of self-government that the new constitution it was drafting would give them and it refused to oblige Gandhi. Nothing availed -- neither Gandhi's own appeals and assurances of co-operation, nor the behind-the-scene approaches of his Indian and British intermediaries, nor the fast, nor the Harijan movement. The ice refused to melt.
On 17 March 1933 the White Paper on Indian Constitutional Reforms, an outline of the constitution then in the making, was issued by the British Government. The mahatma, driven into a corner, received "God's peremptory command"; "the voice became insistent". "At half past twelve came the clear, unmistakable voice: `you must undertake the fast'." So he announced on 30 April 1933 that he would go on another fast -- a fast for three weeks -- from 8 May. He informed the Home Secretary, Government of India, that the "reasons [were] wholly unconnected with Government and solely connected with Harijan movement".(52)
Immediately after the commencement of the fast on 8 May, the Government released him "in view of the nature of the object of the fast and the attitude of mind which it disclosed" -- a possibility which Gandhi had anticipated beforehand.(53) He repaired to the textile magnate Sir Vithaldas Thackersey's mansion at Pune to carry on his fast, which prompted Verrier Elwin to remark wrily: "Gandhi fasting to death in a marble palace is like Jesus Christ going to crucifixion in a Rolls-Royce."(54)
On the same day -- 8 May -- Gandhi issued a press statement condemning "the secrecy that has attended the [civil disobedience] movement". Pitying the "civil resisters [who] would be in a state of terrible suspense during the next three weeks", he asked acting Congress president M.S. Aney (who was afterwards appointed a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council) "to officially declare suspension [of the movement] for full one month or even six weeks". And, while assuring the raj of his co-operation, if he survived the ordeal, he made an appeal for the release of "all the civil resisters".(55)
In a communique issued on 9 May, the Government of India stated that the civil disobedience prisoners would not be released unless the movement was unconditionally withdrawn; and that it had "no intention of negotiating with the Congress for a withdrawal of the civil disobedience movement or of releasing prisoners with a view to arrive at any settlement".(56)
As usual, Gandhi did not think of observing democratic norms in getting the country-wide movement suspended for six weeks. His "comprehension of the difficulties of the Government" was truly remarkable. He always decried secret methods adopted by political workers when all open political work, except rendering support to the raj, was banned. But he never hesitated to carry on secret negotiations, directly or through intermediaries, with British imperialists and making secret commitments to them and getting the Congress to fulfill them. More of it later.
The suspension of the movement provoked Subhas Bose and V.J. Patel to issue a statement from Vienna (where Subhas had gone for treatment of tuberculosis of which he was a victim). The statement said: "The events of the last thirteen years have demonstrated that a political warfare based on the principle of maximum suffering for ourselves and minimum suffering for our opponents cannot possibly lead to success." It criticized the suspension as "a confession of failure" and called "for a radical reorganization of the Congress on a new principle and with a new method", for "a change of leadership" and, if necessary, for a new party within the Congress, "composed of all radical elements".(57)
Nehru reacted to the suspension by noting in his prison diary that it had come as "A shock -- and then a willing acceptance of the fact..." He wrote:
"As I watched the emotional upheaval during the fast I wondered more and more if this was the right method in politics. It is sheer revivalism and clear thinking has not a ghost of a chance against it.... His [Gandhi's] continual references to God irritate me exceedingly.... more and more I realize the gulf between Bapu and me and I begin to doubt if this way of faith is the right way to train a nation.... And then I cannot understand how he can accept, as he seems to do, the present social order; how he surrounds himself with men who are the pillars and the beneficiaries of this order.... How can we get anything worthwhile with these people as our hangers-on? No doubt they will profit and take advantage of both our movement and of any constitutional changes that may come.... I want to break from this lot completely..."(58)
This was one of Nehru's passing moods. As usual, discretion would soon prove to be the better part of his ideological and political valour; as usual, he would sacrifice his better feelings at the altar of his towering ambition; as before, he would accept "the present social order" and prove to be one of its ablest and staunchest bulwarks. He, too, would surround himself with the same, or the same type of, hangers-on as Gandhi, and while Gandhi invoked religion, he would, as before, invoke his non-violent `socialism' -- `socialism' without tears -- for the same end.
The fast went off well and, soon after it ended, Gandhi's son Devdas was married with Rajagopalachari's daughter Lakshmi in the Thackerseys' marble palace amidst rejoicings.
On 1 June, immediately after the fast was over, Gandhi confided his desire to Rajagopalachari to seek an interview with the Viceroy. Rajagopalachari said: "But they say we should go to them only after first completely withdrawing civil disobedience.... Then the mass struggle comes to an end." "That exactly is going to be the key to the whole affair", replied Gandhi.(59)
Yet there was no favourable response from the raj, for which Gandhi was pining. Writing to Andrews, who, besides other British friends, was contacting British ministers, he sounded a note of dejection and yet hoped that the work Andrews and the others were doing "will tell in the end". He promised that there was "no danger on this side of any precipitate action". Gandhi wired to Agatha Harrison that he would seek an interview with the Viceroy when his health permitted and that "for my part there will be no condition".(60) (These letters and cables, no doubt, passed through the official censorship, yet the raj remained deaf to all pleas.)
In June civil disobedience was suspended for another six weeks. In his prison diary Nehru wrote: "Civil Disobedience again suspended for six weeks -- to end of July! And among the mighty ones so deciding was G.D. Birla! Heigh ho! This is a funny world and not an easy place to live in."(61) Nehru might be right but this again was a fleeting mood, so usual with him.
On 12 and 14 July a meeting of select Congress leaders convened by Gandhi and Aney, was held at Pune. Mass civil disobedience was withdrawn while Gandhi retained the right of offering individual civil disobedience -- the fig-leaf. He sought an interview with the Viceroy to reach "an honourable settlement".(62) He was informed that unless civil disobedience was completely withdrawn, no interview would be granted. He repeated his request and assured the Viceroy: "I hanker for real peace...."(63) Yet there was no real change in the heart of New Delhi's Mussolini.