One should note that Birla's views and commitments to the raj received Gandhi's unqualified approval.
Birla was asked to make another commitment. The Government of India Act of 1935 was passed and Birla's and Gandhi's entreaties for a `personal touch' were rejected by the raj. Yet Zetland, Hoare, Halifax and Lothian insisted that Gandhi should make "no new commitments" (that is, should not come to, and announce, any decision) in respect of the new constitution until the new Viceroy arrived in India in April 1936.(137)
A few words about the GOI Act of 1935, which seemed attractive to the Gandhis and Birlas.
This constitution envisaged India as a sham `federation' of the eleven provinces of `British India' (while separating Burma from India, it created two more provinces -- Sind and Orissa) and `Princely India' comprising more than 560 states. The `federation' and a `responsible government' at the centre would emerge provided the princes of the states having at least half the total population of all the states would voluntarily agree to accession. The constitution gave the states, which together had only about one-fourth of the population of India, two-fifths of the seats in the upper house and one-third in the lower house of the `federal' legislature. `British India' would have separate electorates for the different communities. Franchise, based on property and educational qualifications, would be very much restricted.
Under the Act, the `responsible government' at the centre would have no control over defence, foreign affairs, tribal areas and ecclesiastical affairs, which would be administered by the Governor-General. The `responsible government' at the centre and the federal legislature would also have no say in regard to about 80 per cent of government finance, which would be spent on defence and so on. Besides, the Act armed the Governor-General with special powers for the prevention of grave menace to `peace and tranquillity', for the promulgation of ordinances, for the protection of the rights of the minorities, for ensuring the `financial stability' of the country and so on. Under the Act, pending the establishment of `federation', the Central government and the Central legislature would function as before, that is, according to the provisions of the 1919 Act.
The legislation passed by the `federal legislature', if it ever came into being, wrote Reginald Coupland, "would be subject to refusal of assent or to reservation by the Governor-General, acting under the control of the Secretary of State, and to disallowance by the Crown on the Secretary of State's advice..." and the British Parliament could "legislate for British India without regard, if so it chose, to Indian wishes".(138)
Under the new Act, the provinces of `British India' would be `autonomous'. There would be three lists of subjects -- central, provincial and concurrent -- defining the respective powers of the Centre and the provinces. About 11.5 per cent of the population would be enfranchised, cut up into different communal segments. The provincial administration would be under a governor appointed by the British government and assisted by a council of ministers responsible to the provincial legislature. The governor would enjoy "special responsibilities" as regards the peace and tranquillity of the province, safeguarding the rights of the minorities and so on and could overrule his ministers when he would be pleased to do so. On the plea that the administration of his province could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Act, he could dissolve the ministry and take upon himself the administration of the province. There was nothing in law to prevent the Governor-General and the governor from acting as they liked. The civil services and the police enjoyed protection and were not amenable to the control of the ministers.
The constitution bristled with things like "reserved subjects", "special responsibilities" and "safeguards". The British-owned industry, trade, banking, etc., were protected by "safeguards" against any interference with their right to fleece this country as before.
The Act was devised to build up a constitutional alliance between the imperialist masters, princes, big landlords and the compradors -- all reactionary forces, foreign and native -- to thwart the aspirations of the people.
When the Act was at the stage of preparation, an article in the Communist International stated :
"In its scheme of a pseudo-federal colonial India British imperialism seeks to create such a system as would enable it to preserve and consolidate in the safest possible manner its rule over India, by utilizing to the utmost the feudal relics and all the different contradictions (of a national, religious character, etc.).... The Constitution which imperialism seeks to introduce is aimed not only at strengthening the British yoke but at consolidating all the exploiting classes for the struggle against the Indian people, against the Indian revolution."(139)
Gandhi and his close associates and the Indian big compradors like Birla were quite optimistic. Even when the constitution was under consideration in the British Parliament, Gandhi "realized that the `Bill' was capable of producing benefit, if worked in the right spirit". Indeed, the Act, which Gandhi later described as "the creation of the best British brains" and behind which "there were honourable motives", was capable of producing benefit for the classes Gandhi represented. Birla was quite emphatic that the Act "did contain seeds which were to germinate, blossom and bear fruit giving us ultimately the full independence that we aspired for". He was indeed right as he added: "we have embodied large portions of the Act, as finally passed, in the Constitution which we have framed ourselves which shows that in it was cast the pattern of our future plans."(140)
Before leaving England, Birla wrote to Anderson that he had "been told that in the fullness of time my visit will bear fruit, so I am returning now to India with the blessings of the new Viceroy, the Secretary of State and those others who count".(141)
On his return to India in September, Birla "immediately went to Wardha to stay with Gandhi and give him a first-hand report of my impressions" as well as the messages from Hoare, Halifax and others.
Gandhi had sent his secretary to Bombay to bring Birla and Patel. He had invited Rajendra Prasad to come. Rajagopalachari had already arrived.(142)
As Birla informed Lothian, Zetland and others, "Gandhi was very much impressed" and promised Birla that "he would use his influence with the Congress, so that no new commitments in respect of the Reforms be made until after the arrival of Lord Linlithgow". Writing to Zetland on 23 September, Birla said: "I have found Mr Gandhi extremely responsive and this is a great satisfaction."(143)
Now Gandhi prepared to lead the Congress step by step in his own quiet way to work the constitution, while keeping his plans secret from the Congress and the people -- even from Nehru. Gandhi remained eloquently silent when the GOI Act of 1935 saw the light of day. He sent a message to Nehru, offering him presidentship of the next Congress session and trying to impose a vow of silence on him about the Act.(144)
Why did Gandhi offer presidentship of the Congress to Nehru? It seems that Gandhi wanted to attach him to his bandwagon in order to work the provincial part of the constitution without meeting with any serious challenge from within and outside the Congress, for Nehru was "the best shield of the Congress against left-wing groups and organizations".(145) Gandhi was sure, as he said at an AICC meeting in January 1942, that Nehru "says whatever is uppermost in his mind, but he always does what I want". Nehru's rhetoric would lull the people into complacency and suit Gandhi's purpose. Though Gandhi could not repose the same trust in Subhas,(146) yet two years later he took his chances seeking to utilize his leftist image, make Subhas amenable to his control by making him president, neutralize opposition to the federal part of the constitution and get the Congress to accept and work it. But his calculation went awry. Of that later.
The decision about whether to accept ministerial office under the new constitution was deferred by the Congress Working Committee and the AICC till the Lucknow Congress due to be held in April 1936. The Lucknow Congress under the presidency of Nehru rejected the new constitution "in its entirety". The resolution it adopted was eloquent on the fact that the constitution was "designed to facilitate and perpetuate the domination and exploitation of the people of India and is imposed on the country to the accompaniment of widespread repression and the suppression of civil liberties".(147) On the issue of office acceptance Nehru proclaimed from his presidential chair: "it would inevitably mean our co-operation in some measure with the repressive apparatus of imperialism, and we would become partners in this repression and in the exploitation of our people."(148) But, characteristically, Nehru refused to support the socialist amendments committing the Congress to a policy of rejecting ministerial office. Though the Lucknow Congress rejected the new constitution "in its entirety", it resolved to contest the next provincial elections under the new Act and left the question of accepting ministerial office "to be decided at the proper time by the AICC..."(149) The Faizpur Congress in December 1936, with Nehru as president, while reiterating "its entire rejection of the Government of India Act of 1935" and making radical noise, again deferred the question of acceptance of office -- a crucial question.
In the meantime -- on 20 April 1936, after the Lucknow Congress -- Birla wrote to Thakurdas that he was "perfectly satisfied with what has taken place [at Lucknow]. Mahatmaji kept his promise and without uttering a word, he saw that no new commitments were made. Jawaharlalji's speech in a way was thrown into the waste paper basket because all the resolutions that were passed were against the spirit of his speech.... the things are moving in the right direction. The election which will take place will be controlled by `Vallabhbhai Group' and if Lord Linlithgow handles the situation properly, there is every likelihood of the Congressmen coming into office."(150)
Nehru's verbal radicalism did not cease. On 16 June 1936 he declared: "If the Congress decides to accept office under the new Act, I am quite sure that to that extent it will co-operate with and strengthen British imperialism."(151)
In July 1936 the Congress Parliamentary Board Executive with Patel as President and Rajendra Prasad and G.B. Pant as Secretaries was appointed by the Working Committee. The Executive "declared that its main purpose was to transform the Congress organization into an electoral organization and to revitalize and reorientate it to this end".(152) As desired by the British imperialists, the Congress and Gandhian organizations like the Gandhi Seva Sangh were converted into vote-getting machines to work the new Act.(153)
During his interview with Viceroy Linlithgow on 5 August 1936, Birla said that "Gandhiji has kept his promise" but that there was yet no personal contact with him. Linlithgow hoped "to make a substantial contribution after the election is over" but he would not make any promise. Birla assured him that Gandhi would agree to acceptance of office. Receiving a report from Birla on the interview, Gandhi approved of it. Writing to Lothian next day, Birla said: "The whole question is, `should we make a serious effort to direct the energies of India once for all towards constitutional channels ?'"(154)
Birla had another interview with the Viceroy in March 1937 after the elections were over. The Viceroy was happy at the Congress's success in the elections and said: "In fact, in substance the difference between Gandhiji's position and my own position does not at all exist." He asked Birla: "Would Gandhiji rise against Jawaharlal if the latter disagreed with him on any compromise?" Birla unhesitatingly replied: "Jawaharlal would simply follow." Linlithgow agreed with Birla.(155) They knew the limits of Nehru's verbal anti-imperialism and socialism.
Meeting on 17 and 18 March 1937, the AICC acknowledged that people had voted for the Congress for its declared policy "to combat the new Act and end it" and instructed the elected Congress members of the legislatures to adhere to this policy. Surprisingly, the same resolution decided in favour of "acceptance of office in provinces where the Congress commands a majority", provided the leaders of the Assembly parties received assurances from the respective governors that they would not interfere when the ministers acted within the framework of the constitution.(156) Wrecking the constitution came to mean in the Congress leaders' parlance working it. Earlier, on 28 February, a similar resolution had been adopted by the Working Committee.
Referring to this resolution, Gandhi said :
"The practical part of that resolution concerning acceptance of office has been drafted by me. Jawaharlal thought that it was not in conformity with the remaining three-fourths of the resolution and with the [election] manifesto.... The language is open to two different interpretations; of this there is no doubt. But a satyagrahi can use language which may be interpreted in two different ways."(157)
In other words, a satyagrahi like Gandhi was privileged to use language which was capable of contrary interpretations and was deceptive.
Rajagopalachari, the leader of the Congress party in the Madras Assembly, told Erskine, Madras Governor, that "there was a real chance to get rid of the Civil Disobedience mentality for good, and that it would be a thousand pities if the chance was missed".(158) The deferment in making the crucial decision or rather in announcing it, until the elections were over, was no doubt a clever tactical move, for it reduced the chances of the Congress losing the support of many Congress workers and of many voters who took the main slogan of wrecking the constitution seriously and voted for the policy to combat the new Act.
Gandhi's formula of conditional office acceptance, like the observance by the Congress of 1 April 1937, the day of the inauguration of the constitution, as a day of protest, was a kind of political tactic, a sop to the anti-imperialist political workers and people who had believed in the Congress leaders' strident rhetoric about wrecking the constitution. This face-saving device would "enable the would-be Congress ministers to satisfy their own followers without demanding from Provincial Governors specific assurances which they were debarred by the Constitution from giving".(159) The Working Committee's resolution was described by the Congressmen of Bombay as a "typical Gandhian move".(160) Perhaps it is already clear that Gandhi and his closest associates had decided in favour of office acceptance much earlier. A few more facts may be cited. Kasturbhai Lalbhai, the leading Gujarati business magnate, close to Gandhi and Patel, told members of the British Textile Mission to India in December 1935 that he thought "Congress would take office and rule in the provinces". Before adopting the conditional office acceptance resolution, the Working Committee had already formulated a legislative programme "which assumes that Congressmen will form Ministries and settle down to work the constitution for a number of years".(161)
Interestingly, when in 1935, Bhulabhai Desai, a Working Committee member and leader of the Congress party in the Central Legislative Assembly, and S. Satyamurthi, the deputy leader, were lashing out in high-pitched rhetoric at the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, the Law Member of the Government of India said: "I again ask, what is the good of this heroic language of rejection -- `inconsistent with our self-respect and so on' -- when we know perfectly well that this constitution is going to be worked?"(162)
The Working Committee met from 5 to 9 July and decided in favour of office acceptance "even though the assurances asked for had not been forthcoming, either in form or in substance".(163)
This issue, like all other important issues, was not referred to the AICC for decision, though a resolution moved at the AICC meeting held on 24 and 25 April 1935, by a CSP leader that the Congress should refuse to accept office, had been withdrawn on the assurance of the Congress President Prasad that "no decision on the subject should be taken without consulting the House".(164)
Madras governor Erskine described the Working Committee's decision as an "abject and unconditional surrender" to the British position.(165)
Mahadev Desai wrote to Birla :
"Your jubilation...is shared by numerous people here [at Wardha]. The resolution is another personal triumph for Bapu. Jawahar and his friends of course behaved splendidly."
Desai also informed Birla: "When Jawahar came to Wardha three days before the W.C. [Working Committee meeting] Bapu's mind had been made up and I must say to the credit of Jawahar that he did not prove difficult to persuade." Gandhi too was highly appreciative of Nehru's readiness to co-operate and thought that it would "be most difficult to replace him [as Congress President] next year".(166) Nehru's volte-face was not unexpected: it had been anticipated by Birla and even by Linlithgow.
This interlude of conditional office acceptance, to be candid, was part of the Congress leaders' double-deal and double-speak. On the one hand, there were secret contacts and secret talks with the raj and promises of compliance with the raj's dictates, secretly communicated; on the other hand, there were brave resolutions and statements for the consumption of the people, breathing firm determination to wreck the "charter of slavery".
During this interlude Birla, as usual, played his part. In June he went to England as the government's non-official adviser in respect of Indo-British trade negotiations and saw Secretary of State Zetland, Halifax, Lothian and others. Birla was encouraged by Gandhi to pursue his mission. On 25 June Gandhi wrote to him that if Birla felt that his activity helped "the national cause", "Congress is bound to set its seal of approval on it".
Gandhi did not fail to compliment Birla for his contribution. On 18 July he wrote to Birla: "What you have been doing is good.... Good you will be. Good you remain."(167) Birla gave the benefit of his ideas and advice not only to Gandhi but to other leaders. As he wrote, "I always post one copy [of his letters to Gandhi] to Devdas [Gandhi's son and managing editor of Birla's Hindustan Times] in Delhi, one to Rajaji and one to my brother Rameshwarji who shows it to Sardar."(168)
In an article "Congress Ministries" in Harijan of 17 July, Gandhi wrote that as a result of office acceptance, Englishmen and Indians would "now be thrown together as they never have been before... If the Englishmen or Anglicized Indians can but see the Indian which is the Congress viewpoint, the battle is won by the Congress and complete independence will come to us without shedding a drop of blood.... In the prosecution by the Congress of its goal of complete independance, it [office acceptance] is a serious attempt on the one hand to avoid a bloody revolution and on the other to avoid mass civil disobedience on a scale hitherto not attempted."(169) In other words, the contact with Congress ministers would improve the British rulers' understanding of "the Congress viewpoint" and persuade them to make a gift of "complete independence", and no further struggle would be necessary.
It was along the road of constitutional co-operation and under the aegis of British imperialism that the Gandhis decided to proceed towards their goal of `complete independence'. This was the road indicated by the raj for the Congress to travel along. Senior British officials expected that "Congress would now become the controller of India's political forces under their aegis" -- "a domesticated animal harnessed to the constitutional cart of which the British still held the reins".(170)
In a speech on 28 July the Secretary of State welcomed the "great change for the brighter in the outlook of the political situation in India -- change of very profound significance". As Birla wrote, Gandhi's stocks in England rose very high: those who counted, the ruling classes, were very fond of him.(171)
The Congress leaders and the Birlas were anxious that they should attain the goal of self-government "without plunging into catastrophe". There were indeed two roads before India, as pointed out by Irwin in 1929, by Viceroy-designate Linlithgow in 1935 and Secretary of State Zetland in 1937.(172) One was the road of dependence on the British imperialist masters and close collaboration with them, which would lead to self-government within the imperialist framework; the other was the road of anti-imperialist revolution which would lead to freedom outside the imperialist orbit as well as to the elimination of feudalism and comprador capital -- the main domestic props of colonial rule. The Congress leadership, which dreaded the revolutionary "catastrophe", chose the former road. The decision "to avoid a bloody revolution", even "mass civil disobedience", was a consummation devoutly wished for by the British imperialists and the Indian comprador big bourgeoisie. In May 1937 Birla told the Viceroy's private secretary, George Laithwaite, that "If once the Congress realizes the potentiality of constitutionalism", it would "stick to it to the end". The Congress leaders would, no doubt, have stuck to it to the very end if World War II did not intervene. That is another story to be told later.