Swift, dramatic developments took place on the European war-front from the latter part of April 1940. In quick succession Nazi hordes overran Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. In June, after a brief war, France surrendered; and Italy declared war on the allies.
From the time of Holland's surrender, "Hitler's stocks", as Mahadev Desai informed Birla, "are steadily rising in his [Gandhi's] eyes". Gandhi, to quote Birla, "unfortunately took it for granted that Britain had lost the war".(106) Gandhi praised Hitler's "sadhana", "his single-minded devotion to his purpose that should be the object of our admiration and emulation", his "unclouded and unerring" intellect.(107) Through his letter to Linlithgow and his appeal "To Every Briton", he advised the British to uphold non-violence and surrender when things appeared so black and to invite Hitler and Mussolini to take possession of even "your beautiful island". He volunteered "to go to Germany or anywhere" on a peace mission, if the British cabinet needed his help.(108)
The mahatma's attitude towards British imperialism was changing with the change in the tide of the war. His policy of unconditional co-operation with it yielded at this stage to one of passive waiting "till the heat of the battle", as he said, "in the heart of the allied countries subsides and the future is clearer than it is".(109)
Some of Gandhi's close associates like Prasad hurried to declare their support for Britain through press statements. Gandhi chided Prasad and said: "It is no small thing that we are not resorting to civil disobedience. Take good rest."(110) Nehru thought it "very ungenerous" for them to take advantage of Britain's distress.
The serious reverses of the Allies awakened hopes in the hearts of the Congress leaders that the raj would relent and make concessions. After five days of deliberation in June the Working Committee affirmed that while the Congress would "adhere strictly to the principle of non-violence in their struggle for independence", it could not follow the same principle "in regard to external aggression and internal disorder". The committee left Gandhi "free to pursue his great ideal" and relieved him of his responsibility of leading the Congress. Meeting early in July, the committee adopted a resolution assuring the raj that the Congress would "throw in its full weight in the efforts for the effective organization of the Defence of the country", if the raj made a declaration committing itself to India's complete independence afterwards and, as an immediate step, formed a provisional national government.
According to S. Gopal, "the majority in the committee did not insist on a declaration about independence by the British but offered to assist in defence if a fully national government were established."(111) "A fully national government" was a reconstituted Executive Council of the Viceroy with leaders of political parties and functioning under the Government of India Act 1935.
Gandhi believed that if the Congress would wait and "develop sufficient strength", the raj would transfer power to it without the Congress coming "to an agreement with all parties". He felt that "we can get both our independence and national government", that the raj would transfer power to the Congress alone, "if the government are assured that the Congress will participate fully in the war effort".(112) It was the opinion of the Working Committee, including Nehru, that British imperialism was crumbling.(113)
But all hopes were blasted by the Viceroy's statement of 8 August, known as the `August Offer'. The Viceroy was prepared to reconstitute his Council with some representative Indians and to set up a War Advisory Council with "representatives of the Indian states, and of other interests". The raj agreed to set up at the end of the war "a body representative of the principal elements in India's national life in order to devise the framework of the new constitution". Referring to "the position of minorities in relation to any future constitutional scheme", the statement pointed out that the British government "could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities...to any system of Government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life". The raj looked forward to "the attainment by India of that free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth".(114)
The `August Offer' practically granted the power of veto to the Muslim League in respect of future constitutional advance.
So the Congress Working Committee and the AICC rejected the `August Offer', regretted that the raj had raised the issue of minorities as "an insuperable barrier to India's progress", declared the earlier resolution as having lapsed and again saddled Gandhi with the responsibility of leading the Congress. At the same time the AICC warned Congressmen against "doing anything with a view to embarrass" the British.(115)
It was a very uncomfortable situation for the Congress. The raj refused to buy its co-operation. On the other hand, the policy of not embarrassing the raj on one plea or another was tarnishing the anti-imperialist image of the leadership when thousands of political workers and leaders of other parties, trade unions and the Kisan Sabha were sent to prison. Some action, even a pretence of it, became necessary for the very survival of the Congress leadership. Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy on 29 August: "If things go on as they are and if the Congress remains supine, the Congress will die a slow death."(116) He told the AICC meeting held in mid-September "that the position today is such that if we do nothing, our very existence will be imperilled.... Under the circumstances if we do not make our opposition known we shall cease to exist." He explained that the object of the movement he planned was not to embarrass the government's war efforts but to obtain the right of free speech. He pointed out that it would not be a mass movement.(117)
Gandhi had interviews with the Viceroy at the end of September but Linlithgow failed "to appreciate the Congress position" and refused to grant "freedom of speech" despite Gandhi's assurances that it would do no harm to the war efforts.(118)
In a press statement of 5 October, Gandhi declared that the "immediate issue" was not a declaration by Britain about India's independence, nor her willingness to convene a constituent assembly at the end of the war, nor reconstitution of the Viceroy's Council, but "the right of existence, i.e., the right of self-expression which, broadly put, means free speech".(119)
It was an individual civil disobedience movement that Gandhi planned. Sole author of the plan, he remained in sole control of the movement, designed as a mere symbolic protest which would serve as a safety-valve for the pent-up resentment of the people without embarrassing in the least British imperialism. Gandhi took every precaution to steer the movement in a way that would fulfil this two-fold task. It was he who would select the individuals who would disobey only one official injunction -- that which banned preaching against participation in the war. The satyagrahi was enjoined not to speak at public meetings; he was to give due notice to the authorities before he offered satyagraha and there would be no demonstrations or hartals. It was not the object to prevent "war-minded" Indians from contributing to war-efforts and joining the war or to surround ammunition factories or military barracks.(120)
The first satyagrahi was Vinoba Bhave, an ashram inmate, who offered satyagraha, that is, spoke against participation in the war on 17 October and went to prison four days after. Nehru was the next choice. But he was arrested early in November before he could offer satyagraha.
On 30 October Gandhi in a letter to the Viceroy further clarified that he had not claimed "unrestricted access to the public through the ordinary channels of publicity" like newspapers. He assured Linlithgow that he "was taking extraordinary precautions to ensure non-violence", and that "to that end I was restricting the movement to the fewest possible typical individuals". He added :
"I had hoped that you would be satisfied with such aid as the Princes, moneyed men and professional warlike classes could give you.... I ask you to believe me when I tell you that, in every single step I have taken, I have thought of you and your people as your and their true friend."(121)
According to the Secretary of State, the movement was part of the "pressure upon the British Government to go back upon the Declaration of [August] 1940", which "was regarded by Congress as a direct challenge to its whole position, a direct denial of its claim to speak for India".(122)
In November Mahadev Desai left for New Delhi with Gandhi's "blessings" to meet four persons: Puckle, the Director General of Intelligence; Tottenham, the Additional Home Secretary in charge of the C.I.D. portfolio; Reginald Maxwell, the Home Member; and Laithwaite, the Viceroy's private secretary. At a press conference on 10 November in Delhi, Mahadev repeatedly stressed that it was "a libel", "a gross and ungrateful libel to say that we are hindering the war effort". He cited instances to show that instead of hindering, Gandhi helped the war effort.(123) When Mahadev met Puckle and Tottenham, he told them that Gandhi restricted the freedom of speech he claimed "by declining to address his appeals to the army or munition workers". Puckle confessed: "What puzzles and perplexes me is that one who has been an asset to us for 16 months should have ceased to be that asset." Gandhi's secretary pointed out that such a thing was "psychologically impossible", that it was wrong to think that Gandhi has ceased to be that asset. When Mahadev met Tottenham again, the latter admitted that Gandhi had been "most helpful". Maxwell asked him: "Why will you prevent those who want to pay or those who want to join as recruits?" Desai answered: "We don't..." and gave instances of people whom Gandhi did not want to dissuade from paying to the War Fund and from joining as recruits. He believed that there was "agreement on the principle of `live and let live'" and told Maxwell that it should not be impossible to prepare "a formula agreeable" to both the raj and the Congress. When Mahadev met Laithwaite, the latter said to him: "I told Mr Birla that though we were technically at `war', our relations were as friendly as they used to be." Mahadev repeated what he had told Puckle about Gandhi being an asset to the raj. He explained that it was not Gandhi's object to hamper war efforts in any way and disturb the allegiance of people who wanted to help. He pointed out how the restricted liberty of speech Gandhi claimed would ultimately serve the interests of the raj. He said to Laithwaite: "Rather than that [imprisoning satyagrahis], give us the liberty, [then] there is no agitation, no prisoners." Mahadev's arguments were based on what he said: "you live and let live." Laithwaite asked him, "...if you think your propaganda does not have any effect on the war effort why pursue it ?" Mahadev replied: "For our own existence. On the one hand there is little effect concretely on the war effort and on the other hand if we do not exercise the right, we smother ourselves." He told them all to remember that the advantage arising out of Gandhi's great influence for restraint far surpassed any disadvantages caused by his policy.(124)
Gandhi "was altogether satisfied" that Mahadev "had represented him well as his ambassador!"(125)
In a letter of 2 December, Gandhi assured the Home Member, Maxwell: "My desire is to cause the least embarrassment to the Government consistently with the prosecution of my mission." He added that "duty has enjoined upon me a seemingly opposite course. I take comfort in the fact that though seeming to be in the opposite camp, I work for the same end as is declared by the British Government..."(126) In reply, the Home Member wrote: "I am glad to know that you are only seemingly in the opposite camp and that your end is the same as ours."(127)
While staying with Gandhi at Sevagram in December 1940, Birla noted:
"Whenever satyagraha was in the field, communism disappeared for the time being only to reappear after its suppression.... I wondered what would be the position just now if Gandhiji had not started satyagraha? Would extremists in the Congress and Communists combine to create greater trouble? Was satyagraha not a blessing in disguise? Was Gandhiji, by starting restricted satyagraha, saving Government from greater embarrassment and at the same time registering his protest?.... I know from the past experience that Gandhiji's move is always full of more than one implication?" (128)
During this time Birla played his usual role of bringing the Congress leadership closer to the raj.(129) He was assiduously making contacts with the Viceroy, other high officials and prominent Britishers to bring about a settlement.(130) Towards the end of 1940, Birla had talks with Bombay's governor Roger Lumley on his proposal for expansion of the Viceroy's Council "by taking in men who were neither Congressmen nor Leaguemen but who would command respect" as a solution for ending the impasse. On 18 and 19 December Birla discussed this proposal with Gandhi, who blessed it provided the men were of a representative character. Birla suggested the names of eight "really good men" -- Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, Nalini Sarkar, Sir Mirza Ismail, Sir Sultan Ahmed, M.S. Aney, etc., and Gandhi approved them. With the expansion of the Viceroy's Council there would be an end to the individual civil disobedience movement. When Devdas Gandhi asked if the Congress would tolerate the war effort, the prophet of non-violence said : "Yes, they will. Even today they do.... Why should we grudge war-minded people associating with war?" Birla conveyed the substance of his talk with Gandhi to Linlithgow and asked Thakurdas to pass it on to Lumley, which Thakurdas did.(131) In July 1941, the Viceroy's Council was expanded with five new Indian members, among whom were three whose names had been suggested by Birla and approved by Gandhi -- Nalini Sarkar, M.S. Aney and Sultan Ahmed.
The individual civil disobedience movement gradually petered out. Many like Bhulabhai Desai, a Working Committee member, resented being asked to go to prison and many of those who had gone in were most loath to go for the second time.(132) The movement remained suspended under Gandhi's instruction from 24 December 1940 to 4 January 1941 in order not to mar the enjoyment of the Christmas holiday by British officials. About 23,000 satyagrahis were put in prison for brief periods in the course of one year. It was formally withdrawn in December 1941. In the meantime, in September 1941, Rajagopalachari, Bhulabhai Desai and Satyamurthi started a campaign for a return to the `parliamentary programme'.
Subhas was arrested on 2 July 1940 under the Defence of India Act and did not expect release until the end of the war. The idea gripped him that it would be better to escape to a foreign country and work for India's freedom from outside than to languish in prison. He began a hunger strike on 29 November as a protest against his imprisonment and was released from prison on 5 December and interned in his own house. Members of the Kirti Kisan Party, which had links with the CPI, were contacted, some of them were sent to Afghanistan and two to the Soviet Union. A member of the Forward Bloc Working Committee, Mian Akbar Shah of the NWFP came to Calcutta and went back to make necessary arrangements. On 17 January 1941, soon after midnight, Subhas, immaculately dressed as a Pathan, left home eluding watchers. At Peshawar Bhagat Ram Talwar, a member of the Kirti Kisan Party, took charge of him. Reaching Kabul on 28 January, they made contacts with Soviet Embassy officials and waited, but received no encouragement. On 2 February Subhas contacted German officials who promised to communicate with Berlin. It was on 18 March that he left Kabul on an Italian passport for Berlin via Moscow. He had many anxious moments in Kabul, then infested with spies of different countries.
In the late thirties Subhas had hoped that the imperialist war that was approaching would provide an opportunity for India to liberate herself from the British yoke. But the policies of the Congress leadership shattered his hopes. It was perhaps in late 1939 that the idea dawned on him that he might try to escape to a foreign country and work for India's freedom and raise an army to liberate India. He believed that the enemy's enemy was his friend (whatever the ideological complexion), whose help he felt no scruple to accept with a view to freeing his motherland from foreign rule. He also believed that without foreign assistance the country's liberation could not be achieved, for the Indian army was still loyal to the British raj. During 1938-40 Subhas tried to make contacts with Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union.(133) Immediately the war started, he contacted the CPI to help him to send a message to Moscow. S.S. Batliwala, a member of the CPI Central Committee for some years, stated that he represented the CPI in the meetings with Subhas in October 1939. Subhas said to him: "I trust Soviet Russia as one State which will not be interested in colonizing India. So I would be ready to welcome military help from Soviet Russia to secure our freedom from the claws of the British imperialists." Instructed by Subhas and with help from the CPI, which gave him necessary contacts in London, Amiya Nath Bose, Subhas's nephew, who had just returned from England after his studies there, carried his uncle's message to a Soviet representative in London.(134)
In 1934, when Subhas wrote The Indian Struggle, he wanted "a synthesis between Communism and Fascism".(135) At an interview with Palme Dutt in January 1938, Subhas said:
"My political ideas have developed further since I wrote my book [The Indian Struggle] three years ago.... What I really meant was that we in India wanted our national freedom, and having won it, we wanted to move in the direction of Socialism.... When I was writing the book, Fascism had not started on its imperialist expedition and it appeared to me merely an aggressive form of nationalism.... I have always understood and am quite satisfied that Communism, as it has been expressed in the writings of Marx and Lenin and in the official statements of policy of the Communist International, gives full support to the struggle for national independence and recognizes this as an integral part of its world outlook."(136)
Subhas extolled the achievements of the Soviet Union and as late as 1941 acclaimed the Soviet Union as "the greatest revolutionary force in the world". He was not happy when Germany invaded the Soviet Union and, though he had tied his fate with the Axis Powers, he was critical of the Nazi invasion.(137) He despised Nazi racism and brutality but he did not express anywhere "any sympathy for the millions of victims of Nazi aggression and brutality. He was, Nambiar said, `a one-idea man', and that idea was Indian freedom".(138)
Subhas was essentially a bourgeois nationalist who, unlike Gandhi, Nehru, Patel, Prasad, etc., was uncompromising in his opposition to British imperialism. Since at least the Calcutta Congress in 1928, he was consistent in his open opposition to Gandhi's policies. His book The Indian Struggle 1920-1934, critical of Gandhi and Gandhism, which first appeared in London in January 1935, was banned in India immediately after its publication.
It appears from Subhas's writings that there was an authoritarian streak in his outlook. He believed that it was the political elite who could lead the basic masses to freedom and then to Socialism and that it would be necessary to curb the democratic rights of the people for some years after their liberation.
By escaping to Germany when other doors were barred against him, Subhas objectively joined the most reactionary forces on earth whatever might have been his subjective wishes and however much he might have tried to assert his independence. The plunge that he took in January 1941 landed him from the frying pan into the fire.
But the stories of the free Indian Government and the Indian National Army he organized in South-East Asia brought about at the end of the war a rapid politicization of the masses, even of the British Indian armed forces, and were an important factor which convinced the British imperialists of the necessity of changing their direct rule for an indirect one.
1. Munshi, op cit., 55.
2. CWG, LXX, 162,175,311 -- emphasis added; also Gopal, op cit., 250.
3. Tendulkar, op cit, IV, 338.
4. SWN, X, 119.
5. Ibid, VIII, 752.
6. Bombay Chronicle, 6 Nov. 1939, quoted in Gitasree Bandyopadhyay, Constraints in Bengal Politics, 333.
7. Birla, Bapu, III, 332 -- emphasis added.
8. Ibid, IV, 22 -- emphasis added.
9. Shri Ram to Amritlal Ojha, May 1940, PT Papers, File 239, Part I; cited in Rajat Kanta Ray, op cit., 322.
10. Venkatasubbiah, op cit, 43-4.
11. Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, 243.
12. Balabushevich and Dyakov, op cit., 370.
13. Palme Dutt, India Today, 449-50.
14. See Gopal, op cit., 250.
15. Shankardas, The First Congress Raj, 247,248 -- emphasis added.
16. See SWN, X, 122-38 for the resolution and two earlier drafts.
17. Ibid, 183 fn.3.
18. Birla Bapu, III, 338 -- emphasis added; CWG LXX, 311: also 175.
19. Munshi, op cit., 59.
20. Birla, Bapu, III, 342-3.
21. Ibid, 344.
22. Ibid, 341,338,339.
23. Ibid, 344-5.
24. Gopal, op cit., 254 -- emphasis added.
25. Menon, op cit., 63-4 -- emphasis added.
26. See Misra, op cit., 355 -- emphasis added.
27. SWN, X, 85.
28. Ibid, 274,288 -- emphasis added.
28a. Ibid 73-4; XIII, 714.
29. Ibid, X, 161.
30. Ibid, 18-9,159,229,244-6,247,366, passim.
31. Ibid, 183 fn.3,180,181.
32. Gopal, op cit., 254 -- emphasis added.
33. Ibid.
34. SWN, X, 170-3 -- emphasis added.
35. Gopal, op cit., 255-6.
36. Birla, Bapu, 347-8 -- emphasis added.
37. Tendulkar, op cit., V, 227-8.
38. CWG, LXXII, 147, fn.3.
39. Birla, Bapu, IV, 21; see also CWG, LXX, 292,316,328,389; ibid, LXXI, 11,51,117,306, passim.
40. Ibid, LXX, 189-90,204.
41. Menon, op cit., 66-7 -- emphasis added.
42. CWG, LXX, 290, 316, 328 -- emphasis added.
43. Misra, op cit., 355.
44. Birla, Bapu, III, 352,349,350,353-5,356-7,358-9.
45. Sitaramayya, op cit., II, 145.
46. Munshi, op cit., 390; CWG, LXXI, 437.
47. Munshi, op cit., 59.
48. Misra, op cit., 359.
49. Sitaramayya, op cit., II, 130.
50. Misra, op cit., 359-60; Sitaramayya, op cit., II, 157.
51. Menon, op cit., 68-9.
52. CWG, LXX, 337.
53. Sitaramayya, op cit., II, 145 -- emphasis added.
54. CWG, LXX, 364; LXXI, 316; SWN, X, 280,287,294.
55. CWG, LXXI, 337-8.
56. Birla, Bapu, IV, 4.
57. Bose, Crossroads, 232.
58. SWN, X, 303-7.
59. Ibid, 226,210,223,229.
60. Ibid, 229,315; also, 170-2,451,479, passim.
61. B.N. Pandey, Nehru, 188; Misra, op cit., 489; also Bose, The Indian Struggle, 334; Dietmar Rothermund, The Phases of Indian Nationalism and Other Essays, (Bombay, 1970), 67,138.
62. SWN, X, 230.
63. Menon, op cit., 69.
64. CWG, LXXI, 191-2.
65. GOI, Home, Poll, File, 3/33 of 1940; cited in Gitasree Bandopadhyay, op cit, 337.
66. AICC Papers, File P-5 of 1940, Part-I; cited in ibid.
67. See Subodh Roy (ed.), op cit., 1935-1945, 97.
68. SWN, X, 477; also 175, fn. 4, 189, 230, 311, passim.
69. Ibid, XI, 121.
70. Ibid, X, 379.
71. The Congress Encyclopaedia, XII, 367,368.
72. CWG, LXXI, 305-6.
73. Birla, Bapu, IV, 189 -- emphasis added.
74. Ibid, 30-1 -- emphasis added.
75. Ibid, 32-3, 33-4.
76. CWG, LXXI, 331 -- emphasis added; also 342,343.
77. See Subodh Roy (ed.), op cit., 1935-1945, 160,164,168.
78. CWG, 338,353,349-53,357-60 -- emphasis added.
79. SWN, XI, 12; also 26.
80. Proceedings of the CWC meeting, Wardha, 16-19 April 1940, AICC Papers, File G-32/1940; CWG, LXXII, 4-7.
81. Quoted in Moore, Endgames of Empire, 73.
82. Cited in W.H. Morris-Jones, "`If It Be Real, What Does It Mean?': Some British Perceptions of the Indian National Congress", in Sisson and Wolpert (eds.), op cit., 109-10.
83. Menon, op cit., 82-3.
84. Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 57.
85. Punjab Governor Craik to Linlithgow, 30 Apr. 1940, cited in Ayesha Jalal, op cit, 61; Linlithgow to Secretary of State Amery, 30 June 1940, cited in Moore, Endgames of Empire, 84.
86. Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit, 21.
87. Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 185; also Abul Hayat, op cit, 106.
88. See Moon, op cit., 20, 21; for Sikander's long speech at the Punjab Legislative Assembly, 11 March 1941, insisting on maintaining Punjab's integrity, see Menon, op cit., 442-58.
89. Sitaramayya, op cit., II, 590 -- emphasis added.
90. TOP, X, 159.
91. SWN, XI, 215; also 17.
92. CWG, LXXI, 388.
93. Ibid, XVIII, 289-90; XXIII, 201.
94. Ibid, LXXII, 6.
95. Ibid, 26 and 21 fn.1 -- emphasis added.
96. Birla to Thakurdas, 18 Dec. 1940, PT Papers, File 177.
97. Thakurdas to Birla, 19 Dec. 1940, ibid -- emphasis added.
98. Thakurdas's note on his talk with Jinnah, 2.1.41 (the document is wrongly dated 2.1.40), ibid.
99. CWG, LXXII, 26,27.
100. Iftikharuddin Ahmed, president of the Punjab PCC, was a respected person with left leanings.
101. SWN, XI, 692.
102. Linlithgow to Zetland, 25 May 1940; Linlithgow to Amery, 30 June 1940; both cited in Moore, Endgames of Empire, 84,85.
103. CWG, LXXIV, 92-3; also 112-4,133-4.
104. Ibid, 403-6; Munshi, op cit, 75-6, 411-5; also 77.
105. Ibid, 420.
106. Birla, Bapu, IV, 53; In the Shadow, 273.
107. CWG, LXXII, 70,100,193.
108. Ibid, 100-1,230.
109. Ibid, 104.
110. Ibid, 50-1.
111. Gopal, op cit., 265.
112. CWG, LXXII, 168-9,246.
113. Sitaramayya, op cit., II, 192; SWN, XI, 68.
114. See CWG, LXXII, 472-4.
115. Ibid, LXXII, 474-5; LXXIII, 1-3.
116. Ibid, LXXII, 426.
117. Ibid, LXXIII, 4-21; see also SWN, XI, 140.
118. Ibid, 72; also 76.
119. Ibid, 80.
120. Ibid, 103-6,157-9.
121. Ibid, 137-9.
122. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, 28 Jan.1942, TOP, I, 83.
123. CWG, LXXIII, 161; Birla, Bapu, IV, 121-9.
124. Ibid, 136-62 -- emphasis added.
125. Ibid, 163.
126. CWG, LXXIII, 208-9 -- emphasis added.
127. Ibid, 209, fn.1; Birla, Bapu, IV, 173 -- emphasis added.
128. Ibid, 183 -- emphasis added.
129. Ibid, III, 331-2,334-5,341,343; IV, 3-5,22,30-1,32-4, 44-6,48-9, passim.
130. Ibid, III, 349-50,353-5,357-9; IV, 43, passim.
131. Birla to Thakurdas, 4 Jan. 1941 and Thakurdas to Bombay governor 11 Jan., PT Papers, File 177; Birla, Bapu, IV, 185-7; also 177-8.
132. Ibid, 264-6.
133. Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, 416,426.
134. Ibid, 416; Amiya Nath Bose, "Socialist View", Statesman, 30 June and 1 July 1992.
135. Bose, The Indian Struggle, 313-4.
136. Bose, Crossroads, 30.
137. Bose, The Indian Struggle, 410; Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, 432, 451.
138. Ibid, 536-7.