WITH Congress once again under his tight control, what plan of action would Gandhi chart out for winning complete independence? The nation waited. But there was no immediate answer forthcoming. The official Congress history makes clear that even asking what the plans were was foolish:
"Those gathered at Sabarmati inquired of Gandhi about his plans.... There was no privacy about our plans. But they were not clear-cut either. They would unfold themselves, much as the path on a misty morning reveals itself to a fast-moving motor, almost from yard, to yard. The Satyagrahi carried a searchlight on his forehead. It shows the way for the next step."
Gandhi made one last desperate attempt to stave off the movement. On January 31, 1930, hardly a month after the categorical resolution for complete independence, Gandhi send an 11-point "ultimatum" to Irwin; failing its acceptance, civil disobedience would follow.
Not one of the 11 points made any demand for a change in the political structure - not even for dominion status! The ultimatum included demands for a 50 per cent cut in army expenses and civil service salaries, total prohibition, reform of the C.I.D., changes in the Arms Act, lowering of the rupee-sterling exchange ratio, textile industry protection, reservation of coastal shipping for Indians, 50 per cent reduction in land revenue, and an abolition of salt tax and of the Government's salt monopoly.
Not a single one of the demands was a working-class demand, though the demand for reduction of revenue was an important peasant demand. The sudden focus on salt bewildered one and all; and what was most puzzling was that "Purna Swaraj" was altogether unmentioned.
Even to this abject plea, the Viceroy made no concessions. Finally, on March 2, 1930, Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy to plead his motives in starting civil disobedience:
"The party of violence is gaining ground and making itself felt.... It is my purpose to set in motion that force (non-violence) as well against the organised violence force of British rule as the unorganised violence force of the growing party of violence. To sit still would be to give rein to both the forces above mentioned."
Again, Gandhi's theory of non-violence, on the one hand, disarmed and crippled the mass force; but on the other hand, it did not stop the British from unleashing the most extraordinary violence. The effect was, as R.P.Dutt put it, "one way violence". It was "non-violence for the Indian masses, but not for imperialism, which practiced violence to its heart's content - and won the battle".
The battle was strictly circumscribed. For one, Gandhi was no longer fool enough to risk a general call. "So far as I am concerned", he announced on February 27, 1930, "my intention is to start the movement only through the inmates of the Ashram and those who have submitted to its discipline and assimilated its methods." Secondly, Gandhi found, in the salt monopoly, an issue which Indians could agitate against, which was not crucial to British rule in India, and which in no way isolated or combated Indian collaborators of British rule - unlike calls for no-rent or general strikes.
Gandhi began his famous march to Dandi (March 12-April 6) to defy the government monopoly on production of salt with just 71 hand-picked ashramites. But, spontaneously, people joined as the march went along. Gandhi wisely chose his home ground of Gujarat, though even here pressures from the people were increasing. Village officials began on their own to resign their posts all along Gandhi's march route.
On March 19, peasants of Ras village in Kheda district demanded from Gandhi permission to start immediate non-payment of revenue. Gandhi reluctantly gave permission. Thus the initiative and the mobilisation for Gandhi's most famous campaign came spontaneously from the people, and Gandhi was an unwilling partner. Upto mid-May, until Gandhi's arrest, there was no general Congress sanction for no-revenue movements.
On April 9, Gandhi outlined the course of action. His conception was of a tightly controlled movement, one that raised hopes as deceptively as his "Swaraj in a year" promise:
"Let every village fetch or manufacture contraband salt, sisters should picket liquor shops, opium dens, and foreign cloth dealers' shops. Young and old in every home should ply the takli and spin and get woven heaps of yarn every day. Foreign cloth should be burnt. Hindus should eschew untouchability. Hindus, Musulmans, Sikhs, Parsis and Christians should all achieve heart unity. Let the majority rest content with what remains after the minorities have been satisfied. Let students leave government schools and colleges, and government servants resign their service and devote themselves to the service of the people, and we shall soon find that Purna Swarajya will come knocking at our doors."
Thus Gandhi did nothing to prepare the people for the vicious onslaught that was about to be unleashed on them.
Given the Government's arrest of all the leaders of the working-class organisations in the Meerut conspiracy case, and given Gandhi's refusal to place any workers' demands or to give any programme of working-class agitation, it was inevitable that the 1930 Civil Disobedience movement would (with some notable exceptions), be restricted to the peasantry. But here it was certainly explosive. We do not have space here to chart out the movements in all the regions - U.P., Andhra, Bengal, Punjab, Kanara, Malabar, Gujarat, and Bihar - in which civil disobedience provided an excuse for peasants to agitate on their demands. What needs to be noted here is the constant tendency in these movements for the Gandhian controls to break down, despite Gandhi's best efforts.
Thus Congress's best efforts to restrict forest movements to peaceful satyagraha broke down everywhere, with leaders emerging from the tribals themselves (e.g., Ganjan Korku of the Gonds in Betul) and with violent attacks on forest guards and police parties becoming very common throughout the Central Provinces forests.
Similarly, the no-tax movement in Chhatarpur culminated in a crowd of 20,000 (1,000 of them armed with rifles) attempting to advance on the Maharaja's palace.
Tamil Nadu, despite Rajaji's deliberate attempts not to involve the lower castes, poor-peasants and labourers, says one historian, "thrived upon the violent eruptions of the masses and the violent repression of the police."
Bengal provided the largest contingent of arrests (15,000 out of the nationwide 92,000) as well as the highest incidence of violence (136 incidents excluding terrorist actions).
Gandhian strictures against no-rent did not prevail upon the peasants of Hissar district in Punjab, or Rae Bareli in U.P.: Both launched militant no-rent campaigns. Towards the end of 1930, even in the relatively better controlled region of Bihar, the Congress could not prevent a whole series of attacks on police parties. And in Rohtak, Jats, assisted by lower castes, attacked moneylenders and grain-dealers, depriving them of their property and burning their account books.
In Nasik district, Maharashtra, Koli tribals armed themselves with spears, swords, and other weapons, raised Congress slogans, refused to disperse, and hurled down stones in the face of police firing.
Even in Kheda, Gandhi's strongest base, many peasants turned to violence in the face of confiscation of their land. Kheda peasants physically resisted arrest of their local leaders, summoning aid from nearby villages by beating drums; and violence was done to officials who refused to resign their posts.
The most alarming incidents from Irwin's or Gandhi's point of view, were those at Chittagong, at Sholapur, and at Peshawar. The Chittagong Armoury Raid we have already described earlier. It is easy to see why in the context of the all-round unrest, the raid on the armoury should have seemed so alarming to the Congress.
The Sholapur episode showed how, despite Gandhi's deliberate ignoring of the workers, they were not willing to be excluded from the movement. In the early phase of Civil Disobedience workers in Karachi, Madras, Calcutta and Budge-Budge spontaneously went on strike. After Gandhi's arrest, the textile workers of Sholapur went on strike from May 7; burnt liquor shops; attacked police outposts, law courts, municipal buildings, and the railway station; and ran a virtual parallel government (with popular appointment of all officials). This lasted until May 16, when the British forces imposed martial law. Although Congress cadres had participated in the insurrection, Vallabhbhai Patel condemned it. "Do anything, he warned, "but don't make the mistake that Sholapur did. In this fight we cannot conquer with violence... it is only when we receive lathis non-violently that that the British Government calls our movement dangerous."
Events in Peshawar took an even more dramatic turn. Ghaffar Khan's Pathan movement (whose members were called "Khudai Khidmatgars") stayed non-violent and within the Congress fold, but it attracted huge numbers of Pathans who believed it would fight against their chronic indebtedness to moneylenders. In the six months after the Lahore Congress, its membership shot up from 500 to 50,000. The British freely used aerial bombardment on the village areas. The arrest of Ghaffar Khan and other leaders, on April 23, led to a massive upsurge in Peshawar with crowds confronting armoured cars and defying, intensive firing for three hours at Kissakahani Bazaar. According to the British, 30 were killed; according to non-official estimates 200 to 250 were killed - recalling the scale of Jallianwala Bagh.
A remarkable event took place during the firing. Two platoons of the Second Battalion of the18th Royal Garhwali Rifles, Hindu troops facing a Muslim crowd, refused to fire, broke ranks, and fraternised with the crowd, handing over their weapons. They were later to declare before their court-martial:
"We will not shoot out unarmed brethren, because India's army is to fight India's enemies without. You may blow us from the guns, if you like."
The British were unable to restore their rule in Peshawar until 10 days later, i.e., on May 4. Later, 17 men of the Garhwali Rifles were given savage sentences: one transported for life, one given 15 years' rigorous imprisonment, and 15 assigned terms of up to 15 years.
It would seem, on the surface, that the Garhwali soldiers were practicing the highest and most courageous form of non-violence, and that Gandhi should have been, pleased. But Gandhi was not; what the Garhwali soldiers had done was in total violation of his theory. His theory depended centrally on the upholding of the status quo, while the Garhwali soldiers' action threatened to altogether undo the status quo. Gandhi explained to a journalist:
"A soldier who disobeys an order to fire breaks the oath which he has taken and renders himself guilty of criminal disobedience. I cannot ask officials and soldiers to disobey, for when I am in power, I shall in all likelihood make use of those same officials and those same soldiers. If I taught them to disobey I should be afraid that they might do the same when I am in power."
This is perhaps Gandhi's single most revealing and honest statement, the core of his theory of "non-violence", and the key to understanding post 1947 India.
Despite all repression, the Civil Disobedience movement, by the end of 1930, was at a remarkable height. Over 90,000 volunteers were in jail - three times the number in 1921. Wrote the Observer correspondent on June 29, "visitors... are frankly amazed at the state to which Bombay has been reduced". The Spectator correspondent wrote on July 5, "But for the troops and armed police, the Government of Bombay would be overthrown in a day, and the administration of Bombay would be taken over by the Congress, with the assent of all." Even the loyalist Millowners' Association (which was one-third European), desperate at the turn of events, called for immediate self-government of India on a dominion status basis.
Gandhi, far from being happy, was deeply distressed. An English professor who interviewed him in prison at the start of 1931 recorded that:
"Even in the seclusion of his prison he is acutely conscious that such embitterment is developing, and for that reason he would welcome return to peace and co-operation as soon as it could be honestly obtained...,. His influence is still great; but more dangerous and uncontrollable forces are gathering strength daily."
The British saw it was the appropriate moment to negotiate. On January 26, Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee were released unconditionally and given freedom to meet. Gandhi stated that "I have come out of gaol with an absolutely open mind, unfettered by enmity and unbiased in argument. I am prepared to study the whole situation from every point of view...." Few could have guessed exactly how open the Mahatma's mind was at this stage.
Gandhi's first move was to ask the Viceroy for an inquiry into the reports of police atrocities. Irwin refused. Then the Mahatma asked or a "heart-to-heart" talk with the Viceroy - without agenda. The offer was immediately accepted, and talks began straight away on February 17, 1931.
The two leaders met six times until, at last, on the morning of March 5, an agreement was arrived at. In every single respect, the Gandhi-Irwin Pact of March 1931 stands as an appalling and abject surrender, a surrender unmitigated by a single concession on the British side. Even Gandhi's Eleven Points remained unfulfilled - indeed, practically unmentioned.
First, there was no assurance on even dominion status. On the contrary, there were specific subtractions of the powers of an Indian government under any future constitutional scheme: the Pact deemed essential "reservation or safeguards in the interest of India, for such matters as, for instance, defense; external affairs; the position of minorities; the financial credit of India; and the discharge of obligations."
Secondly, while the Government would release most of the prisoners, Civil Disobedience and the boycott of British goods would be discontinued without winning a single concession.
"Civil Disobedience will be effectively discontinued.... The effective discontinuance of the Civil Disobedience movement means the effective discontinuance of all activities in furtherance thereof, by whatever methods pursued, and in particular the following:"(1) The organised defiance of the provisions of any law.
"(2) The movement for the non-payment of land revenue and other legal dues.
"(3) The publication of news-sheets in support of the Civil Disobedience movement.
"(4) Attempts to influence Civil and military servants or village officials against Government or to persuade them to resign their posts.
"(6) As regards boycott of foreign goods... the position of the government is as follows. They approve of the encouragement of Indian industries... and they have, no desire to discourage methods of propaganda, persuasion or advertisement pursued with this object in view, which do not interfere with the freedom of action of individuals, are not prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order. But the boycott of non-Indian goods (except of cloth, which has been applied to all foreign cloth) has been directed during the Civil Disobedience movement chiefly - if not exclusively - against British goods, and in regard to these it has been admittedly employed in order to exert pressure for political ends.
"It is accepted that a boycott of this character and organised for this purpose will not be consistent with the participation of representatives of the Congress in a frank and friendly discussion of constitutional questions between representatives of British India, of the Indian States, and of His Majesty's Government and political parties in England, which the settlement is intended to secure. It is, therefore, agreed that the discontinuance of the employment of the boycott of British commodities as a political weapon and that, in consequence, those who have given up, during a time of political excitement, the sale or purchase of British goods must be left free without any form of restraint to change their attitude if they so desire."
With regard to the picketing of liquor shops,
"...resort will not be had to methods coming within the category of picketing, except within limits permitted by ordinary law,. Such picketing shall be unaggressive and it shall not involve coercion, intimidation, restraint, hostile demonstration, obstruction to the public, or any offense under the ordinary law. If and when any of these methods are employed in any place, the practice of picketing in that place will be suspended."
Thus Gandhi gave his signature to a charter of suppression of the existing movement. Gandhi performed such amazing total capitulations on all substantial points that it is best to quote the actual text:
"Mr. Gandhi has drawn the attention of the Government to specific allegations against the conduct of the police, and represented the desirability of a public enquiry against them. In the present circumstances, Government see great difficulty in this course and feel it must inevitably lead to charges and counter-charges, and so militate against the re-establishment of peace. Having regard to these considerations, Mr. Gandhi agreed not to press the matter. (emphasis added)."...(c) Where immovable property (confiscated for non-payment of revenue) has been sold to third parties, the transaction must be regarded as final, so far as Government are concerned.
"Note: Mr. Gandhi has represented to Government that according to his information and belief some at least of these sales have been unlawful and unjust. Government, on the information before them, cannot accept this contention."
Even the glorified salt issue was discarded:
"(26) Government are unable to condone breaches of the existing law relating to the Salt Administration, nor are they able in the present financial conditions of the country to make substantial modifications in the Salt Acts."
To save Gandhi's face, the Government said it might discretionarily allow coastal villages collect salt for their own use, "but not for sale to, or trading with, individuals living outside them".
Ryots were betrayed wholesale. To get his confiscated land back, a ryot would have to convince the Collector that he was willing to pay his revenue and would do so in future. And "fines which have been realised and securities forfeited and realised under any law will not be returned." Moreover, "compensation will not be given for deterioration". The most complete historical study of the Kheda movement too points out that even the Kheda peasants "considered the pact a betrayal".
And, of course, on the question of violence, Gandhi and Irwin were already one, so there was no need for Gandhi to concede anything; on the contrary, the pact was his way of isolating the "violent elements" from the rest of the nation.
Thus:
"(10) Ordinances promulgated in connection with the Civil Disobedience Movement will be withdrawn."Ordinance No.1 of 1931 relating to the Terrorist Movement does not come under the scope of the provision."
There was a sweeping caveat for the release of prisoners:
"(13)(i) Those prisoners will be released who are undergoing imprisonment in connection with the Civil Disobedience movement for offenses which did not involve violence, other than technical violence, or incitement to such violence."
Finally, there was cosy agreement that the Garhwali heroes should be punished:
"(13)(iii) Soldiers and police convicted of offenses involving disobedience of orders - in the very few cases that have occurred - will not come within the scope of the amnesty."
Though Irwin did not meet all the business demands contained in the Eleven Points, Indian businessmen supported the Pact. On February 11, Birla's close adviser D.P.Khaitan declared in his presidential address to the Calcutta Indian, Chamber of Commerce:
"It may not be amiss to suggest to Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress that the time has come when they should explore the possibilities of an honourable settlement.... we all want peace."
The Bombay Governor reported to the Viceroy on February 7 that "a number of Gandhi's followers, particularly among mercantile community, are contemplating a breach with him unless he adopts a reasonable attitude". And Irwin informed Wedgewood-Benn on February 11 that "Purshottamdas will probably go to see Gandhi at Allahabad in order to try to put commercial pressure on him."
Thakurdas was in Delhi during the negotiations, and helped to resolve the final hitch over the Gujarat land confiscations on March 4.
To the youth of the nation, the Pact's silence on Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev, and Rajguru, who were scheduled for execution later that month, seemed an even more dramatic betrayal. When confronted by hecklers after the hanging, Gandhi claimed "I pleaded with the Viceroy as best as I could. I brought all the persuasion at my command to bear on him."
The Mahatma's definition of truth was obviously elastic, or his memory poor. Here are Lord Irwin's own confidential minutes of his discussions with Gandhi on February 18, the second day of the talks:
"In conclusion, not connected with the above (talks), he mentioned the case of Bhagat Singh. He did not plead for the commutation (of the death sentence). But he did ask for the postponement in the present circumstances." (File No.5-45/1931 KW2, Home Department, Political Branch in the National Archives of India.)
Herbert Emerson, Secretary to the Government of India at the time, and the man in whose name the Pact was actually issued, records
"...listening with amazement to Irwin and Gandhi after the agreement had been reached by them that Bhagat Singh must be executed, engaged in, a prolonged discussion not as between two statesmen on the political implication of terrorism, but as between two saints on the sanctity of human life." (emphasis added).
However, Gandhi was terrified at the prospect of the inevitable public backlash. Irwin recorded in his memoirs:
"If the young man was hanged, said Mr. Gandhi, there was likelihood that he would become a national martyr and the general atmosphere would be seriously prejudiced."
So Gandhi decided not to tell the full truth to the public. He asked Irwin:
"Would your Excellency see any objection to, my saying that I tried for the young man's life? I said that I saw none, if he would also add that from my point of view he did not know what other course I could have taken. He thought for a moment, then finally agreed, and on that basis went to Karachi... and I was told that he was roughly received. But when he had opportunity he spoke in the sense agreed between us."
As the Pact created what Subhas Bose described as "an uproar", and as the date of both the hanging and the Karachi Congress drew closer, Gandhi grew nervous.
Irwin's minutes, of March 1931 from the same file quoted above, state that:
"As he (Gandhi) was leaving he asked me if he might mention the case of Bhagat Singh; that he had seen in the press the intimation of his execution for March 24. This was an unfortunate day as it coincided with the arrival of the new President (of the Congress) in Karachi and there would be much popular excitement. I told him that I had considered the case with most anxious care, but I could find no grounds on which I could justify to my conscience commuting the sentence.... He appeared to appreciate the force of this argument and said no more."
Later, Gandhi changed his mind a little. The official History of the Indian National Congress states:
"Anyway Lord Irwin was unable to help in the matter, but undertook to secure a postponement of the execution till after the Karachi Congress. The Karachi session was to meet in the last week of March, but Gandhi himself stated to the Viceroy that if the boys should be hanged, they had better be hanged before the Congress, than after. The position of affairs in the country would be clear."
Irwin, it seems, granted a slight preponement. Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev, and Rajguru were hanged on March 23, 1931, at 7.33 in the evening. When Gandhi arrived at Karachi for the Congress session, he was met by a Naujawan Bharat Sabha demonstration against him - a remarkable indication of what his reputation now was.
Gandhi intelligently got Jawaharlal to propose the key resolution on the Gandhi-lrwin Pact in the open session, stifling much of the opposition. (Jawaharlal had at first refused to move the resolution, but as usual, after some persuasion, agreed.)
Hypocritically, the Congress nevertheless reiterated the goal of "Purna Swaraj" for the sake of the dissident section. It added that the Congress delegation to the Round Table Conference "will be free to accept such adjustments as may be demonstrably necessary in the interest of India". To interpret that phrase, Gandhi was given a blank cheque; he was the only Congress representative to the Round Table Conference.
If, on the hard material issues the Karachi Congress was, the mere post-facto endorsement of a surrender, on the woolly undefined issues it was grand and broad. Actually, in the Karachi Congress resolution, drafted by Nehru, both political and economic rights were classified together as Fundamental Rights: freedom of religion, thought, and assembly, equality before the law, protection of regional languages and cultures, a "living wage" for industrial workers, limited hours of labour, unemployment and old age insurance, abolition of untouchability, right to form unions, reduction of land revenue and rent (note: "reduction", not "abolition), a system of progressive taxes, free compulsory primary education, a secular State, protection of hand-spun cloth, and so on, and so forth. (In post-1947 India, however, these minimum economic rights were separated from the other Fundamental Rights and relegated to the position of broad intentions, or Directive Principles of State Policy. At any rate, both the political and economic rights promised so easily in 1931 have in practice been set aside.)
Pro-Congress historians call the Karachi resolution on Fundamental Rights a landmark; and, indeed, it was: For, while the early Congress leaders had frankly advertised their class interests and their loyalty to the imperialists, the Karachi resolution marked the beginning of the deliberate and growing cleavage between the Congress's "Left" rhetoric and its reactionary policies. In this flow of hypocritical eloquence. Nehru, both in 1931 and later, was to play the key role.
For the next nine months, the Congress did its very best to honour the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, holding back the restive forces nationwide. Meanwhile, there seemed a distinct possibility that these forces might defy the Congress openly, as they were doing in practice.
One historian writes, "It was the conclusion of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, rather than government policies, which altered the Congress hold on the coastal districts of Andhra."
In Bengal, terrorism surpassed all previous records in 1931, with 92 incidents (of which nine were murders). In Chittagong district alone, 52 villages were declared "disturbed areas". On October 29, 1931, an anti-terrorist ordinance, with sweeping powers to arrest suspects, was issued.
Even in Kheda and Bardoli, Gandhi could not get peasants to comply with the Pact, and by May 1931 revenue collections fell off. (Gandhi spent much of his time between March and August 1929 trying to recover his base in these two districts.)
In U.P., the Congress leaderships best efforts to get peasants to pay rent were failing, despite Gandhi's personal issuing of a manifesto: "let me warn you against listening to the advice, if it has reached you, that you have no need to pay the zamindars or taluqdars at all". However, such propaganda was in fact emanating from lower-level activists, such as Kalka Prasad, using the Congress name in extremely militant anti-landlord agitations. Jawaharlal, as head of the area's Kisan Sabha, presided over the driving-out of Kalka Prasad and other radical elements from the local Congress. (The region's Congress was largely financed by the landlord, Seth Achal Singh.) Things cooled down after Jawaharlal's June 1931 tour of the area. To make up for its ground-level suppression the U.P. Congress had to speak radically: By 1936, the U.P. Congress was the first P.C.C. to advocate abolition of zamindari.
Anti-feudal movements and riots also marked Jammu (three talukas), Bihar (in Gaya), and Andhra (particularly in Nellore, Krishna, and Guntur).
Meanwhile, Gandhi was becoming desperate at the Round Table Conference of September 1931. It needs to be remembered that his departure for it in August was greeted with hostile demonstrations against him by Bombay workers. The British knew very well that the various representatives - or rather, pseudo- representatives - of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, depressed classes, and the Congress, would find it impossible to arrive at any agreement at the conference itself.
The attending of it, it should have been clear from the start, was futile from any nationalist point of view. Indeed, it gave British ample chance to re-justify its rule on the basis that the different communities and castes in India could not agree among themselves. (Some historians have tried to show that Gandhi did his best by offering broad concessions to the Muslims in representation. But the point really is, such agreement between Hindu and Muslim leaders by itself could not have resolved the communal question. In fact it might have further fanned it. What had been eroded over the years by the leadership, but what was necessary, was the creation of mass-based Hindu-Muslim unity on the basis of struggle against British rule. This option being blocked by Gandhi, his "generosity" to Muslims was insincere and superficial, and even gave the Hindu Mahasabha a further handle.)
With the failure of the Round Table Conference and the growing peasant resurgence, the British felt that the time was ripe for a pre-emptive strike. against the nationalist movement. A last pathetic plea by Gandhi to the Viceroy for an interview was rudely turned down at the end of 1931. The Congress had, of course, made no preparation for such a possibility. On the contrary, even after the 1932 arrests, repression and conditions of illegality, the Congress High Command specifically issued orders against any secrecy, as this was against Congress principles.
Thus while the repression of 1930, with the national movement on the offensive, did not succeed in crushing the movements, the repression of 1932, with the national movement disarmed, unprepared, and on the helpless defensive, was far more effective. Arrests during January 1932 to March 1933 totalled over 120,000; and the arrests this time were far more systematic.
The 1932-33 Civil Disobedience was as varied as the 1930-31 movement but it was less powerful. Again, it was among the peasants - of Gujarat, Bihar, U.P., and Rajasthan - that the movement was concentrated. Despite a number of courageous Congress actions - illegal hoisting of Congress flags, public conduct of illegal Congress sessions, picketing of cloth and liquor shops, closing of markets and boycott of white or loyalist concerns, salt satyagrahas, forest satyagrahas, non-payment of revenue in ryotwari areas and nonpayment of chaukidari tax in zamindari areas (again, never no-rent) - the movement could not be sustained in the face of severe repression and organisational disarray.
Meanwhile the Mahatma, far from focusing on the main issues at hand - struggle for freedom, or resistance to repression - turned his attention to the scheme for separate representation for the "untouchables", the depressed classes" (in post-1947 India, the scheduled castes). His argument was that "untouchables" were an integral part of the Hindus, and therefore should not have separate representation.
Interestingly, contrary to popular belief, Gandhi never opposed the caste system itself. And he specifically opposed Ambedkar, who felt that the caste system had to be abolished; Gandhi claimed that whatever the "limitation and defects" of the varnasrama, "there is nothing sinful about it, as there is about untouchability". He felt the caste system could function in such a fashion as to make each caste "complementary of the other, and none inferior or superior to any other":
"I believe that every man is born in the world with certain natural tendencies. Every person is born with certain definite limitations which he cannot overcome. From a careful observation of those limitations the law of Varna was deduced. It establishes certain spheres of action for certain people with certain tendencies.... This great law has been degraded and fallen into disrepute. But my conviction is that an ideal social order will only be evolved when the implications of this law are fully understood and given effect to." (The Modern Review, October 1935)
In effect, his Harijan campaign was an effort to keep these sections within the fold of Hinduism, and it is not surprising that the fervent Hindu, G.D.Birla, not only heavily funded the campaign but even became president of the Anti-Untouchability League. It is also significant that Gandhi consistently refused to take up any of the economic problems of the Harijans, the crux of which was the land question.
Gandhi by his fast-unto-death in 1933 succeeded in obtaining an agreement, whereby the number of reserved seats for Harijans was doubled, but they were kept within the Hindu electorate. The real question remains: why had he decided to focus on this question at a time when a civil disobedience and government repression were commanding the attention of all other Indians?
"The episode", says R.P.Dutt, "served to divert attention from the national struggles, of which he was still supposed to be the responsible leader."
R.P.Dutt's neat summing-up (in his work India Today) of the final collapse of Civil Disobedience is worth quoting at length:
"In May 1933, Gandhi began a new fast, directed, not against the Government, but to change the heart of his countrymen. He described it as a `heartprayer for purification of myself and my associates for greater vigilance and watchfulness in connection with the Harijan cause'."The delighted Government released him unconditionally. Immediately the Acting-President announced, on the recommendation of Gandhi, the suspension of civil disobedience for six weeks; not on the basis of any terms reached with the Government, or even hopes of terms, but on the ground that, as Gandhi said, the country would be in `a state of terrible suspense' during his fast, and it would be better, therefore, to hold up the campaign for it (even if the Government did not hold up its repression).
"In July 1933, after a request by Gandhi for an interview with the Viceroy had been refused unless civil disobedience were first finally ended, the Congress leadership decided to end mass civil disobedience and replace it by individual civil disobedience. At the same time, the Acting-President issued orders dissolving all Congress organisations.
"The Government gave no response save to increase its repression against the individual civil resisters.
"In August, Gandhi was arrested anew, but was released before the end of the month, following a fast. During the autumn, having decided to abstain from political activity for a period on conscientious grounds, he devoted himself to a Harijan tour. Meanwhile the struggle dragged on - neither ended, nor led."
Palme Dutt continues:
"It was not until May 1934 that the final end came to the struggle which had opened with such magnificent power in 1930. In April, Gandhi had issued a statement explaining his view of the reasons for the failure of the movement. The fault lay with the masses."`I feel that the masses have not yet received the message of Satyagraha owing to its adulteration in the process of transmission. It has become clear to me that spiritual instruments suffer in their potency when their use is taught through nonspiritual media.... The indifferent civil resistance of many... has not touched the hearts of the rulers'. Even the transition from mass civil disobedience to individual civil disobedience had not solved this problem of the uncontrollable character of any mass movement.
"In May 1934, the All-India Congress Committee was allowed to meet at Patna to end civil disobedience unconditionally (with the solitary exception recommended by Gandhi). There were no terms, and no concessions from the Government. At the same time, decisions were taken, for which the preliminary steps had already been prepared, to enter the new stage of contesting the coming elections directly on behalf of the Congress.
"In June 1934, the Government lifted the ban on the Congress, but not yet on many of its subsidiary organisations, youth organisations, peasants' unions, and the Red Shirts of the North-West Frontier Province. In July 1934, the Government proclaimed the Communist Party of India illegal. The new stage was opening."
Thus the Congress leadership, over the preceding five years, through the most remarkable combination of deceit, high-rhetoric, diversion, suppression, and deliberate over-exhaustion, had managed to turn the tables on the people.
In 1929, it was the militant masses that had forced an utterly reluctant leadership to take up the slogan of complete independence; but by 1934 the leader of the Congress was able to criticise, with unabashed condescension, the "indifferent civil resistance" of the masses! We have only to remember the enormous sacrifices undergone by all walks of ordinary people during this period, to realise the full offensiveness of Gandhi's conclusion.
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