HOWEVER, the period beginning in 1934 saw the re-emergence of the labour movement, linked to the revival of Communist activity. The number of man-days lost more than doubled between 1933 and 1934, and there were big strikes in Sholapur, Nagpur and Bombay. The 1934 banning of the C.P.I. did not cripple its activity - by sharp contrast with that of the Congress in 1932-33 - since it had made preparations for the eventuality. Moreover, with a shift in C.P.I. policy (related to the ascendance of a different trend) many of the Communist cadre were working within the Congress itself, particularly in the Congress Socialist Party - a sub-group of the Indian National Congress.
The Congress Socialist Party (C.S.P.) had been formed by such Congressmen as Achyut Patwardhan, R.M.Lohia, Narendra Dev, Jayaprakash Narayan, Minoo Masani, Yusuf Meherali, and Ashok Mehta. It wound up having the effect not of forcing, the Congress to the Left, but of keeping Leftist Congressmen from leaving the fold. (It is interesting to note that practically all the C.S.P. founders were to become Right-wing supporters of America in the post-1947 period.)
Nevertheless, the very need of the Congress for the C.S.P. itself indicated the Leftward trend of the Congress cadre - especially those, like Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, who were in the kisan movement.
Thus Gandhi, by late 1934, was stating that "there is a growing and vital difference of outlook between many Congressmen and myself", and that for "the majority of Congressmen" non-violence was not "a fundamental creed", but only "a policy". He stated that "if they (socialist groups) gain ascendancy in the Congress, as they well may, I cannot remain in the Congress".
On the one hand, Gandhi got the Congress Working Committee on June 18, 1934, to condemn those that preached "the necessity of class war" and "confiscation of private property".
But a more drastic step was necessary to maintain control. By the end of 1934, Gandhi resigned from his membership of the Congress. In the process, he actually strengthened his hold over the organisation. More and more he followed the policy he began at Karachi: getting others, especially the "Leftist" Jawaharlal, to say and do things on his behalf. We shall trace below exactly how Jawaharlal was shaped and promoted, by which classes, and for what purpose.
First, the background. In 1934, with the collapse of the Civil Disobedience movement, the meaningless debate of the early 1920s was revived: between those, like Rajaji, who wished to participate in the 1934 elections to the Central Legislative Assembly, and those, like Gandhi, who wished to concentrate on "constructive" work (an obsession Gandhi had even managed to keep up during the Civil Disobedience itself).
There was actually no difference of opinion between the two groups. The difference of opinion lay between these two schools on the one hand, and, on the other, the militant cadres who wanted a boycott of the Councils and a renewal of mass struggles. Gandhi wanted to pretend to oppose Council-entry so as to divert the militants into his camp. Having taken such a stand, he could magnanimously afford to compromise and allow the Council-entryists to contest.
In fact, he baldly stated this in an April 1934 letter to G.D.Birla: "there will always be a party within the Congress wedded to the idea of Council-entry. The reins of the Congress should be in the hands of that group" (emphasis added). Thereafter, at the AICC session of May 1934, he "arrived" at a compromise with the Council-entry group, whereby they could contest. This time, they contested not under a separate name, but in the name of the Congress.
With the increasing election orientation of the Congress, even more direct links with the big bourgeoisie were necessary in order to obtain funds. Birla wrote to Purshottamdas Thakurdas on April 12, 1934, that if the Council-entry group
"is to be successful, they will have to collect some fund for fighting the new election and I would suggest that fund should not be supplied from Bombay without being satisfied that the right type of men are being sent".
And again, on August 3, 1934:
"Vallabhbhai, Rajaji, and Rajendra Babu are all fighting Communism and Socialism. It is, therefore, necessary that some of us who represent the healthy capitalism should help Gandhiji as far as possible and work with a common object."
It is interesting to note how Birla defined it: not as fighting both the British as well as Communism and Socialism, but only the latter. This was, naturally, how the Indian big bourgeoisie was politically lining up.
In the November 1934 election, the Congress did well, capturing 45 of the 75 elected seats for Indians. But within a year the Government of India Act, 1935, revived the election debate. The 1935 Act was the long-delayed end-product of the Simon Commission and subsequent deliberations, practically all of which excluded Indians.
The Act was eventually passed after heated discussion within the British Parliament alone.
By the Act, an all-India federation, based on the union of British Indian provinces and princely states, was to be established. The representatives of the princely states were to be appointed directly by the princes. Voting rights were limited to 30 million adults - i.e., about one-sixth of the population. While the provinces under a new scheme of provincial autonomy, were to be controlled by elected ministers who would control all the departments, the ministers themselves could be overruled by the Governor of the province, who retained sweeping discretionary powers - including the power to take over and indefinitely run the administration of a province. The Governor was appointed by the Viceroy. Foreign affairs and defense, of course, remained with the Viceroy; so did the Central Reserve Bank, railways, debt services, ICS salaries, and ultimate financial control.
Thus the 1935 Act effectively gave no powers to the elected Ministers to change the existing set-up. It also did not fulfill Irwin's promise, made six years earlier, that India would receive dominion status.
Its sole purpose was stated in a private letter by Linlithgow, Chairman of the Joint Parliamentary Committee and Viceroy from 1936. The Act wad framed, he said:
"...because we thought that way was the best way... of maintaining British influence in India. It is no part of our policy, I take it, to... gratuitously hurry the handing over of controls to Indian hands at any pace faster than that which we regard as best calculated, on a long view, to hold India to the Empire."
The above statement brings out the remarkable foresight of the British rulers. Already, in 1935, they were conceiving of a situation in which they could hand over the reins of government bit by bit to the Congress while keeping the actual structure of British rule intact! They viewed the 1935 Act and its provincial governments as a way of training Congress on how to run the Raj.
Of course, the entire Congress in one voice condemned the Act as a sham. The Congress demanded, instead, the convening of a Constituent Assembly, elected on universal adult franchise, in order to frame a Constitution for an independent India. Such an event was, in fact, never to happen in Indian history.
Jawaharlal, of course, took the lead in condemning the Act. From 1933 onwards, he appeared to have become even more fervent than the Communists in preaching socialism, the expropriation of private property, class struggle, and the need to recognise the class character of the State. Bipan Chandra, one of the foremost historians of the Congress, goes so far as to describe Nehru during 1933-36 as being "on the verge of becoming a marxist revolutionary anti-imperialist"! Let us see how much material truth there is in this statement.
It is true that Jawaharlal had become verbally even bolder than in 1927-29. In 1933, he said that "capitalism means the developed system of production for profit (which) is based on private ownership of the means of production". Socialism, which was not to be defined "in a vague, humanitarian way, but in the scientific, economic sense" involved, he said, "vast and revolutionary changes in our political and social structure, the ending of vested interests in land and industry". He even committed himself verbally to the latter goal: "There is no middle road between Fascism and Communism. One has to choose between the two, and I choose the Communist ideal."
At Lucknow, in April 1936, he proclaimed that "the only key to the solution of the world's problems, and of India, lies in socialism. I see no way of ending the poverty, the vast unemployment, the degradation, and the subjection of the Indian people, except through Socialism."
But Jawaharlal was not reckless. It was no accident that he said he chose "the Communist ideal", rather than the Communist Party. He never associated himself with the Indian Communists, and even refused to be a member of the Congress Socialist Party.
Espousing Communism without espousing a system of organisation to bring it about suited Nehru admirably. He would not alienate the real sources of power in the Congress and in Indian society. While stating that "coercion or pressure is necessary to bring about social change", and that "class struggles have always existed and exist today... some classes dominate the social order, and exploit other classes... (the remedy lies) in the ending of that exploitation", Nehru still upheld the principle of non-violence. He claimed it was not "a negative and passive method" but "an active, dynamic and forceful method".
On one point, however, Jawaharlal seemed categorical. There was no scope for a compromise with the British: "...between British imperialism and Indian freedom there is no meeting ground and there can be no peace". The context of such remarks was the possibility of the Congress contesting the 1937 elections under the 1935 Act and accepting office under it. Gandhi, Patel, and the entire business community were pushing hard for office-acceptance.
In his presidential address at the 1936 Lucknow Congress (it is significant that, once again, Gandhi placed Jawaharlal in the chair for this crucial session), he attacked the strategy of office acceptance. "Behind it lies", he said, "somewhat hidden, the question of independence itself and whether we seek revolutionary changes in India or are working for petty reforms under the aegis of British Imperialism" (emphasis added). The Congress could not afford even to "hesitate or waver about it".
Office acceptance would amount to giving up "the very basis and background of our existence". Such a step would be fatal to the effort "to cultivate a revolutionary mentality among our people."
Office acceptance, Nehru pointed out,
"would inevitably mean our co-operation in some measure with the repressive apparatus of imperialism and we would become partners in this repression and the exploitation of our people" (emphasis added).
Nehru had already stated more than two years earlier that "if an indigenous government took the place of the foreign government and kept all the vested interests intact, this would not even be the shadow of freedom"; but the Lucknow address put the matter even more exactly - viz., "partners in this repression and exploitation of our people".
The Lucknow speech led to a reaction, a counter-reaction, and a solution - all of which are, perhaps, the best available illustration of the political alignments of Indian big business, the interests that controlled the Congress, and the manner in which modern Indian politics evolved.
Among Indian big business, by the 1920s, two major groupings had emerged, neither fundamentally antagonistic to the other but pursuing different policies. The first, led by the Tatas and containing such major forces as the Bombay Millowners' Association, was openly loyal to the British. The second, headed by Birla and containing the various Indian Chambers of Commerce (formed later into the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) gave support to the Right wing of the Congress leadership - at times decisively pressing it toward a deal.
Though neither of the two schools was prepared for an anti-imperialist struggle, they pursued different strategies in heading it off. Of the two strategies, that of the Birla group was certainly more sophisticated, and eventually persuaded most of the proponents of the group headed by Tata. Sir Purshottamdas Thakurdas, probably the biggest cotton trader in India, was in a sense a bridge between the two schools - a director of many Tata firms as well as of many foreign-owned ones (such as Killick Nixon), he was also Birla's closest confidante.
A few days after the Lucknow Congress A.D.Shroff of Tatas fired off a refutation of Nehru's speech. Three weeks later, on May 18, 1936, 21 leading Bombay businessmen issued what came to be known as the "Bombay Manifesto" - against Nehru. Among the signatories were Sir N.Saklatvala, Sir Purshottamdas Thakurdas, Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, Sir Pheroze Sethna, Sir Cowasji Jehangir, Walchand Hirachand, Dharamsey Khatau and A.D.Shroff. It began with a quotation from the Lucknow address which advocated socialism for India, and which gave Russia as an example of the sort of civilisation India should work for. The signatories then stated:
"We have no hesitation in declaring that we are unequivocally opposed to ideas of this kind being propagated, as in the present condition of widespread economic misery in the country, they are likely to find a ready though unthinking reception. We are convinced that there is a grave risk of the masses being misled by such doctrines into believing that all that is required for the improvement of their well-being is a total destruction of the present social and economic structure. The inculcation of such ideas into the minds of unthinking millions of this country would lead to a situation in which not only the institution of private property but the peaceful observation of religion, and even personal safety, would be jeopardised."
The capitalists also made clear their political objectives: not complete independence, but "self-government":
" ... such an ideal, apart from creating disorder in course of time, cannot but result in causing further division in the country and impeding the achievement of the common purpose of all patriotic Indians, namely, self-government for India."
The manifesto is a clear statement of the views of the Indian big bourgeoisie. Had they been a national bourgeoisie, oppressed by imperialism and capable of developing a basic contradiction with it, they would have been willing to undergo "disorder" in order to throw it off; and their contradictions with the compradors would be such that they would desire the sharpening of certain "divisions within the country". But the Indian big bourgeoisie, as subsequent history has shown, had no such character. Revealingly, A.D.Shroff condemned the type of pronouncements Nehru made at Lucknow because they might result "in checking industrial enterprise and encouraging flight of capital from India" (emphasis added).
However, the manifesto appeared to have an effect opposite to the one desired: It threatened to expose the character of the Indian capitalists and the Congress leadership by aligning them openly against the people's aspirations. Moreover, it seemed to take Jawaharlal's words at face value.
G.D.Birla, who was much closer to the Mahatma, and who at any rate was a far more sophisticated politician, was not prone to such errors. According to Birla's autobiography, for the previous two years he had been working hard behind the scenes, both in India and England, to bring about amity between the British officials and the Congress leadership.
The correspondence between Birla and Thakurdas in this period reveals that Gandhi had promised Birla that he would prevent Nehru from committing the Congress to rejection of office at Lucknow. Thakurdas asked Birla on April 18, "whether you think the Mahatma's and your expectations have been fulfilled", and Birla replied that he was "perfectly satisfied with what has taken place". "Mahatmaji", he said, "has kept his promise, and without his uttering a word, he saw that no new commitments were made".
While Jawaharlal had lectured against office-acceptance at Lucknow, said Birla, he had not attempted to commit the Congress to this position. Just as importantly, Jawaharlal had "confessed in his speech... that there was no chance of any direct action in the near future."
Moreover, the Congress organisation itself was firmly controlled by the Right wing. Out of the 14 members of the new Working Committee, 10 were Right-wingers - what Birla called "an overwhelming majority of Mahatmaji's Group". The inclusion of Rajaji in the new Committee was also a good sign. The candidates for the election, and the conduct of the legislatures thereafter, were also no cause for concern: "the election which will take place will be controlled by Vallabhbhai Group".
It is revealing what Birla meant by "moving in the right direction": "if Lord Linlithgow handles the situation properly, there is every likelihood of the Congressmen coming into office".
The Bombay Manifesto of 1936, and the controversy it threatened to raise, threw a spanner into Birla's works. He wrote angrily to Walchand Hirachand on May 26, 1936, that the manifesto had been "instrumental in creating further opposition to Capitalism.... You have done no service to your castemen.... Your manifesto has done positive harm to the capitalist system".
He also wrote to Thakurdas, another signatory he could rally round: Birla had been "painfully surprised to see your name in the crowd". The manifesto was
"liable to be seriously misinterpreted.... evidently you did not consider its contents carefully, a thing which is against your habit. The manifesto has given impetus to the forces working against Capitalism - another result which you did not intend."
The most cynical part of the correspondence, the part that reveals Birla as a truly modern politician, was his explanation of how Socialism can best he fought. He, told Walchand Hirachand: "We are all against Socialism... (but) it looks very crude for a man with property to say that he is opposed to expropriation in the wider interests of the country." True, expropriation was against the wider interests, "but the question is, Are you or myself a fit person to talk?.... Let those who have given up property say what you want to say". (emphasis added; Bipan Chandra, "Jawaharlal Nehru and the Capitalist Class, 1939", Economic and Political Weekly, 1975)
Surely no better explanation has ever been offered for the phenomenon of Gandhian 'asceticism'!
Birla's solution was simple. First, "strengthen" the hands of the Congress Right-wing - "We businessmen are so short-sighted... even people like Vallabhbhai and Bhulabhai, who are fighting against Socialism, are not being helped." (Walchand Hirachand promptly gave Rs. one lakh toward the costs of the Faizpur session of the Congress, presided over by Jawaharlal.)
Secondly, to tolerate and even promote Jawaharlal's radical postures while ensuring that they had no material effect.
Birla noted, for instance, that at Lucknow the "Mahatma's men" had delivered the goods. "Rajendra Babu spoke very strongly and some people attacked Jawaharlal's ideology openly.... Jawaharlal's speech in a way was thrown into the waste-paper basket because all the resolutions that were passed were against the spirit of his speech."
More importantly, even Jawaharlal was not a real enemy. He had easily buckled to the Right-wing at Lucknow, and there was ample scope to mould him further. Answering Thakurdas's question of April 18 - viz., whether Gandhi could keep Nehru in check - Birla praised Jawaharlal for fully realising his position of being in a minority and for not taking advantage of his powers as a President to push through any radical resolutions.
Birla complained that the Bombay Manifesto had not done "full justice to Jawaharlal". Nehru, after all, had not been willing to fight Mahatmaji's men at Lucknow, nor had he attempted to bring about a split by resigning. "Jawaharlalji seems to be like a typical English democrat who takes defeat in a sporting spirit.... He seems to be out for giving expression to his ideology, but he realises that action is impossible and so does not press for it."
This exactly echoes Gandhi's own assessment (quoted earlier) at the time of the Lahore Congress. Gandhi also wrote to Agatha Harrison on April 30, 1936, that Jawaharlal's speech was nothing more than "a confession of his faith".
"You see from the formation of his `cabinet' that he has chosen a majority of those who represent the traditional view, i.e., from 1920.... But though Jawaharlal is extreme in his presentation of his methods, he is sober in action.... My own feeling is that Jawaharlal will accept the decision of the majority of his colleagues."
It was not long before Thakurdas was also won over. He wrote to Birla: "I never had any doubt about the bone fides of J. In fact, I put them very high indeed." However, "a good deal of nursing will have to be done right through to keep J. on the right rails all through."
Soon, not only Thakurdas but a host of capitalist associations in Bombay dissociated themselves from the manifesto and rose to Nehru's defense: the Bombay Bullion Exchange, the Marwari Chamber of Commerce, the Hindustan Native Merchants' Association, the Bombay Cotton Brokers' Association, the Bombay Grain and Seed Brokers' Association, the Sugar Merchants' Association, the Grain Merchants' Association, the Seed Merchants' Association, the Bombay Grain Dealers' Association, the Country-Made Fancy and Grey Cotton Piecegoods Merchants' Association, the Shri Mahajan Sabha, and the Indian Merchants Chamber all held meetings in his defense, presented him purses, and even supported his organising of workers and peasants. The Indian Merchants Chamber went so far as to entreat him "to explain what he meant by Socialism, when it would be achieved, and whether the merchants with their limitations could give their quota in the movement of Socialism."
The significance of support from all these major Congress donors could not have missed Jawaharlal, with the election around the corner. And, indeed, Gandhi played heavily on Jawaharlal's taste for office. He rebuked Jawaharlal's "intolerance" and reminded him that it was only at Gandhi's sufferance that he held the chair:
"you are not in power yet. To put you in office was an attempt to find you in power quicker than you would otherwise have been."
Thus Nehru quickly further toned down his actions at the Congress sessions. At Faizpur, the resolution on agrarian reforms almost obliterated the All-India Kisan Sabha Manifesto on which it had originally been based: demands for abolition of zamindari and for redistribution of uncultivated government land or waste land were chopped; instead of a 50 per cent reduction of rent and a 6 per cent ceiling on interest, the resolution proposed "substantial" reduction in rent and debt burdens.
When Patel attacked N.G.Ranga for trying to get Andhra Congress candidates to sign a pledge supporting minimum demands of kisan sabhas as a precondition for getting Kisan Sabha support, Nehru did not support Ranga. Instead, he claimed the whole affair was a "misunderstandings" and advised Ranga to "drop the controversy", which Ranga eventually did.
If Nehru's action was moving further and further to the Right, his very utility to the Right wing was his Left-wing rhetoric. Nehru's electioneering acquired astounding proportions. In campaigning for the 1937 elections, he traveled 80,000 km in less than five months and addressed nearly 10 million people. By contrast, Gandhi did not address a single election meeting.
The elections were controlled, as Birla had predicted, by the "Vallabhbhai group". With funding coming from men like Birla and Dalmia, and with the majority of finances coming out of the candidates' own pockets, it is hardly surprising that almost all the candidates were propertied men. Numerous Kisan Sabha militants in Bihar, for instance, were denied seats, and as the Bihar Congress leader A.N.Sinha himself stated, most of the Bihar Congress candidates were of the zamindari class.
The Congress did extremely well on the Left rhetoric it had peddled. It had given the masses the impression that it was going to reject office. As even the March 18, 1937, resolution which prepared the way for office acceptance admitted:
"The Congress entered these elections with its objectives of Independence and its total rejection of the new Constitution, and the demand for a Constituent Assembly to frame India's Constitution. The electorate has, in overwhelming measure, set its seal on this policy and programme and the New Act therefore stands condemned and utterly rejected by the people .... "
Nevertheless the resolution ends with a sudden twist:
"And on the pending question of office-acceptance, and in pursuance of the policy summed up in the foregoing paragraphs, the A.I.C.C. authorises and permits the acceptance of offices in provinces where the Congress commands a majority in the legislature, provided the ministerships shall not be accepted unless the leader of the Congress party in the legislature is satisfied and is able to state publicly that the Governor will not use his special powers of interference or set aside the advice of the ministers in regard to constitutional activities."
The alternative amendment, unconditionally rejecting office, was defeated by 135 votes against 78 (the A.I.C.C. was tightly controlled by the right wing in a way which would have been impossible with the general body). Birla wrote a letter to Viceroy Lord Linlithgow's private secretary hailing the decision as "a great triumph for the Right wing of the Congress" - indicating how closely Indian capitalists, the Raj, and the Congress leadership were collaborating now.
Linlithgow refused to give any public assurance that the Governors would not invoke their special powers - the single, paltry condition set by the A.I.C.C. resolution. Yet the Congress was already set on its course. Gandhi had made up his mind that office must be accepted, and his private secretary wrote to Birla on July 16 that it must be said "to the credit of Jawaharlal that it did not prove difficult to persuade him". Congress ministries rapidly assumed office in U.P., Bihar, Orissa, Central Provinces, Bombay, and Madras; and a few months later, with the help of some "defections", in Assam as well. Birla, upon hearing of Congress acceptance of office, declared he was "simply overwhelmed with joy".
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